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ABSTRACT 
Title: Essays on Pension Funding and Long-Term Investing 
by Mirko Cardinale 
The thesis focuses on risk management for pension investors. It analyses these issues 
both the point of view of individuals saving for retirement and of company pension 
schemes which are required to fulfil pension promises to their employees. 
The first chapter considers pension investments in the context of a privatised and a 
partially-privatised social security system, drawing implications for individual asset 
allocation and the choice from a pure investment return perspective between a fully 
funded and a traditional pay-as-you-go system. The empirical analysis is carried out 
using Chile as a case study as it was the first country to introduce private individual 
accounts as the primary vehicle for providing pensions. 
The second chapter looks at the asset allocation problem of a defined benefit pension 
fund. By showing that there appears to be a long-run equilibrium between wages and a 
wide range of asset prices, at least in the case of the UK, the chapter argues that, in the 
absence of a perfect hedge for salary growth, a diversified portfolio with a positive 
equity component is preferable to a 100% fixed income investment. 
The third chapter uses a structural model framework to investigate how defined benefit 
pension liabilities affect the bond market perception of company risk, measured by 
credit spreads. The empirical implementation is carried out using bond market data, 
pension and corporate accounts of Fortune 1000 companies in the US and of the largest 
listed companies in the UK and Japan. The paper shows that credit spreads do take into 
account pension liabilities. 
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Introduction 
The publication of Averting the old Age Crisis by the World Bank in 1994 
sparked a wide-ranging debate among academics and policy-makers on pension systems 
and pension reforms. The book argued that systems designed to provide fmancial 
security for the old, one of the most remarkable innovations of the 20th century, were 
increasingly under pressure because a combination of adverse factors was threatening 
their long-term sustainability. These included a rapid demographic transition in most 
developed countries, the difficulty to reform flawed government-sponsored programmes 
and the uneven coverage, underfunding and complexity of private occupational 
schemes. 
Since then pension policy has been at the forefront of the political agenda in 
most countries, both in the developed and developing world. However, given the 
complexity of pension policy choices, most reform attempts have struggled to balance 
out the need to ensure fmancial sustainability of the system with the ultimate objective 
of providing an effective old-age insurance mechanism. The latter has traditionally been 
satisfied with defined benefit promises, either by the State or the private sector, that 
have often made pension systems vulnerable to shocks undermining their long-term 
fmancial equilibrium. 
The main areas of debate can be broadly summarised in terms of four 
fundamental public policy choices: 
1. Pay-As-You-Go versus Funded 
2. Defmed Contribution versus Defmed Benefit 
3. Private versus Public 
4. Centralised versus de-centralised 
The first one has to do with the fmancing of the system: Pay-As-You-Go systems 
transfer money from workers' contributions to pensioners while funded systems use the 
proceeds of accumulated assets invested in the capital markets. In equilibrium both 
systems are sustainable but rates of return are different: in the former they are linked to 
growth of the contribution base, whilst in the latter they vary in function of asset 
returns. As a result of that, Pay-As-You-Go systems are more vulnerable to adverse 
demographic shocks reducing the size of the workforce and increasing the number of 
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beneficiaries. The problem is often exacerbated by the absence in most countries of 
automatic mechanisms to restore the fmancial equilibrium of the system and this has 
often led to prolonged imbalances. Some countries have begun to address this by 
introducing some elements of funding by either establishing a reserve fund or by 
shifting part of the pension burden to funded private schemes. However, this is by no 
means an easy solution because assets need to be accumulated in the first place or 
transferred from somewhere else in the economy. 
The second one defines the risk-sharing properties of the system. Changes in 
demographics, real interest rates and, if the system is funded, asset returns are all 
sources of risk for pension systems. In a defined benefit environment risks are borne by 
the sponsor (private or public), whereas in defined contribution systems risk 
management is left to the individual worker. The problem with defined benefit 
promises, even when they are partially funded, is that movements in underlying risk 
factors affecting assets and liabilities are hard to predict and may ultimately threaten the 
overall fmancial stability of the system. Conversely, under a defmed contribution 
system volatility of asset returns can lead to large disparities in retirement benefits 
across cohorts and there may be insufficient supply of hedging instruments for the 
development of an efficient annuities market to convert accumulated assets into 
pensions. 
The third one is part of a broader debate over the role of the public sector in the 
economy. In most countries public pension provision operates through a Pay-As-You-
Go defined benefit system, but this model has been under pressure to reform itself in the 
last decade. Some countries have maintained the role of the public sector while 
introducing Pay-As-You-Go notional defmed contribution systems in order to 
strengthen the link between contributions and benefits. Conversely, private provision is 
harder to categorise in a single group as it includes both company-sponsored and 
individual arrangements, which can be defmed benefit or defined contribution as well as 
either funded or unfunded (an example of the latter are traditional book reserves of 
German companies). 
The fourth one is the choice between a centrally-managed system and a system 
where individuals or companies are given freedom to choose their pension 
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arrangements. Pay-As-You-Go systems are in most cases centralised but centrally-
managed systems can also be fully funded with investment management delegated to 
private entities. Whilst centrally-managed systems may lead to administration costs 
savings, the downside is lack of flexibility and more scope for political interference. 
Over the last decade ageing populations and low fertility rates in most developed 
countries have increased the pressure on traditional Pay-As-You-Go systems and led to 
sustained efforts to widen the role of private funded schemes. Meanwhile, the 
demographic transition, together with a prolonged equity market downturn after 2000, 
has also started to put pressure on private defined benefit schemes and accelerated a 
trend towards defined contribution arrangements. 
If pension assets are invested in the capital markets asset allocation becomes a 
fundamental pension policy choice but the problem is very different in a defmed 
contribution with respect to a defmed benefit setting. In the former it is about 
individuals investing to secure their own retirement income, while in the latter it is 
about pension funds choosing an asset mix that is consistent with their duty to fulfil 
commitments towards beneficiaries. Furthermore, portfolio choices of pension plans or 
pension investors are by no means the only interaction between pension policy and 
capital markets. If defmed benefit promises made by the private sector are akin to 
corporate debt these are also likely to affect companies' risk exposure and their cost of 
capital. 
This thesis will look at the problem of asset allocation within the context of both 
defmed benefit and defmed contribution systems as well as the interrelationships 
between private corporate pension policy and bond markets. 
Discussion of the Thesis 
This thesis focuses on asset allocation of private pension funds and, more 
broadly, on the interrelationships between pension funding and financial markets. Since 
Samuelson (1958) seminal paper, a large part of the literature on pension policy has 
concentrated on pay-as-you-go schemes, which transfer funds across generation without 
capital accumulation. This piece of work takes a different approach by considering 
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funded pension vehicles where contributions are not used to pay current pensioners but 
rather invested in asset markets. 
There are clear reasons for this choice. Firstly, private pensions tend to be at least 
partially funded and the private component of pension provision is very large in 
countries like the UK or the US, where corporate plans are an important source of 
retirement income. Secondly, the World Bank over the 1990s has encouraged 
developing countries and transition economies to follow Chile's example and introduce 
systems that rely on fully-funded individual accounts. Thirdly, even countries like Italy 
and Germany with large pay-as-you-go schemes have recently expanded the role of 
private provision and moved towards a multi-pillar system. Finally, asset allocation is 
still an interesting problem even in the presence of a pay-as-you-go system because, 
following Samuelson (1958) and Settergren and Mikula (2005), pay-as-you-go schemes 
can be treated as a fmancial investment with an implicit rate of return. 
However, although asset allocation is an important problem in all of the contexts 
discussed above, there is an important distinction to be made. If the system is defined 
contribution, like Chilean fully-funded individual accounts, the choice over asset 
allocation is in usually left to the individual worker, who ultimately bears the risk of 
not retiring on an adequate pension if assets underperform ex-ante expectations. 
Conversely, many company plans in the US and the UK have traditionally been defined 
benefit, which means that any risk deriving from underperforming investments is 
underwritten by the sponsoring company, which promises a pension payment 
independent of asset returns. This thesis consider the asset allocation problem in these 
two alternative contexts. 
The first chapter focuses on individual asset allocation choices in the context of a 
private defined contribution system and uses Chile as a case study because the country 
was the first to establish such a framework with a radical pension reform in 1981. The 
analysis relies on 101 years of Chilean and international fmancial assets returns and 
calculate mean-variance optimal (Markowitz, 1952) portfolio allocations. In particular, 
the chapter examines the case of a fully privatised system with overseas investment 
restrictions and the one of an innovative mixed system where a "social security asset" is 
available to investors and can be combined with financial assets. 
Whilst only the former was in fact implemented in Chile, the latter is an 
important counterfactual case and is useful to compare a fully privatised system with a 
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mixed one that retains a pay-as-you-go component. This comparison can be drawn from 
an individual investment perspective using the framework of Samuelson (1958), 
modified by Settergren and Mikula (2005). An example of empirical work in this 
direction is Baxter (2002), who explored individual portfolio decisions when US social 
security is treated as a financial asset. 
Previous studies have found higher real rates of return to be a key advantage of 
funded pension in emerging economies (see for instance Palacios and Whitehouse, 
1998) although these have not always been fully exploited due to the cost of investment 
restrictions (Srinivas and Yermo, 2000). However, there have been few attempts to 
examine the long-run distribution of local currency returns from domestic and 
international investments from the point of view of a non-US investor and to 
incorporate implicit returns from pay-as-you-go schemes in the analysis. 
One weakness of this approach is that historical pre-reform returns may be a 
biased guide to the future because pension reforms could end up influencing the demand 
for domestic assets and therefore altering equilibrium asset prices and returns. These 
issues have been explored by Diamond and Geanakoplos (2003) in a general 
equilibrium framework and conclusions are far from straightforward. The chapter does 
not attempt to incorporate general equilibrium consideration into the analysis, but 
focuses on a portfolio allocation problem that takes historical asset returns as input 
variables. However, the analysis recognises the possibility of structural breaks in return 
distributions and replicate the analysis after breaking down the sample into meaningful 
sub-periods. 
The first key conclusion of the analysis is that the share of international 
unhedged investments is substantial even in minimum risk portfolios (20%) and, as a 
result, there is a clear efficiency loss arising from overseas investment restrictions. The 
chapter also argues that this conclusion is unlikely to be affected by the shortcomings of 
the mean variance model discussed by Merton (1973) and Campbell and Viceira (2002), 
unless the period 1980-2002 is assumed to be drawn from a different distribution and 
previous history is disregarded. The second key conclusion is that mean-variance 
optimal investors would have generated substantial demand for an asset replicating the 
return profile of an efficient pay-as-you-go pension scheme. However, it is also argued 
that the inclusion of individual labour income in the analysis and departures from log-
normality of returns might affect this result. 
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The second chapter transfers the asset allocation problem from individual choice 
to the context of UK occupational pension schemes with defmed benefit promises. With 
respect to portfolio choice of the Chilean investor this is an entirely different problem: 
individuals are here replaced by pension funds investing on behalf of their members and 
striving to maintain their own financial equilibrium, while honouring promised 
payments to members. Defined benefit plans typically have contractual liabilities to 
their members that vary in function of a number of unhedgeable non-financial factors 
such as wage growth and unexpected mortality shocks. In principle these factors can be 
incorporated in an asset-only optimisation problem by taking into account the 
covariance between asset returns and the growth of liabilities (Sharpe, 2002), but this is 
hardly a straightforward process. 
Much of the previous literature on asset-liability modelling since the highly 
influential Wilkie (1995) actuarial model treats the wage-linked component of pension 
liabilities as essentially bond-like without an in-depth analysis of historical correlation 
between wage growth and the return from different assets available to investors. 
However, these conclusions appear puzzling from an economic theory perspective (e.g. 
Lucas, 1978) as one would expect a positive relationship between the return on capital 
and the growth of wages to hold, at least in the long-run. In fact the presence of a 
common underlying factor driving the behaviour of long-term returns from fmancial 
assets and long-term growth of real wages could lead the long-run optimal portfolio for 
a fund whose liabilities rise in line with members' wages to deviate substantially from 
the standard mean-variance benchmark. 
In this context, unlike in the case of overseas investment restrictions of defmed 
contribution funds, the shortcomings of mean variance portfolio choice may lead to sub-
optimal investment choices for a defmed benefit investor. There is indeed a substantial 
body of literature to support this claim. Merton (1973) seminal paper and, more 
recently, Campbell and Viceira (2002), explored the impact of intertemporal hedging 
effects. This could lead safe investments in the short-run to become riskier over longer 
horizons and risky investments over short periods to become safer in the long-run. For 
instance, a predictable component in excess stock returns (Campbell and Thompson, 
2005) could make long-term investors more willing to hold equities than a one-period 
optimisation would predict. Similarly, long-run relationships between wages and asset 
prices would make long-term pension investors more willing to hold assets hedging 
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long-term salary increases than what would be implied by a conventional mean-variance 
optimisation process. 
The chapter explores the long-term relationship between salaries and asset prices 
and relates it to the asset allocation decisions of defined benefit pension funds. In 
particular, it discusses whether a 100% bond allocation is indeed the minimum risk 
position for an ongoing scheme whose benefits accruing to active members rise in line 
with their wages. The main finding from empirical analysis of UK historical data is that, 
while shorter-run correlation evidence is less consistent, there is indeed a long-run link 
between the evolution of salary-linked liabilities and a range of asset classes including 
equities. From the point of view of defined benefit funds the practical implications of 
these fmdings for minimum risk asset allocation depend on a range of additional factors. 
These include portfolio rebalancing costs, how much short and medium-run asset 
allocations move around the long-term equilibrium as well as how significant active 
liabilities are as a proportion of total pension liabilities. 
Moreover, the analysis suggests that even companies with fully-funded pension 
promises face the risk of ending up with substantial deficits in the future because assets 
and liabilities could move in the wrong direction. This is because pension liabilities 
cannot be fully hedged using fmancial instruments and long-term minimum risk 
portfolios with positive equity weights can still bring substantial short-term volatility. 
Clearly, this has also important implications for companies' market valuations. From 
the shareholder's perspective unmatched liabilities reduce shareholder vale (Bulow et 
al., 1985) and, similarly, bondholders are expected to require a compensation for 
bearing additional risk. The third chapter is an empirical investigation of this point 
from the bondholders' standpoint. 
As mentioned above, the third chapter takes a corporate finance perspective and 
explores how corporate bond markets react to the presence of pension liabilities, either 
unfunded or funded but not fully hedged (essentially all liabilities given the discussion 
in the second chapter). To use the terminology of Bodie et al. (1986), this is a test of 
whether the market sees pension liabilities as akin to other fixed financial liabilities for 
the firm, in contrast with the "traditional perspective", which considers pension funds as 
entirely separate entities from the corporation. 
Clearly, if one accepts that pension promises are of a similar nature to other 
financial liabilities, pension policy plays a role in the overall corporate fmancial strategy 
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and influences the value of bonds issued by individual companies. This can be shown 
using a structural approach pioneered by Merton (1974) seminal paper. Here the price of 
corporate bond securities, for a given maturity and risk-free interest rate, is written as 
function of just two input variables: the leverage ratio, which in turn depends on the size 
of all firmwide liabilities, and the volatility of the firm's operation. 
The chapter takes the point of view of corporate plan sponsors and focuses on the 
bond market's recognition of defined benefit pension liabilities. Since Sharpe (1976) 
and Treynor (1977) the literature on pension funding and corporate fmancial policy has 
emphasised the bond-like nature of pension liabilities and the need to account for these 
liabilities in an extended balance sheet model of the corporation. Yet most of the 
empirical literature on the market recognition of pension liabilities since Feldstein and 
Seligman (1981) has been based on either stock market data (e.g. Yoshida and Horiba, 
2003) or credit ratings (e.g. Carroll and Niehaus, 1998) rather than market spreads of 
traded bonds, which enable a more direct connection between pension liabilities and 
companies' cost of debt capital. 
The chapter tests empirically whether pension information derived by accounting 
disclosures is priced in corporate bond spreads. The empirical implementation builds on 
the literature on structural models of bond spreads initiated by Merton (1974) and is 
tested using US corporate and bond data for the period 2001-2003. A key conclusion is 
that unfunded pension liabilities are incorporated in credit spreads and the sensitivity of 
market spreads to deficits is greater than the sensitivity to ordinary long-term debt. 
However this relationship is rather more complex than a linear monotonic function 
would suggest and there is some evidence that the bond market sees some residual risk 
even in funded obligations and gives lower weighting to off-balance sheet liabilities, 
while it does not seem to account for the asset mix of the pension plan. The same 
econometric model of corporate spreads is also tested with UK and Japanese bond 
spreads, which also appear to respond to pension liabilities, albeit with some important 
differences from the US. 
In conclusion, the thesis breaks new ground on several important fronts, all of 
which are particularly relevant in the context of the ongoing debate on the future of 
pension provision. 
The first one is referred to the implications of the transition from traditional pay-
as-you-go pension systems to individual accounts invested in the fmancial markets. 
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Using 101 years of Chilean data as a back-up, the thesis shows that overseas investment 
restrictions within individual accounts tend to force sub-optimal choices and that a 
"pay-as-you-go pension asset" has historically been a valuable investment for 
individuals to hold from a risk/return standpoint. The implication of these findings is 
that privatisation of social security programmes does not necessarily make individual 
investors better off and that any investment efficiency gains are further eroded if the 
menu of assets available in the new system is not complete and significantly restricts 
diversification opportunities. 
The second one concerns the investment policy of pension assets set aside to 
meet pre-defined liabilities when the growth rate of liabilities cannot be perfectly 
hedged with financial instruments, but it is associated with the behaviour of economic 
variables such as real wages. Using long-term UK data, the thesis suggests the presence 
of a long-run dynamic relationship between fmancial markets and wages, as economic 
theory since Lucas (1978) would predict. These findings carry important implications 
for long-term asset allocation weights and short-term dynamic rebalancing strategies of 
occupational defined benefit pension funds. 
The third one refers to the market recognition of private pension liabilities. We 
provide fresh US, UK and Japanese evidence to suggest that corporate pension 
liabilities, especially when they are unfunded and when they are not hidden by complex 
accounting rules, drive up corporate credit spreads and, as a consequence, companies' 
cost of capital. This suggests that there are important externalities associated with 
letting the private sector bear the cost of old-age security. 
Overall, these fmdings suggest that there are important trade-offs with respect to 
pension policy, whose importance has not always been taken into account by policy-
makers. Firstly, privatising social security and moving to a system of investment 
accounts is not necessarily optimal for individuals, especially if the privatisation is 
accompanied by tight restrictions on how contributions can be invested in the capital 
markets. Secondly, transferring risk of future uncertain economic variables such as 
wages from individuals to funded pension pools is not a risk-free process. Whilst an 
appropriate investment policy can reduce risk arising from the uncertain path of 
aggregate wages over long-horizons, no single financial instrument is a perfect hedge. 
Thirdly, shifting to the private sector the burden of guaranteeing income security to the 
elderly might help public finances whilst worsening the risk profile of companies, and 
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this could lead to higher borrowing costs and sub-optimal corporate investment 
decisions. 
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Optimal portfolio allocations and funded 
pension systems: the case of Chile 
Summary 
The chapter uses 101 years of Chilean and international fmancial 
assets returns to investigate mean-variance optimal portfolio 
allocations. The key conclusion is that the share of international 
unhedged investments is substantial even in minimum risk portfolios 
(20%), unless the period 1980-2002 is assumed to be drawn from a 
different distribution and previous history is disregarded. In addition, 
the chapter finds that mean-variance optimal investors would have 
generated substantial demand for an asset replicating the return profile 
of an efficient pay-as-you-go pension scheme. Labour income and 




In the debate over pension reform, higher real rates of return are often mentioned 
as one of the key advantages of funded pensions. However, in many emerging markets 
returns from domestic instruments have historically been on average low and highly 
volatile in real terms, because of high inflation, economic crises and political instability. 
Nevertheless, pension investments in privatised systems have typically been highly 
concentrated in domestic assets, often because of explicit constraints to international 
exposure. 
The purpose of the chapter is to analyse Chilean historic investment returns in 
the last 101 years and evaluate the asset allocation problem of a Chilean investor from a 
mean-variance standpoint. Chile was a pioneer in introducing a funded pension system 
and is at present the only country with a long enough history of a privatised pension 
system. 
The contribution of the chapter is twofold: one relates to the optimality of 
overseas investment restrictions and the second to the return of a pay-as-you-go vs. a 
funded system. The first one shows that, unless pension reforms signal the beginning of 
a new era of sustained high real returns and lower risk of domestic investments, a 
substantial exposure to foreign instruments, especially fixed income, helps achieve 
investment efficiency from a mean-variance standpoint. In contrast to conventional 
wisdom, the chapter finds that even minimum risk portfolios have a significant exposure 
to foreign currency (in the range of 20%), while optimal portfolios with a 4% expected 
returns would involve a 40% exposure to foreign instruments. The second one is that, in 
the Chilean case, even an investment in an efficient pay-as-you-go scheme would have 
produced high returns because of substantial growth in real salary and the labour force. 
In particular, the chapter shows that, had a "social security" asset been available, 
Chilean investors would have included it in optimal portfolios because of high expected 
return and lower risk than any of the financial assets. 
The chapter relies on a mean-variance optimisation framework which obviously 
fails to fully capture the complexity of long-run asset allocation decisions. The last 
section of the chapter shows that conclusions on the optimality of "social security" are 
mitigated by factors such as the inclusion of labour income risk and departures from the 
4% is equal to the implicit benchmark foreseen by Chilean legislators (as discussed in section 1.2) 
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assumption of log-normal returns, while arguments on international diversification of 
investments are likely to be reinforced by the inclusion of factors not incorporated in a 
simple mean-variance optimisation. 
1.2 The Chilean pension reform 
Chile passed in 1981 a landmark reform of social security provision, which 
moved away from the traditional pay-as-you-go model and introduced a capitalisation-
based system. Following Chile's example, a number of other major Latin American 
countries embarked upon a major overhaul of their pension systems in the 1990s, while 
Brazil has remained the most notable example in the region of a largely unreformed 
pension system2. 
Several arguments were put forward to justify the need of a radically new 
approach to pension policy in the context of the developing economies of Latin 
America. Some of these arguments such as the impact of population ageing and 
substantial pension schemes design flaws, arising from the lack of substantial 
correlation between contributions and benefits (i.e. early retirement programmes), were 
common to the debate on the reform of pay-as-you-go systems in Europe3. However, 
there were also specific factors in Latin America which have created additional 
problems to public pension systems and questioned the viability of parametric reforms 
similar to those adopted in Europe4. 
Of the region-specific factors, one was linked to the structure of the labour 
market and the widespread underreporting of contributory earnings (Arbelaez and 
Milman, 1997), another was the higher political clout of client groups which contributed 
to create large inequality of pension entitlements (i.e. generous civil servants 
provisions), and a third one was the high frequency of economic shocks (i.e. the early 
1980s across the region) and political turmoil (i.e. the mid 1970s in Chile), which 
tended to have an asymmetric impact upon the balance sheet of pay-you-go schemes, 
further exacerbating existing imbalances. 
2 Reforms were undertaken in Peru and Colombia (1993), Argentina (1994), Uruguay (1995), Mexico 
(1995), Bolivia (1997). Barrientos (1998), Cantera and Burbridge (1999), Cardinale and Orszag (2002), 
Devesa and Vidal (2002) and Arbeldez and Milman (1997) review the key characteristics of pension 
systems across Latin America 
3 See for instance Tito Boeri et al. (2001) 
4 Diamond and Valdes Prieto (1994), Godoy and Valdes Prieto (1997) and Barrientos (1998) provide an 
excellent review 
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A full evaluation of the implications of social security reforms in Latin America 
would lie outside the scope of this chapter, which focuses on investment efficiency 
within the context of a privatised pension programme. However, when drawing 
implications out of the analysis, it will be useful to refer back to the issue of pension 
reforms and to discuss whether the new systems have managed to overcome some of the 
problems which led to the perceived failure of traditional pay-as-you-go schemes (i.e. 
vulnerability to economic shocks etc.). 
We now briefly describe the Chilean pension system following the 1981 reform. 
Chile introduced a radical pension reform at a time when the normal political process 
was suspended. The reform was inspired by the ideas of El Ladrillo, a group of 
economists of the Catholic University of Chile, who advocated a free market solution as 
an alternative to the programme of former socialist president Salvador Allende and the 
work carried out by the National Planning Office (Odenplan) during the initial years of 
the military dictatorships. 
In the new system introduced by Law 3500 in 1980 workers pay contributions to 
a pension fund management company or AFP of their choice. Since 1983 all new 
workers6 were compulsorily enrolled in the new system, which requires to contribute 
10% of wage up to the maximum taxable wage. Members can also make voluntary 
contributions, up to a limit, in order to increase benefits or bring forward retirement age. 
There is a minimum pension guarantee provided by the State and workers are 
allowed to retire early if the balance in the individual account would be sufficient to 
fmance a pension greater than 50% of the average taxable wage and higher than 110% 
of the minimum pension8. At retirement, workers can choose between a scheduled 
withdrawal and a life annuity9. 
Individuals whose working life began under the old system were issued 
recognition bonds representing the periods of contributions paid to the pay-as-you-go 
scheme. The value of the bond was calculated as the capital needed to receive at normal 
retirement age a pension equal to 80% of wages received between June 1978 and June 
5 Acufia and Iglesias (2001) review this and other aspects of the Chilean reform in more detail. 
6 With the exception of self-employed and the armed force 
7 In addition to that, workers must also pay to AFPs management charges and insurance premiums for 
disability and survivorship insurance 
8 This is set to increase to 150% under a new draft law 
9 Palacios and Rofman (2001) and Cardinale and Orszag (2002) discuss more in depth the payout stage in 
the context of the Chilean pension system 
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1979, weighted by a coefficient related to the amount of years the worker has 
contributed to the pay-as-you-go scheme. This amount is adjusted automatically for 
inflation, and foresees an implicit real return of 4%. As reported by Rodriguez (1999), 
4% real was effectively seen as the benchmark return of the privatised system, whose 
contribution rate was set using a target replacement rate of 70% of average salary in the 
last 10 years of working life under the assumption of a 4% real return on investments. 
Realised rate of returns achieved by Chilean pension funds in the first 20 years 
of the AFP system have been on average higher than the implicit 4% benchmark and 
this has been one of the key arguments used by the advocates of the benefits of funded 
systems. Figure 1.1 shows aggregate pension funds real returns since 1981, calculated 
by the pension funds supervisory authority SAFP as a simple average of AFPs returns 
weighted by assets under management. The arithmetic average real return between 1981 
and 2001 was 10.7% and the geometric average was 10.4%. However, these numbers 
are disputed by Williamson (1999) on the grounds that they do not take into account 
initial costs, which could lower real returns by three points in real terms. 
1.3 Investment regulations and home bias 
Privatisation of social security and the introduction of a system of individual 
accounts has sometimes been described as a virtually risk-free way to enable workers to 
obtain higher rate of returns than those implicit in a pay-as-you-go system. Palacios and 
Whitehouse (1998) argue that higher rates of return under private schemes are an 
important reason for reform. Enthusiastic supporters of the Chilean model such as 
Rodriguez (1999) cite the 10.62% average real rate of return between 1981 and 1999 of 
Chilean pension funds among the benefits of privatisation. However, most of these 
arguments were based on little in-depth focus on the underlying sources of high 
observed investment returns under a privatised system. 
Mittelstaedt and Olsen (2003) provide more realistic estimates of the investment 
performance of Chilean AFPs, but agrees with Diamond and Valdes Prieto (1994) 
suggesting that Chilean pension funds should be expected to earn real rates in the range 
of 7%. However, it is also possible that increasing demand for domestic assets driven by 
new social security system would lead to a lower equilibrium interest rate and equity 
premium than historical numbers would suggest, as predicted by general equilibrium 
models developed by Diamond and Geanakoplos (2003). 
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Although there was a key emphasis on individual choice in the reforms 
implemented across Latin America, in practice private fund management companies 
have been subject to a high degree of regulation. 
First of all in Chile and, similarly in Argentina, Mexico, Peru and Colombia, 
only institutions with a specific authorisation are currently allowed to manage pension 
assets. Since 2001 a new law in Chile opened up the market to broader competition 
from mutual fund managers and insurance companies, but only for the voluntary 
component of pension contributions1°. 
Secondly, in the Chilean pension system and in most other Latin American 
reformed systems (with the exception of Mexico), pension funds are subject to peer 
group minimum return guarantees which have effectively created little incentive for 
fund managers to hold a substantially different portfolio from their competitors (Acura 
and Iglesias, 2001). 
Third, except for Chile since 2002, individuals are de facto prevented from 
making asset allocation decisions based on age, risk preferences and other personal 
characteristics, because pension fund management companies are only authorised to 
offer one fund to all members. This has partially changed in Chile with the introduction 
in 2002 of the requirement for AFPs to offer multiple funds (at least four and up to five) 
with varying degree of exposure to stock market and foreign currency investments. 
With the introduction of multiple funds (SAFP, 2002), minimum risk was 
implicitly defined by the Chilean regulator as high exposure to Chilean government 
bonds or bills and term deposits with domestic banks. Individuals are free to choose one 
of the four or five funds offered by the AFP, but Fund A, in which high exposure to 
domestic equities (up to 60%) and foreign currency (up to 40%) is allowed, cannot be 
chosen above a certain age threshold". Moreover, if contributors do not make a choice, 
the default option is a lifestyle strategy with gradual shift towards a portfolio which the 
regulator considers more conservative (with up to 15% in domestic equities and up to 
15% in foreign currency). 
Fourth, pension funds are subject to explicit quantitative restrictions on 
permitted investments. Table 1.1 summarises quantitative restrictions in Chile with the 
I° This is referred to as Ahorro Previsional Voluntario 
The threshold is at present 56 year for men and 51 for women 
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present regulatory environment and Table 1.2 shows how restrictions changed since the 
introduction of the AFP system. 
At present restrictions are established separately for the five permitted types of 
funds. On top of this, there is a further requirement that the overall international 
investments' exposure be not higher than 20% of the sum of the four or five portfolios. 
Figure 1.2 shows actual asset allocations of Chilean pension funds as of December 
2001, before the implementation of the multiple funds reform. Foreign investments 
accounted for approximately 13% of the total and the majority of the assets were 
invested in domestic bills, bonds and term deposits (only 11% in domestic equities). 
This chapter will focus on quantitative restrictions on overseas investments and 
their impact on investment efficiency. As a starting point, we will review the literature 
on home bias to understand whether foreign investment restrictions can be justified 
from a theoretical standpoint. 
It must be stressed that home bias is not a peculiar characteristic of Latin 
American regulators; it is in fact a widespread phenomenon in developed countries as 
well. As OECD (2002) shows, international investment restrictions in Europe and the 
US are in general not as strict as in Latin America, but there are countries, such as 
Germany and Belgium, still foreseeing direct limits on foreign investments. However, 
as Davis (2002) pointed out, there has recently been a gradual trend towards easing 
quantitative restrictions, including international investment ones, because, apart from 
other factors, they are likely to lead to sub-optimal returns and risk taking. 
Moreover, even in the absence of explicit investment restrictions, such as in the 
case of the US or the UK, empirical evidence summarised by Dimson et al. (2002) 
suggests that institutions and individuals hold a large share of their investments in their 
home market. Although the degree of home bias appears to have diminished over time, 
it remains substantial, as documented, among others, by Lewis (1999). 
Following Campbell et al. (2002), we will distinguish between equity home bias 
and foreign currency home bias, as these are conceptually two separate issues, provided 
that hedging is available at a reasonable cost. 
1.3.1 Equity home bias 
From a financial economics standpoint, a corollary to the theory of portfolio 
choice pioneered by Markowitz (1952) is that investors should hold a globally 
diversified portfolio of risky assets, as it was argued that international diversification 
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helps reduce overall portfolio risk because foreign assets should be in principle less 
correlated than domestic assets, which are all exposed to country-specific shocks 
(Solnik, 1974b). 
This would suggest investors should hold an internationally diversified portfolio 
of stocks. Intuitively, it also appears that potential gains from international 
diversification will be inversely proportional to the size of the domestic stock market as 
a proportion of the worldwide market capitalisation and to the degree of openness of the 
domestic economy. It has in fact been argued that, from a US investor standpoint, the 
efficiency gains arising from international diversification beyond those attainable 
through home market diversification have become statistically and economically 
insignificant (Errunza et al., 1999). This relates to the longstanding debate summarised 
by Lewis (1994) about whether industry or country specific factors are the primary 
sources of risk. However, while the relative importance of country specific shocks and 
the benefits of international diversification are debatable in the case of the US, it is clear 
that a similar argument would hardly apply to Chile, whose domestic stock market 
capitalisations was equal to 0.2% of world market capitalisation as of year end 200012. 
Several explanations have been advanced for the equity home bias puzzle. The 
classical argument is based on barriers to overseas investments, which may not 
necessarily take the form of quantitative restrictions, but may include constraints on 
cross-border holdings and withholding taxes. However, French and Poterba (1991) as 
well as Cooper and Kaplanis, (1994) pointed out that these barriers should have been 
more substantial than generally thought in order to explain the observed degree of home 
bias. 
Another explanation is that domestic investors are more optimistic than foreign 
investors about the expected return of domestic assets. French and Poterba (1990) argue 
that holdings of Japanese investors in US stocks and of US investors in Japanese 
equities could be explained if Japanese investors have a more optimistic assessment of 
the expected return from Japanese stocks. In fact, it must be remembered that, even 
without departing from Markowitz (1952) assumption that investors care only about the 
mean and the variance of investment portfolios, Bossaerts (2002) shows that, for the 
optimal portfolio to be equal to the global portfolio, one would need a set of extra 
12 As of year end 2000 the Chilean stock market capitalisation was US$48bn, which represented 0.2% of 
the world market capitalisation calculated by (Dimson et al.,2002) 
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assumptions (i.e. investors holding common beliefs on asset return distributions, which 
ensures that the risky benchmark will be equal to the market portfolio). 
Another possibility to explain the home bias departs from the classical mean-
variance optimisation framework. One criticism of mean-variance optimisation is that, 
because empirical distribution cannot accurately be described using only means and 
standard deviations, higher moments should be incorporated in optimal portfolio 
selection. Key references in this area are Chunhachinda et al. (1997) and Tokat et al. 
(2003). Others including Chan et al. (1999) and Chopra and Ziemba (1993) argued that 
time-varying variance/covariance structures may impact upon asset allocation decisions. 
Butler and Joaquin (2002) showed that gains from international diversification are likely 
to be overstated because correlations between stock markets tend to rise in bear market 
environments. Nevertheless, whilst these are important arguments, they are unlikely to 
provide a justification for home bias (and hence quantitative restrictions) from a Latin 
American investor's standpoint, because the inclusion of non-normalities is likely to 
make optimal portfolios more rather than less tilted towards international equity markets 
due to the frequent occurrence of country-specific crises13. 
Another substantial body of literature has argued that mean-variance is not an 
appropriate framework for the analysis of long-term portfolio choice. Campbell and 
Viceira (2002) provide an excellent review. The basic intuition is that long-run investors 
do not rank portfolios based on mean and variance but they tailor their asset holdings to 
hedge against changes in state variables that will ultimately matter to them. However, as 
argued by Campbell et al. (2002) even within this framework it is still very hard to 
justify equity home bias. 
One possibility might be the inclusion on non-traded assets in the analytical 
framework, which would imply that domestic investors will hold only equities with 
payouts in domestic non-traded goods (Stockman and Dellas, 1989). The basic 
argument here is that domestic equities provide a better hedge for domestic price 
uncertainty than foreign equities, because purchasing power parity does not hold for 
non-traded domestic goods. 
Negative correlation between labour income and domestic equity returns, as 
documented by Bottazzi et al. (1996), could justify some degree of home bias, but the 
13 Examples here are the early 1980s in Chile, the "tequila crisis" in Mexico during the mid-1990s and the 
recent peso devaluation in Argentina 
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latter evidence was questioned by Baxter and Jermann (1997) who argued that salaries 
tend to be positively correlated with domestic equities. 
Finally, long-run mean reversion of stock prices, an established "new fact in 
finance" according to Cochrane (1999), could potentially explain home bias, but only in 
certain economic environments. If for instance pension reforms promote capital market 
development, which ultimately leads to economic growth, as argued among others by 
Holzmann (1997) and Levine and Zervos (1998), than home bias may be temporarily 
justified because domestic stock returns are expected to be higher than in the past and, 
arguably, higher than abroad. 
The issue of equity home bias from a Latin American investor perspective has 
not been studied extensively so far. Valente (1988) and, more recently, Reisen (1997), 
Srinivas and Yermo (1999), Srinivas and Yermo (2000) using a mean-variance 
optimization framework, argued that Latin American pension funds should invest a 
sizable proportion of their assets in foreign equities. Berstein and Chumacero (2003) 
have also tried to quantify the cost of investment restrictions for Chilean pension 
investors using a range of portfolio selection models. 
In particular, Srinivas and Yermo (2000) construct hypothetical portfolios for 
pension funds combining their existing domestic portfolio with different proportion of 
foreign equity indices (MSCI EAFE and S&P 500) and conclude that, especially after 
the 1990s, pension funds in Chile, Peru, and Argentina would have obtained higher risk-
adjusted returns by investing a larger proportion of their assets abroad. 
1.3.2 Foreign currency home bias 
If purchasing power parity holds and real exchange rates do not move very much 
over time, investors in countries with a history of high inflation should in principle hold 
more stable currencies and, in general, a diversified portfolio of currencies is a safer real 
investment than a portfolio heavily concentrated in a single currency. However, this 
behaviour would have important macroeconomic consequences and this has led 
Fontaine (1997) to justify capital controls in exceptional circumstances14. 
On the other hand, in a world characterized by a variable real exchange rate, 
Solnik (1974a) argued that the optimal investment portfolio is internationally diversified 
14  In particular this was the case of several developing countries over the 1990s have experienced sharp 
and costly real depreciations in the wake of exchange rate crises 
35 
in equities but home-biased in currency, assuming that returns in local currency are 
uncorrelated with exchange rate movements. 
This view can be challenged, however, if equity markets are correlated with 
exchange rate movements over the long-run, as argued for instance by Froot (1993) or, 
as suggested by Campbell et al. (2002), if foreign currency hedges domestic investors 
against real interest rate fluctuations. 
The latter assumes uncovered interest parity holds, at least in the long-run, and 
investors are compensated by shrinking investment opportunities at home with 
depreciation of the domestic currency. Of course home bias might still be justifiable if 
other instruments capable of better hedging real interest rate risk are available to 
investors (long-term inflation-indexed bonds or nominal bonds if there are no wide 
fluctuations in inflation expectations). 
1.4 Research methodology: mean-variance 
optimisation 
The primary purpose of the chapter is to evaluate whether an internationally 
diversified portfolio has historically been mean-variance efficient for Latin American 
investors. The resulting solution will be then compared to a constrained solution in 
which maximum international exposure is restricted by law. 
Through historical analysis of asset returns, the chapter also aims at providing 
evidence to fuel the debate on returns from funded pension systems. Mean-variance 
optimisation will provide ex-ante expected returns from efficient portfolios (with or 
without constraints) and these could be used instead of deterministic numbers (i.e. the 
4% real implicitly assumed by the Chilean reform) as a starting point to discuss the 
benefits of funded pensions versus pay-as-you-go systems. An asset representing an 
implicit investment in a pay-as-you-go system will be introduced at a later stage to 
assess its properties in comparison with the assets which would typically be included in 
the fmancial portfolio of a funded defined contribution account. 
It is widely known that mean-variance is an appropriate framework for a one-
period optimisation problem in which investors care only about the distribution of 
wealth at the end of the first period. Classical results by Merton (1969) and Samuelson 
(1970) show the assumptions under which mean-variance analysis provide an optimal 
solution in a multi-period context. In particular: 
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• Asset returns must be independent and identically distributed (iid). A convenient 
assumption is that returns are lognormally distributed, a hypothesis consistent 
with standard portfolio choice models with power utility functions defined over 
terminal wealth. In these models optimal portfolio allocations depend only on 
mean, variance and correlation of returns, as well as on the coefficient of risk 
aversion15. 
• The investor optimally rebalances his/her portfolio at the end of each period. 
However, in the case of no rebalancing Barberis (2000) shows that horizon 
effects are small if returns are iid. 
• The N available data provide a large enough sample of the true underlying 
distributions of asset returns (there is no small sample bias) and properties of 
asset returns can be observed with certainty by investors. Barberis (2000) 
explores in depth the impact of parameter uncertainty on optimal portfolio 
choice. 
• There is no labour income and portfolio returns are investors' only source of 
wealth. As shown by Davis and Willen (2000) and Campbell and Viceira (2002), 
the inclusion of labour income as a riskless asset would tilt the portfolio towards 
risky assets, while, if labour income is risky and sufficiently correlated with 
risky investments, the contrary would be true. 
Intertemporal hedging effects arising from relaxing one or more of the above 
assumption were first explored by Merton (1973) and then analysed in depth by, among 
others, Campbell and Viceira (2002), Campbell et al. (2002) and Barberis (2000). 
These models treat the traditional mean-variance solution as a benchmark against which 
evaluating the impact of relaxing one or more assumptions. The analysis will constantly 
bear in mind the potential limitations of drawing implications from a mean-variance 
optimisation exercise, but the mean-variance solution remains a fundamental reference 
point, without which future work on long-term asset allocation would become extremely 
problematic. 
15 However, Campbell and Viceira (2002) show that the mean-variance solution is still optimal if returns 
are not iid in the special case of a log utility function, in which both relative risk aversion and elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution are equal to one (or in the case of an Epstein-Zin utility function with unit 
relative risk aversion) 
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Developing a formal model of long-term asset allocation for a Latin American 
investor would lie outside the scope of the present chapter, but the discussion will focus 
on the degree to which intertemporal hedging effects could potentially change the 
conclusions arising from mean-variance optimisation. In particular, it will focus on 
whether the hypothesis of predictability in asset returns would affect the results. 
Moreover, preliminary conclusion on the potential impact of the aggregate component 
of labour income shocks will be drawn after including aggregate real salary growth in 
the analysis. 
In the present work, the longest available time series of historical returns will be 
considered, but results arising assuming a unique distribution over the entire sample will 
be compared against the alternative hypothesis of a structural change following the 
economic reforms at the beginning of the 1980s. 
Moreover, careful attention will be given to the robustness of results to 
alternative estimation of returns (i.e. inclusion or exclusion of reinvested dividends), 
given that several studies such as Merton (1980) and Best and Grauer (1991) argued 
that mean-variance optimal portfolio weights are more sensitive to alternative 
assumption on asset return means with respect to variances and correlations. 
1.5 101 years of Chilean investment returns 
As a starting point for the analysis, long-term investment returns data were 
collected for Chilean and international assets from the point of view of a Chilean 
investor, using a similar methodology to Dimson et al. (2002), who, however, did not 
include any Latin American country in their study of global investment returns16. 
Key emphasis was placed on real returns which are of ultimate concern to 
investors, and this is not a subtle distinction given that Chile has experienced periods of 
very high inflation (and also hyperinflation in the mid 1970s). 
As a proxy for domestic equity investment returns, the chapter used a broad 
stock market index calculated by Global Financial Data. For the period 1901-1926 the 
index is an equally weighted composite of the ten main stocks traded in the Santiago 
16 Jorion and Goetzmann (1999) included Chile in their comparison of global stock market returns, but 
only for the period 1927-1996 
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stock exchanger. Since 1927 the index corresponds to the composite index calculated 
by the Santiago stock exchange, and after 1960 it corresponds to the IGPA index, a 
capitalization-weighted price index including the majority of stocks traded in the 
exchange. 
Ideally, the index should be adjusted for dividends but a reliable dividend series 
is not currently available before the early 1980s. As an alternative, the IPSA index, 
which includes the 40 most traded stocks and is adjusted for dividend payments, is 
available since 1975. The chapter will explore some alternatives to deal with the 
problem. 
Real returns were calculated using the consumer price index in Braun et al. 
(2000) as a deflator. From 1995 onwards the official IPC index calculated by INE was 
used. 
As a proxy for Chilean short-term fixed income investments, the chapter used 
two alternative series. One (from now on this is referred to as PUC series) is constructed 
using the nominal interest rate in Braun et al. (2000), capitalised assuming monthly 
interest payments and reinvestment of principal until 1982 and adjusted using the 
consumer price index described above. From 1982 onwards inflation-adjusted short-
term debt instruments were available to Chilean investors and average rates for 90 to 
365 days securities were employed. The second series (from now on Global Financial 
Data series) is equal to the first one until 1924 and after 1982, but uses the Global 
Financial Data interest rates series in between, which employs the official discount rate 
until 1976 and interest rates on certificates of deposits with commercial banks 
thereafter. This is because Braun et al. (2000) use interest rates on short-term loans, 
which slightly overstate returns because they may incorporate a loan spread. 
Ideally, one would want to include domestic long-term debt as well, but, because 
a liquid market for maturities longer than a year did not exist before the 1990s18, the 
chapter does not include domestic bonds in the analysis. 
As a proxy for international equity investments, the S&P 500 and the FTSE All 
Share were used, as they represent the two largest stock markets at the beginning of the 
17 These are two banks (Banco de Chile, Banco Hipotecario de Chile), two insurance companies 
(Compariia de Seguros America and Compailia de Seguros Nacional), one mining company (Compailia 
Minera Orura), two nitrate companies (Compailia Salitera Agua Santa and Compariia Salitera 
Antofagasta), one sugar company (Compailia Azucarera de Villa del Mar), and two utilities (Compariia de 
Gas de Santiago and Compariia de Gas de Valparaiso) 
18 In fact Chilean bond indices are only available since 1995 
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XX century. These were converted in Chilean pesos using end-year exchange rates in 
Global Financial Data, which were then compared against those in Braun et al. (2000) to 
ensure consistency. Bearing in mind the examples in Dimson et al. (2002) on the impact 
of reinvested dividends when returns are calculated over the very long-run, the chapter 
compared Chilean with international price indices first (this would be equal to assuming 
that our hypothetical Chilean investor at the beginning of the 20th century was always 
spending rather than reinvesting dividends) and then the likely impact of dividends was 
evaluated with international total returns indices. 
US and UK bill and bond series were also used as a proxy for international fixed 
income and money market investments. The US bond series corresponds to the 10-year 
government bond total return index in Global Financial Data, while the UK series 
corresponds to the consol total return index until 1931 and the 10-year government bond 
thereafter, also from Global Financial Data. 
Tables 1.3-1.7 display the main results. Jorion and Goetzmann (1999) exclude 
data between 1971 and 1974 because of the nationalisation policies implemented by the 
Allende government. In principle we did not want to exclude any relevant observation 
from the sample to avoid survivorship bias. However, it was chosen to opt for a middle 
of the road solution by excluding 1973, the year of Pinochet's coup d'etat, because data 
were simply unreliable in a context of hyperinflation and political chaos. In 1973 the 
stock market index in Global Financial Data recorded a 255.62% rise in real terms, but 
these numbers are disputed by studies such as Cortazar and Marshall (1980) or Larrain 
and Paiva (2000), who argued that the official price index was manipulated by the 
government statistical body INE to reduce salary adjustments, especially between 
September and December 1973. 1975 was also excluded from the sample because of the 
large devaluation accompanying the unification of the system of multiple exchange 
rates reported by Corbo (1998). We opted for excluding 1975 because leaving the 
observation in would have had an enormous impact on summary statistics and because a 
more careful investigation would be needed to assess the true impact of the unification 
of the exchange rate for Chilean investors. 
As shown in Table 1.3 and Table 1.4 nominal returns from domestic investments 
were magnified by high inflation and returns from international investments were 
magnified by the accompanying exchange rate depreciation. 
Inflation (even leaving out the hyperinflationary 1973 and 1975) was on average 
24% (19.25% using a geometric average), while the nominal exchange rate of the 
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Chilean peso depreciated on (arithmetic) average by almost 30% per year against the 
dollar and by almost 22% against the pound sterling. However, it would be misleading 
to look at these overall averages without breaking down the sample into sub-periods. 
Table 1.6 shows returns from domestic assets and inflation across sub-periods defined 
bearing in mind the discussion in Braun et al. (2000), who referred to conventions used 
by Chilean economic historians. Exchange rate changes and inflation differentials with 
the US are also displayed to evaluate the hypothesis of long-run purchasing power 
parity. 
Inflation was on average low until 1929 (slightly over 5%), then on average 
around 20% between the 1930s and the late 1960s, when there was a shift towards State 
interventionism, it became hyperinflation in the 1970s during Allende presidency and 
the first years of the military dictatorship, and finally it went down again to an average 
of 14% between 1980 and 2002. 
The exchange rate of the peso broadly followed the trajectory of domestic 
inflation, suggesting that, at least in the long-run, purchasing power parity was satisfied. 
A simple linear regression to explain peso/US$ behaviour with inflation as the only 
predictor yields a R-square of over 60% and a simple Wald test cannot reject the 
hypothesis of a beta coefficient equal to 1. Table 1.6 shows that the inflation differential 
with the US closely followed the path of Chilean inflation. Figure 1.3 displays the real 
exchange rate of the peso against US$ and GBE, visually confirming the hypothesis of 
purchasing power parity, although significant deviations have historically occurred. In 
the 1990s, for instance, a sharp appreciation of the peso was followed by depreciation, 
which, especially after 1998, has brought the peso above its historical equilibrium value 
(depreciated in real terms). 
Returns in real terms from domestic investments were also quite different across 
sub-periods. From Table 1.7, it appears evident that the period 1980-2002 was 
exceptional in the Chilean history (with real returns in the range of 12% even without 
adjusting for dividends), highlighting the danger of extrapolating average returns 
realised over a limited period to draw conclusions on the virtues of privatised pension 
systems. Averaging out a century of Chilean stock market returns the numbers are 
significantly lower (2.86% arithmetic mean without adjusting for dividends). 
Overall real equity returns in Chile have historically been far lower than the 
7.2% world arithmetic average estimated by Dimson et al. (2002) and more in line with 
Jorion and Goetzmann (1999), who estimated a 2.99% average real return for Chile. 
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Real bills were also a good investment after the 1980s because, as reported by 
Corbo (1998), the Central Bank actively used a high interest rates policy to curb 
inflationary pressures19. A century of real interest rate data would suggest a significantly 
lower average for bill returns in real terms (even negative using the Global Financial 
Data bill series between 1925 and 1981). In fact negative real rates have appeared fairly 
frequently in the Chilean history (for instance at the beginning of the 20th century as 
well as during the 1950s and early 1970s). 
Over the entire 1901-2002 sample, returns from US and UK assets have been 
substantially higher than domestic investments (even when expressed in pesos and real 
terms). Even without adjusting for dividends, investments in the US have returned on 
average over 6% and investments in the UK over 4%. Interestingly, if reinvested 
dividends are not considered, international bonds have been almost as competitive as 
stocks (and even more in the case of the UK). International assets have been on average 
more volatile than domestic ones because of the additional impact of deviations from 
purchasing power parity, but the difference is far higher if Chilean bills rather than 
Chilean equities are the term of comparison. 
Breaking down the sample again into sub-periods, it appears clear that extra 
returns from foreign investments were substantial especially before 1969. However, 
leaving aside the confusion of the 1970s, even between 1980 and 2002 US assets have 
not been outpaced by Chilean stocks or bonds. Real returns from investing in the S&P 
500 have been on average 11.37% against 11.64% in the Chilean stock market and with 
a substantially lower standard deviation. Returns from investing in US fixed income 
instruments have also been very competitive because even the in United States there has 
been a transition from a (relatively) high inflationary environment in the 1970s towards 
low inflation in the 1990s. 
As shown in Table 1.8, the correlation between the Chilean and the US stock 
market was higher in real terms between 1930 and 1969 than after the 1980s, when it 
reached negative territory. However, this might lead to erroneously think that the 
Chilean nominal stock returns were negatively correlated with US returns after the 
1980s. In fact the opposite is true as shown in Table 1.9 (over 27% correlation) and this 
is also confirmed by Lefort and Walker (2002) who argue that correlation has increased 
19 This occurred especially after an independent Central Bank model was adopted in 1989 
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substantially only in the 1990s with the issuance of the first ADRs by Chilean 
companies. 
In the overall 1901-2002 sample, positive correlation between the two stock 
markets in real terms arose because of a strong positive correlation between real Chilean 
stock returns and depreciation of the exchange rate, consistently with the fact Chile has 
historically been highly dependent on export of raw materials and competitive terms of 
trade have historically anticipated sustained economic growth (Belaisch and Soto, 
1998). 
Between 1980 and 2002, on the other hand, the reverse was true, as positive real 
returns were associated with an appreciation of the Chilean peso. This is likely to be 
because the exchange rate was largely used as a nominal anchor to reduce inflation 
(Corbo, 1998) and also because Chile has become more integrated with world capital 
markets (Larrain and Laban, 1994). The latter implied that positive foreign capital 
inflows became associated with positive domestic stock returns and currency 
appreciation at the same time, while the reverse happened in circumstances such as the 
1982 debt crisis. 
Finally, whilst Chilean and US bill and bond returns were substantially 
positively correlated between 1900 and 1929, when inflation differentials were on 
average low, the degree of dependency was lower thereafter, mainly because domestic 
returns were more likely to be influenced by the domestic fight against inflation and 
international factors played a limited role. 
1.6 Mean-variance optimal portfolios 
This section will investigate what combination of domestic and foreign assets 
was mean-variance optimal for a Chilean investor rebalancing his/her portfolio every 
year. Portfolio weights are constrained to be equal or greater than zero, to reflect the 
presence of constraints to borrow and short-sell assets. This hypothetical investor could 
be thought of a (long-lived) individual who invested a pool of money at the beginning 
of the XX century and optimally rebalanced the portfolio every year since then. 
Alternatively, the investor could be thought of a pension fund investing money on 
members' behalf, had the AFP system existed long before 198120 . 
20  Implicitly assuming that the existence of a funded pension system would not have affected the realised 
distributions of returns 
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This exercise assumes no parameter uncertainty, which means that the 
hypothetical investor knew ex-ante the distribution of returns which we now observe ex-
post. Each of the n observations of the ex-post distribution has every year probability 
1/N of occurring. In our case there are effectively 99 observations because 1973 and 
1975 are removed from the sample for the reasons discussed in the previous section 
(this mean setting all probabilities to 1/99 while setting the probability of another 1973 
coup d'etat or of another unification of multiple exchange rates to zero). In most 
calculations further three highly influential observations are removed (the entire 
hyperinflationary 1972-1976 period) and the impact of this on the results is discussed. 
Furthermore, the exercise assumes no time variation in investment opportunities 
(returns are not serially correlated and are identically distributed). Later in the chapter 
the hypothesis of identical distribution is relaxed by assuming two distributions: the pre-
1981 world and the post-1981 world. The latter is the implicit assumptions of 
enthusiastic supporters of the AFP system such as Rodriguez (1999), who believes 
returns achieved between 1981 and 1999 are the only useful reference point to assess 
future returns. 
However, the assumption of iid returns deserves a further methodological 
discussion. A vast body of literature from Fama (1976) addressed the issue of whether 
the iid assumption applies to simple or to log (or continuously compounded) returns. As 
argued by Campbell and Viceira (2002), the convenient hypothesis of normally 
distributed simple returns is not appropriate for the study of long-term portfolio choice 
because it cannot hold at more than one time horizon (this is because the product of 
normally distributed random variables is not itself normal). This problem can be 
overcome by using log returns, given that the assumption of lognormal returns can in 
principle hold at any time horizon. This may not be a serious problem in our context 
given that a multi-period problem is broken down in a sequence of equal single period 
problems, but, perhaps more importantly, it is a well documented fact that the 
distribution of annual returns more closely follow a lognormal "fat-tailed" as opposed to 
a Gaussian distribution (Dimson et al., 2002). 
However, the log approximation of simple returns significantly underestimates 
true returns, which are of ultimate concern to investors and the bias increases when 
returns are larger in absolute terms, such as in the case of annual returns. Dorfleitner 
(2003) provides more detail on this. The approach adopted by the chapter to address the 
issue follows Dorfleitner (2003) and transforms the moments of the log return 
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distribution into corresponding moments of the simple return distribution (see 
Appendix). In fact, although a functional relationship between corresponding moments 
does not in general exist, an exact solution can be found when log-returns are normally 
distributed. 
It has also been argued (Miles and Timmermann, 1999) that, as retirement 
accounts grow over time with workers' contributions, the problem faced by individuals 
saving for retirement is different from a standard multi-period investment because a 
shock one year before retirement has a very different impact on wealth than a shock at 
the beginning of the working life. However, in this simplified setting where returns are 
independent and identically distributed, the efficient frontier will not change over time, 
although, depending on individual preferences, actual portfolio allocations may not be 
constant because risk aversion may vary. In particular, with constant relative risk 
aversion, individuals would be likely to pursue a lifestyle investment strategy with a 
gradual shift towards the minimum risk portfolio because towards retirement a shock to 
the investment portfolio has a bigger impact on wealth. 
Finally, the mean-variance optimisation framework assumes that index returns 
can be achieved without costs. The inclusion of fees would drive down the estimated 
average gross portfolio returns, but would have no impact on asset allocation unless fee 
levels are different for different asset classes21. 
As discussed in Section 1.3, the assumptions outlined above ensure that complex 
multi-period portfolio allocation problems can be effectively restated in terms of a 
sequence of equal single period problems. 
The fundamental question within this framework asks what is the proportion of 
international investments in mean-variance optimal portfolios. The baseline solution 
will be compared to a solution obtained assuming that maximum exposure to 
international assets is constrained by law, as in the case of Chile (although restrictions 
used to be far more stringent than they are at present). 
1.6.1 Minimum risk portfolios 
Table 1.10 shows minimum risk portfolio weights, portfolio returns and standard 
deviations as implied by mean-variance optimisation with no international investment 
21 In the case of Chilean pension funds, two layers of fees would drive down portfolio returns: a front-
loaded fee for managing contributions as reported by Mittelstaedt and Olsen (2003) and a variable 
fee/commission paid by AFPs to brokers or external fund managers. The former does not affect asset 
allocation, the latter is clearly difficult to quantify 
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constraints. It is worth noting that the mean-variance efficient frontier is derived using 
the moments of the log returns distribution transformed into approximate simple returns 
moments with the formulas explained in the Appendix. 
Table 1.11 shows the mean-variance optimal bill-equity split when foreign 
investments are not allowed (as it was effectively the case for AFPs before 1991) and 
Table 1.12 constrains the maximum international exposure to 10%. 
Differences between implied portfolios are due to changes in the menu of assets 
(i.e. UK instead of US assets as a proxy for international investments) or in the 
definition of a particular asset (i.e. Global Financial Data instead of PUC series for 
Chilean bills). All calculations are performed in Chilean pesos and in real terms. 
Expected returns from minimum risk portfolios are all lower than optimistic 
assumptions on returns from funded pension systems and also lower than the 4% real 
implicitly assumed by Chilean policymakers and awarded to holders of recognition 
bonds. These numbers in fact range from marginally above 1% to slightly below 4% if 
optimistic assumptions on Chilean stocks' dividend yields are made. Moreover, 
standard deviations are always above 10% meaning that the likelihood of negative 
returns is substantially high. Portfolio returns lower than -5% always lie within a one 
standard deviation confidence interval. Diversification helps significantly reduce 
volatility but it is not a panacea, as one might expect in a world in which not only there 
is no riskless asset but the least volatile asset in real terms (Chilean bills) has a standard 
deviation of over 12% (raising to more than 15% if hyperinflationary years are 
included) on a year by year basis. 
Chilean money market instruments have by far the largest weight in all 
portfolios and this appears justified because, as it is evident from Table 1.3 and Table 
1.4, they were the asset with lowest standard deviation. The difference is even more 
pronounced in real terms, meaning that Chilean money market instruments have 
historically been a better hedge for domestic inflation than domestic equities or the 
exchange rate. This conclusion holds even if the Global Financial Data series described 
in the previous section is used. Although expected returns from bills are marginally 
negative using this series, optimal allocations in the minimum risk portfolio are not very 
different. Interestingly, however, if hyperinflationary years in the 1970s characterised 
by negative real interest rates (-10% in 1971, -68% in 1972) are included in the sample, 
the share of Chilean fixed income instruments in the portfolio goes down by more than 
6% from 68.5% to 62.6% (Table 1.10). 
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Domestic equities (not adjusting for dividends) have the lowest Sharpe ratio 
because average returns are more than 2% lower than US fixed income instruments, 
which also have a lower standard deviation. However, minimum risk portfolios retain a 
proportion ranging from 6.6% to 10.7% in domestic equities because they are a useful 
diversification tool. Correlation with domestic bills is low (although it goes up to 
around 20% if hyperinflationary years are excluded from the sample) and correlation 
with foreign assets is not too high (and it would be even lower had we used the 1980-
2002 correlation matrix). 
The last two rows in Table 1.10 recalculate optimal portfolio shares after 
factoring in the expected impact of dividend adjustment. In the first of the two rows it is 
assumed that the impact of reinvested dividends would add 5% to average returns. This 
would be in line with the impact of dividends in the US (the average return of the S&P 
500 price index in US$ between 1901 and 2002 is 6.7% against 11.5% if the total return 
index is used) and the UK (the average return of the FTSE All Share price index in GB£ 
is 5.8% against 10.6% if the total return index is used). 
However, the Chilean dividend yield from 1982 to 2002 has been on average 
2.6% higher than the world dividend yield calculated by Global Financial Data, which 
represents a weighted average of the major equity markets. Lefort and Walker (2002) 
argue that a structural change resulting in lower dividend yields than in the past 
occurred at the beginning of the 1990s and they explain it with a reduction in the local 
market risk premium. Optimal weights were also recalculated assuming reinvested 
dividends would add 7% to Chilean equity returns. 
Not surprisingly, including reinvested dividends raises the share invested in 
foreign stocks up to 10% but does not change the share invested in domestic equities. 
Only had reinvested dividends added almost 9% to Chilean stock returns, domestic 
equities would have had a higher Sharpe ratio than US equities. 
In an unconstrained minimum risk portfolio the share invested abroad is always 
above 20% and, interestingly, the share invested in international fixed income is always 
above the share invested in international equities (even considering reinvested 
dividends). Using UK assets instead of US assets does not significantly change the 
picture. It is also worth noting that, when hyperinflationary years in the 1970s are 
included in the sample, an increase in US fixed income allocations to above 20% is the 
counterpart to the reduction in Chilean bill exposure. This is because international fixed 
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income has lower standard deviation in real terms (although still very high because of 
exchange rate and inflation fluctuations) and is uncorrelated with domestic bills. 
Mean-variance optimization was also performed assuming US equity exposure 
was hedged in domestic currency to test Solnik (1974a) conclusion on the optimality of 
foreign currency home bias. For a Chilean investor, US equities in real terms and 
hedged back in Chilean pesos would have been an even more attractive asset although 
expected real returns are negative because of Chile's high inflation. This is because they 
would help diversify the portfolio, as returns are almost uncorrelated with the domestic 
stock market and unhedged international fixed income assets. However, the share 
invested in foreign currency would still be substantial (over 20%) even if Chilean 
investors are given access to international equity markets with no currency exposure. 
From the discussion so far, it is not surprising that portfolios with embedded 
quantitative restrictions on foreign investment exposure would have been suboptimal 
from a mean-variance standpoint. If no international investments are allowed (Table 
1.11) portfolio returns are always lower by approximately 1% than corresponding 
returns from unconstrained optimal portfolios. Constrained portfolio returns range 
between 0.1% using the Global Financial Data series which is less optimistic on short-
term fixed income returns and slightly below 3% if optimistic assumptions are made 
both for fixed income (PUC series) and dividend reinvestments. 
Portfolios with no international exposure make up for lack of additional 
diversification opportunities by increasing the share in domestic fixed income to over 
80% while keeping the rest is in domestic equities. However, besides lower portfolio 
returns because of lower average returns of domestic instruments, this also implies 
higher standard deviations of the portfolio (between 1% and 2% higher), although 
domestic fixed income and equity investment are practically uncorrelated in the overall 
sample. 
Portfolios with a 10% constraint on international exposure (Table 1.12) are also 
suboptimal given that the unconstrained optimal share in international investments is 
higher than 20%. Portfolio returns are here lower by a percentage ranging between 
0.2%, when foreign equities are hedged in Chilean pesos22, to 0.5% in the baseline case 
This is primarily because international equity returns are on average negative if hedged back in Chilean 
pesos, as currency depreciations were historically associated with high domestic inflation 
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with the PUC series (with or without hyperinflationary years). Standard deviations are 
also substantially higher, up by a percentage between 0.5% and 1%. 
1.6.2 Moving along the efficient frontier 
Table 1.13 shows optimal portfolio allocations assuming no international 
investment constraints but an expected return of 4% real, the implicit benchmark of the 
privatised pension system. 
Because average rates of returns from foreign assets are higher, moving along 
the efficient frontier leads to an increase in the share of foreign investments over the 
minimum risk portfolio. Thanks to the virtues of diversification, standard deviation is 
still marginally lower than in the case of a portfolio fully invested in the least risky asset 
(Chilean bills), except when either the more pessimistic Global Financial Data series is 
used for bills23 or hyperinflationary years are left in the sample.. 
The share of international assets over the total is equal to over 40% in the first 
baseline case using the PUC series for domestic fixed income and excluding 
hyperinflationary years. The foreign portfolio is almost equally split between equities 
and fixed income because foreign equities bring higher expected returns but fixed 
income helps control portfolio risk. Interestingly, while the minimum risk portfolio 
would allocate only to Treasury bills, the composition of the international fixed income 
portfolio changes as the required return goes up (with a 4% required return, 
international fixed income is made up of only bonds). 
If hyperinflationary years are left in the sample, risk associated with domestic 
fixed income investments is higher and this leads to a decrease in the share of domestic 
fixed income of over 10%. And if the Global Financial Data series for Chilean bills is 
used, the percentage invested in domestic fixed income drops even further to only 30%. 
The rationale is that, if domestic instruments are not an effective way of controlling risk 
or their expected return is too far from the required rate of return, international fixed 
income investments become even more attractive. 
Moreover, the share of international equities is higher than that of domestic 
equities, except when UK equities are employed. US equities are more attractive due to 
higher expected returns and practically zero correlation with domestic fixed income, 
although their standard deviation in real terms is marginally higher than that of UK 
23 This is because with the GFD series higher exposure to riskier assets is needed to achieve the target 
expected return 
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equities (Table 1.4). With US stocks, the international equities share is over 20%, rising 
to 24% when hyperinflationary years are included in the sample. However, when a 
dividend adjustment is performed the share goes down to around 10% because expected 
returns from stocks are higher and additional exposure is not needed to achieve the 4% 
target. 
1.6.3 Social security as an asset? 
Samuelson (1958) showed that a mature pay-as-you-go pension system's 
implicit rate of return is equal to the rate of growth of the labour force plus the rate of 
growth of real wages. In Samuelson pay-as-you-go model, consumption foregone by 
current workers would be effectively loaned to current retirees and the loan would be 
paid back by future workers. If the size of the workforce increases from a generation to 
another and workers become more productive resulting in higher real wages, each 
generation of retirees would receive more benefits than the previous generation. More 
recently, Baxter (2002) analysed the implications for asset allocation of US workers of 
the implicit investment in social security, a non-tradable asset whose return profile can 
be modelled in a similar way to a fmancial asset. Valdes-Prieto (2005) even proposed to 
grant property rights over future contributions by securitising the revenues of pension 
institutions, which would become issuers of "pay-as-you-go securities". 
Given that a pay-as-you-go system can be in principle thought of an implicit 
investment in an asset whose return profile is equal to the rate of growth of the labour 
force plus the growth of real wages, the question here is how did social security 
compare with fmancial assets' returns. In order to investigate this for the case of Chile, 
implicit returns from a social security asset were replicated using the real wage index 
and the labour force statistics in Braun et al. (2000). 
There are clearly a number of simplifying assumptions underlying the analysis. 
Lindbeck and Persson (2003) review these aspects in more detail. The first is that from 
an individual perspective implicit returns from social security may be significantly 
different from the growth of aggregate real wages plus labour force unless the system is 
designed as notional defined contribution with indexation factor equal to the growth of 
the contribution base. Higher benefits may in fact be awarded to particular categories of 
workers (i.e. civil servants) for political reasons. The second is that Samuelson' s model 
does not focus on the consequences of uncertainty, while in the context of Latin 
America benefits from social security were subject to a high degree of uncertainty, 
especially because of accumulated deficits to fund generous benefits to privileged 
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workers. The third is that pension reforms can themselves influence savings and the rate 
of return on fmancial assets (Cifuentes, 2000). The fourth is that we are abstracting from 
labour income (see the discussion in Section 1.7), which may be an additional source of 
risk correlated with the social security asset return. The fifth is that we are abstracting 
from imperfections of annuity markets to convert wealth arising from fmancial assets 
into life annuities at retirement (Cardinale and Orszag, 2002). Finally, to incorporate 
social security in a portfolio choice framework, one implicitly assumes the pay-as-you-
go asset is fully divisible and marketable24. 
There are indeed countries in Latin America such as Argentina and Colombia 
where individuals are given the choice between a pay-as-you-go scheme and individual 
accounts, but these systems do not allow individuals to contribute to both at the same 
time (Cardinale and Orszag, 2002). A divisible and marketable pay-as-you-go asset 
would implicitly assume that investment instruments replicating the return profile of a 
pay-as-you-go system are available in the market and can be combined with other 
fmancial assets25. 
Figure 1.4 shows that, in contrast to many developed countries, rate of returns 
from a pay-as-you-go system would still be substantially high in Chile (an average of 
almost 5% during the 1990s), primarily because of high real salary growth (almost 3% 
in the 1990s) but also because labour force has grown faster than population since the 
1 980s26. 
Table 1.14 shows that in the long-run labour force and population growth were 
aligned with an average rate of growth slightly below 2%, while real salary grew at an 
average rate slightly below 3%, giving the social security asset an average implicit 
return of 4.35%, only marginally higher than the real return of recognition bonds and 
the implicit benchmark of the funded pension system. 
24 Alternatively, one could think of the mean-variance optimisation as an exercise performed ex-ante by 
the regulator to determine the optimal share of the first pillar pay-as-you scheme for the representative 
worker. One problem with this though is that the aggregate rate of return of the pay-as-you-go system 
depends not only on the growth of the contribution base but also on shifts in income and mortality 
patterns (the expected turnover duration of the system, see Settergren and Mikula, 2005) 
25 These could be thought of long-term bonds paying variable real coupons linked to real salary and 
labour force growth, similarly to what advocated by Shiller (1993), who proposed the introduction of 
bonds whose yield is tied to the growth rate of GDP, or Bohn (2002), who envisaged the issuance of 
bonds indexed to wages and other demographic variables 
26 Rise in women participation could be one of the underlying reason given that the ratio of active women 
as a percentage of the total active population has risen from 27.3% to 31.8% between 1980 to 1995 
according to Braun et al., 2000) 
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The results from mean-variance optimisation with the social security asset are 
displayed in Table 1.15. 
It appears clear that social security was a very attractive asset during the 20th 
century in terms of its risk/return profile (over 60% share in the minimum risk 
portfolio). Although with a standard deviation of almost 10% it was not a riskless 
asset27, it has been less risky, at least in terms of standard deviation, than all fmancial 
assets considered in this analysis (and, arguably, of all financial assets available to 
Chilean investors). 
Interestingly, however, foreign assets appear in the minimum risk portfolio even 
with the inclusion of social security, although their share decreased with respect to the 
case with no social security in the menu of assets (14% against 24%)28. The equity share 
is also lower when social security is included (it decreases from 16% to 6%) and would 
be unlikely to rise significantly with dividend-adjusted series29. Moreover, with the 
inclusion of social security, only Chilean equities have a positive weight in the 
portfolio, and this is primarily because standard deviation in real peso terms was lower 
(Table 1.4) and the return profile is uncorrelated with that of the social security asset. 
Although the exposure to international investments is lower in mean-variance 
optimal minimum risk portfolios with respect to the case with no social security asset, 
investment restrictions would still result in sub-optimality from a mean-variance 
standpoint. If no international investments are allowed, the minimum risk portfolio has a 
mean 0.2% lower and a standard deviation over 0.5% higher. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, given high historical returns from the social security 
asset, the portfolio mean is substantially higher than without social security and is also 
higher than the 4% threshold even if no investment abroad are allowed. Social security 
also helps control portfolio standard deviation (7.5%) although negative surprises 
(portfolio returns lower than 0) still lie within a one standard deviation confidence 
interval. 
Moving along the efficient frontier, the international investments' share would 
rise to around 20% in the unconstrained portfolio and the foreign equity share, because 
27 This is primarily because real salaries have been fairly volatile, especially during economic crises such 
as the 1930s and the 1970s 
28 Comparisons are made with baseline results in Table 1.10 using the PUC series, unhedged US assets, 
excluding hyperinflationary years and with no dividend adjustment 
29 In the baseline results with no social security the equity share was actually slightly lower and not higher 
when dividend adjustment was taken into account 
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of higher expected returns, would go up above the domestic equity share. Foreign fixed 
income would, however, still represent the largest part of the overseas portfolio (12.9% 
of the total, 64% of the foreign currency component). Interestingly, the social security 
share also increases substantially, because of high historical returns, and, in fact, the 
Chilean bill share becomes equal to zero with a 5% expected return. 
1.7 Discussion 
The previous section showed that historically minimum risk portfolios in real 
terms for Chilean investors involved a substantial component of overseas investments 
and that this percentage would rise if investors require higher rates of returns. In 
particular our results suggest that portfolio standard deviation would be reduced by up 
to 2 percentage points by investing in =hedged foreign instruments, in particular fixed 
income. This has not been fully taken into account by the recent reform of the AFP 
system to introduce member choice, which establishes a 10% or 15% threshold to 
foreign instruments in the more conservative portfolios, one of which is also the default 
option for older workers who do not make an active investment choice. Moreover, in 
contrast with claims that the introduction of a funded pension system would increase 
rates of return, the results suggest that an asset replicating the implicit return profile of a 
pay-as-you-go system would help reduce the standard deviation of the minimum risk 
portfolio by further three percentage points, given high historical real salary growth and 
increasing participation rates in the labour force. 
This section review the shortcomings of a mean-variance optimisation exercise, 
in particular when applied to a multi-period problem, and ask whether these would 
significantly modify the conclusions reached so far. 
1.7.1 Investibility 
One of the arguments used by Valdes Prieto (1999) to criticise Srinivas and 
Yermo (1999) methodology was the fact market indices are not effectively investable, 
especially in emerging markets where liquidity is typically low. The mean-variance 
framework developed in the previous section assumes that Chilean investors can invest 
in a broad index of shares and the expected rate of return is equal to the IGPA 
performance. 
However, AFPs have traditionally held more concentrated portfolios and this 
was also influenced by explicit quantitative restrictions. Devesa and Vidal (2002) report 
that 40% of fund managers' returns in the early 1990s arose from investments in two 
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electricity companies. Mittelstaedt and Olsen (2003) compare risk-adjusted returns of 
pension funds with those of Chilean stock indices, mutual funds and debt instruments 
using a multi-factor Jensen alpha model and find that pension funds outperformed the 
IGPA index in most years, because they heavily invested in shares of privatised 
companies, which were sold at deep discounts during the privatisation process. 
Ideally, one should assess the long-term performance of investments in the 
Chilean stock market using the broadest portfolio of shares available to investors or, 
alternatively, different subsets of the market could be considered as separate assets and 
their long-term risk return characteristics could be evaluated. Since 1927 the Santiago 
stock exchange calculated sector indices alongside the broad IGPA index and these 
enable to compare a broad index against more concentrated portfolios, in order to obtain 
preliminary conclusions on the risk-return properties of domestic equity when only a 
subset of the stock market is investable. In particular four indices are considered in this 
context: mineral & mining, banks, industrials and utilities, all consistently available 
since 1927 through Global Financial Data, except the utilities index, which is only 
available from 1927 to 1974 and then from 1980 to 1993. 
Average returns, standard deviations, correlations with IGPA and Jensen's 
alphas are computed from raw returns in real terms and displayed in Table 1.16. 
Industrials and utilities registered a higher performance than the overall index, but this 
was compensated by higher risk in terms of standard deviation. Conversely, mineral & 
mining and banks' returns have on average underperformed the aggregate benchmark. 
However, Jensen's alphas are not statistically different from zero for the four sector 
indices considered. Correlation with international investments is highest for the 
aggregate index, while the banks' index is almost uncorrelated with US equities in the 
1927-2002 sample. In fact, while industrial and mining companies heavily relied on 
exports, the Chilean fmancial sector has traditionally been domestic-oriented, especially 
before the liberalisation process of the 1980s. 
If available domestic equity investments are better proxied by a more 
concentrated portfolio than the IGPA, the mean-variance optimal minimum risk 
portfolio would be more tilted towards foreign fixed income investments because 
domestic stocks are riskier. Moving along the efficient frontier, international 
investments would be more attractive because of lower correlation with domestic stocks 
than with the aggregate index. 
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1.7.2 Log-normality 
Mean-variance optimisation relies on the hypothesis that higher moments are 
irrelevant to investors' decisions. As argued by Chunhachinda et al. (1997) and 
Campbell and Viceira (2002), this is reliable approximation if the derivatives of the 
utility function for the third and higher moments are zero (i.e. lognormal returns and 
power utility), or if investors have a quadratic utility function defined over wealth. The 
latter, however, implies absolute risk aversion increasing with wealth, which is 
generally found to be inconsistent with empirical evidence. If investors' preferences are 
better approximated with a power utility function, then higher moments cannot be 
disregarded, unless log returns are normally distributed. 
Table 1.17 display sample third and fourth moments (skewness and kurtosis) 
computed from log returns of the assets considered in the previous section and Jarque 
Bera normality tests. Interestingly, the hypothesis of log-normality cannot be rejected 
for the Chilean stock market index, while it can be rejected for all other assets. UK 
stock market returns in real peso terms are closer to log-normality than US returns but 
kurtosis is still significantly higher than 3. Chilean bills (especially using the Global 
Financial Data series) and even more the social security asset are negatively skewed, 
especially because of negative surprises in the 1950s and the 1970s during periods of 
high inflation. International assets are, on the other hand, positively skewed but, while 
bond series are skewed even in dollar or pound nominal terms30, international equities 
become positively skewed in real peso terms, given the impact of large real exchange 
rate depreciations in periods such as the early 1960s and the 1930s. 
Using the multi-objective portfolio selection framework derived by Lai (1991), 
Chunhachinda et al. (1997) and Sun and Yuxing (2003) argue that skewness could be 
incorporated into optimal portfolio selection to derive optimally formed mean-variance-
skewness efficient portfolios. 
An in-depth understanding of the impact of skewness in the portfolio selection 
problem of Chilean investors would lie outside the scope of this work, but some 
comments will be made on how incorporating skewness might affect optimal portfolio 
choice. Intuitively, in a mean-variance-skewness framework investors would trade 
expected return for positive skewness, accepting a lower expected return if this is 
compensated by positive surprises. For Chilean investors this would have again implied 
30 This is especially because of high returns due to the convergence to lower interest rates after the 1980s 
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tilting the portfolio towards international assets and away from domestic fixed income 
and the social security asset, which is subject to very negative surprises at times of high 
inflation. 
A major problem with this framework is that normality tests suggest departures 
from log-normality are largely caused by leptokurtosis rather than skewness. An 
extension to mean-variance- skewness portfolio selection would therefore model 
separately the tails of the distribution in a non-Gaussian setting (Tokat et al., 2003). 
1.7.3 Identically distributed returns or multiple distributions? 
Mean-variance optimisation was built on the premise that the underlying 
distribution of Chilean investment returns, besides not significantly deviating from log-
normality, does not radically change over time. As argued by Thong et al. (2003) this 
would translate, if stock returns are considered, in a strong version of Fama (1970)'s 
efficient markets hypothesis with constant discount factor and stationary real dividends 
process around a time trend. Given that international assets and fixed income returns are 
also considered, a set of additional assumptions is also needed: stationary real interest 
rate fluctuating around a constant mean, both in Chile and abroad31, and no systematic 
deviations from purchasing power parity. 
In this world, next year's returns would be randomly drawn from the same 
underlying distribution of yesterday's returns and any attempt to anticipate trends in the 
market would be fruitless. If this is case, Chilean investors' optimal asset allocation 
today would be accurately described by the mean-variance optimisation exercise in the 
previous sections. There are, however, reasons to believe that this may not be an 
accurate description of the world. 
Marsh and Merton (1986) challenge the stationarity assumption of stock prices 
and dividends. Poterba and Summers (1988) and Fama and French (1988) document a 
long-run pattern of mean reversion in US stock prices. Miles and Cerny (2002) assume, 
in a calibrated model of the Japanese economy, that long-run movements in the 
aggregate capital-to-labour ratio drive the mean of the stochastic process of both riskless 
and risky assets. Diamond and Geanakoplos (2003) observe that pension investments' 
asset allocation shifts could create a structural break by altering equilibrium interest 
rates and the equity premium. 
31 For foreign bonds stationary term premium is also required 
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In the case of Chile, Lefort and Walker (2002) list a number of reasons why 
there might have been a structural change at the end of the 1980s affecting the 
distribution of Chilean equities: relaxation of limits to foreign investments leading to an 
increase in capital flows, issuance of ADRs and the transition to a democratically 
elected government. Chaudhuri and Wu (2003) find structural breaks in 14 emerging 
markets stock price indices. In the case of Chile, Argentina and Colombia a break point 
was identified in 1991. There are also reasons to believe that a structural change had 
occurred earlier in the case of Chile, in particular in the early 1980s, with the 
establishment of the basis for developing a securities market through the introduction of 
market makers for securities, mutual funds and pension funds (De la Cuadra and Valdes 
Prieto, 1990). 
Moreover, macroeconomic stabilisation policies aimed at reducing inflation, 
culminated with the introduction of an independent Central Bank and inflation targeting 
in 1989, may have caused a structural break in both the stock and the bill market. Fama 
(1991) argued that time-varying expected inflation can indeed explain actual stock 
market movements. 
In this chapter we explore the hypothesis that a structural change occurred at the 
beginning of the 1980s, arguing that the pension reform has signalled a radical long-
term shift in government policy, unlike other macroeconomic stabilisation policies, 
which could have been more easily reversed by new governments. At the same time the 
issuance of inflation-linked government debt in 1982 has arguably reduced risks 
deriving by the absence of perfect hedging instruments. 
The period 1981-82 is highly influential for the results because the banking 
crisis led to huge stock market losses. On the one hand, the exclusion of this period 
from the analysis carried out by Srinivas and Juan Yermo (1999) was criticised by 
Valdes Prieto (1999), but, on the other hand, De la Cuadra and Valdes Prieto (1990) 
interpreted the crisis as a product of ineffective regulation unable to cope with the pace 
of fast fmancial liberalisation (and therefore implicitly as a one-off event which would 
not happen once the transition towards a modern fmancial system is completed). In this 
chapter the results are presented including the 1981-82 period. 
Mean-variance optimisation was performed using monthly data for the same 
variables considered in the previous analysis for two sub-periods: 1927-1979 and 1980-
2002. For Chilean bills the Global Financial Data index, which tracks deposit rates, is 
used because only annual data are available for the PUC index. For Chilean equities, 
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while the IGPA is used for 1927-1979, two indices are employed for 1980-2002: IGPA 
and IPSA, the latter being a dividend-adjusted index of the most liquid shares. 
International investment proxies are the S&P 50032, the US 10-year government bond 
total return index and T-Bill total return index, for which monthly data are also 
available from Global Financial Data. 
In the sub-sample 1927-1979 hyperinflationary years are excluded from the 
sample (when monthly inflation was higher than 100% on an annualised basis). Tables 
1.18-1.19 display basic sample statistics and correlation matrices in the two sub-
samples. 
In the sub-sample 1980-2002 average real returns were higher both from 
domestic and international assets, primarily because of lower inflation. Chilean bills and 
Chilean equities become two significantly more attractive assets with lower standard 
deviations and higher expected returns. Average returns from Chilean bills were on 
average negative in the sub-sample 1927-1979 while they were in the range of 0.6% 
monthly after the 1980s, when a high real interest rates policy was pursued to attract 
foreign capital flows and curb inflationary pressures. Furthermore, a more stable 
macroeconomic environment enabled the government to issue inflation-linked 
government bills and this has certainly contributed to lower the risk associated with 
money market investments (monthly standard deviation in real terms of the Chilean bills 
series dropped from 2.39% between 1927 and 1979 to 0.99% between 1980 and 2002). 
In terms of risk-adjusted returns or Sharpe ratios, Chilean money market 
instruments, which had been the worse investment in the period 1927-1979, offered the 
most attractive risk-return profile after 1980. Interestingly, although domestic stocks 
(using the dividend-adjusted IPSA series) on average outperformed the S&P 500 after 
the 1980s, this came at the price of much higher risk (IP SA recorded very negative real 
returns during the banking crisis at the beginning of the 1980s and, to a lesser extent, in 
1998 after the Asian crisis). 
Correlation between Chilean and foreign investments is lower in the sub-sample 
1980-2002, although correlation between the Chilean and the US stock market does not 
reach negative territory if monthly data are used (unlike with annual data as outlined in 
Section 1.5). However, the pattern is different when only the 1990s are considered, 
32 The S&P 500 price index is the term of comparison for IGPA, while the total return series is employed 
with IPSA 
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consistently with Lefort and Walker (2002), because correlation with the US stock 
market rises above the 1927-1979 estimated value (26%), while correlation between 
Chilean bills and US bills comes back to values close to those estimated in the 1927-
1979 sub-sample. 
Tables 1.20-1.21 display mean-variance optimal portfolios calculated separately 
for the periods 1927-1979 and 1980-2002. An investor facing the problem of investing 
pension contributions when the pension reform was passed at the beginning of the 
1980s would have heavily invested abroad based on historical experience. The 
minimum risk portfolio is in fact heavily invested in Chilean bills (90%) but expected 
returns from such an investment are negative in real terms. In order to obtain an 
expected return of 1% real, the share invested in foreign assets rises to over 40% and to 
achieve an expected return equal to the 4% benchmark, foreign investment would have 
to be 60% of the total portfolio. Based on this experience, any constraint to foreign 
investment would result in loss of efficiency from investors' point of view. If the share 
invested abroad was constrained to 10%, the 4% real return benchmark would no longer 
be feasible and 1% real could only be achieved by heavily investing in domestic shares 
(34%) raising the standard deviation of the portfolio from 16% to over 20%. 
In the subsequent 22 years, however, realised returns from domestic investments 
have greatly exceeded ex-ante expectations based on history. Minimum risk portfolios 
based on 1980-2002 experience have expected returns over 6% real and are practically 
only invested in domestic fixed income (with only 4% in US Treasury bills). 
Nevertheless, foreign investments have been a valuable diversification tool if investor 
were seeking extra returns over the minimum risk portfolio. With an expected return of 
8% real, the share invested abroad would rise to 35% if equity price indices are used 
and to 17% if total return indices are employed. With total return indices, the share of 
international investments decreases primarily because of high dividends paid by Chilean 
companies and higher expected returns from foreign equity, which make additional 
exposure to foreign instruments unnecessary. 
The analysis would apparently support the view of a different distribution of 
returns for the period 1980-2002 but findings must be interpreted with caution. It may 
be that a more appropriate yardstick to evaluate future expected returns is the long-term 
1900-2002 history, which incorporates periods of market-friendly economic policies 
together with periods which emphasised State intervention, as well as major economic 
crises alongside prolonged periods of rising prosperity. Moreover, considering 1980- 
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2002 in isolation would be likely to lead to overoptimistic expectations on risk-adjusted 
returns from domestic assets. 
The 1980-2002 period was characterised by fast economic growth, which 
followed a period of crisis, chaos and hyperinflation. The reversal of nationalisation 
policies accompanied by financial liberalisation has probably raised the expectations for 
future dividend growth and, subsequently, a soft transition to democracy has helped to 
further remove uncertainties over future economic and political developments. If stock 
prices do indeed move in response to changing growth prospects, a major correction 
took place in the Chilean history in the last 20 years. Although there were in fact major 
economic and financial crises even in the 1980s and the 1990s, it could still be argued 
that the realised distribution of returns after 1980 cannot be reliably projected forward, 
nor used as a benchmark to assess expected returns from funded pensions in other 
countries. 
The example of Argentina warns against projecting the short-term past into the 
future. In fact, Argentina implemented market friendly reform and a major stabilisation 
policy with the introduction of a currency board in 1991, which effectively tied the 
exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar. Before the late 1990s it would have appeared 
reasonable to assume that a major structural break occurred in Argentina and previous 
history of crises and instability was no longer an appropriate yardstick to evaluate 
expected returns from domestic assets. However, the financial chaos in 2001-2002 in 
the wake of devaluation of the peso and foreign debt moratorium would suggest that in 
fact a more realistic estimate of Argentina's prospective returns should have 
incorporated pre-1991 events. 
1.7.4 Intertemporal hedging 
As discussed in Section 1.4, Campbell and Viceira, M. (2002) develop a 
comprehensive theory of long-term investment and analyse in detail the reasons why the 
"myopic" mean-variance solution may not be appropriate in a multi-period setting. 
Campbell et al. (2002) incorporate foreign currency investments applying a similar 
methodology. 
Intertemporal hedging effects are identified as the key reason why a simple 
mean-variance solution is not appropriate for long-term investors. These arise because 
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safe investments for short-term investors may turn out to be risky in the long-run33 or 
because risky investments for short-term investors may be safer for long-term investors. 
In the context of Chile, as there is no risk-less asset, the mean-variance 
optimisation exercise performed in the previous sections already captures uncertainty 
over real short-term interest rates. It was also argued that volatility of real bill returns 
was relatively high and that investors have repeatedly experienced prolonged periods of 
negative real rates. It is therefore sensible to argue that an intertemporal hedging 
demand would arise for assets hedging investors against variations in future Chilean real 
rates. In the US context, Campbell and Viceira (2002) identify inflation-indexed long-
term bonds or, in a low inflation environment, long-term nominal bonds. In Chile, had 
these instruments been available to investors, conclusions would have changed on 
minimum risk portfolios. But in fact they were not. Only since the beginning of the 
1980s inflation-indexed securities appeared, and only since the 1990s a liquid market 
for maturities longer than one year was created. 
This suggests that, unless in the future Chilean investors are given access to a 
liquid market of long-term inflation-indexed securities, optimal minimum risk portfolios 
are likely to include a significant component of foreign currency investments. In the 
1990s a sizable market (although still small in comparison with pension fund assets) of 
long-term inflation-indexed securities was developed through the issuance of long-term 
notes by the Chilean Central Bank (PRCs) and mortgage bonds (Letras Hipotecarias) 
by domestic financial institutions, but growth in the supply of inflation-indexed bonds 
could slow down in the future because "nominalisation" of medium and long-term debt 
is the current Central Bank policy. As of 1999, the market value of inflation-indexed 
debt with maturity longer than 10 years was estimated to be in the range of US$10bn, 
equal to less than 1/3 of the total AFPs assets (US$34.5bn in 1999). 
As argued in Section 1.6, long-run purchasing power parity appeared to hold 
between Chilean pesos and US dollars. In Campbell et al. (2002) framework, Chilean 
long-term investors would therefore be even more likely to hold foreign currency to 
hedge against domestic real interest rates fluctuations if inflation-indexed long-term 
bonds are not available. 
Intertemporal hedging effects can also arise because there is a predictable 
component in excess returns on stock, which makes long-term investors more willing to 
33 For example Treasury bills, which have to be rolled over at uncertain future real rates 
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hold equities than in the case of unpredictable stock returns. Lefort and Walker (2002) 
argue that there appears to be a substantial predictable component in Chilean stock 
returns and identify the dividend yield as a significant predictor, but the conclusion is 
based on the last 20 years of returns, for which dividend data are available. 
Moreover, in the case of international equities investments, a predictable 
component in returns would influence not only the exposure to equities but also the 
breakdown of equity investments between domestic and foreign markets. With 
hindsight one could argue that, had Chilean investors been "strategic market timers", 
they would have heavily invested abroad in the 1970s and then raised the allocations to 
domestic stocks in the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s. 
Mean-variance optimal portfolios are not heavily invested in equities given that 
minimum risk portfolios with the 1900-2002 sample have allocations not exceeding 
20% of the portfolio and the percentage does not rise significantly moving to a 4% real 
expected return. Nevertheless, one could argue that a predictable component in stock 
prices would raise equity investments for long-term Chilean investors above the 
"myopic solution" threshold. 
There are, however, two factors that could mitigate this result. One is time-
varying volatility, a property consistent with substantial empirical evidence and a large 
literature pioneered by Bollerslev (1986). The second one is parameter uncertainty, 
which, as argued by Barberis (2000), leads to conclude that long-horizon investors will 
in general still allocate more to equities than short-horizon but the difference is not as 
large and could sometimes be negative. 
In the case of Chile both factors appear to play a substantial role. Figure 1.5 
shows conditional variance chart derived by fitting a GARCH(1,1) model with no 
predictors in the mean equation to Chilean real stock returns. Not surprisingly, a large 
spike would be evident in the 1970s, but even taking the 1980-2002 period in isolation 
volatility appears to have substantially decreased after the early 1980s, although some 
occasional spikes can still be detected (the last one after the 1997 Asian crisis). 
Estimation risk is also a substantial problem in Chile given that there are no 
reliable data before the 1980s for dividend yields and price-earnings ratios, two 
variables typically identified as predictors of stock returns (Campbell and Shiller, 2001). 
It is possible, on the other hand, to explain ex-post the performance of the Chilean stock 
index in real terms using macroeconomic variables, as shown in Table 1.22. The 
equation would predict higher real stock returns in stable as opposed to inflationary 
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environments, when real GDP growth is higher and the peso depreciates (although the 
latter would not fit post-1980s data as outlined in Section 1.5). However, a 
contemporaneous model, although residuals are not significantly serially correlated, is 
of little use as a forecasting tool. But causality effects with macroeconomic variables are 
very hard to uncover, as displayed in Granger causality tests. The only significant 
predictor appears in fact to be inflation (a more stable macroeconomic environment 
appears to lead stock market growth in real terms). 
The combined impact of all these factors is likely to be a modest increase in 
equity allocation and perhaps an equity portfolio more tilted towards foreign stocks for 
which estimation risk (and probably volatility clustering as well) is likely to be a less 
severe problem. 
1.7.5 Labour income 
A mean-variance asset allocation model assumes that investors derive utility 
only from their financial asset portfolio. As argued by Campbell and Shiller (2001) this 
is only a reasonable assumption for retired individuals or institutional investors, but not 
for individuals saving for retirement. Moreover, if AFPs incorporate members' 
preference into their utility function, at least the aggregate component of salary growth 
would be included in the asset allocation problem. 
In Section 1.6.3 it was argued that social security would be a valuable asset from 
a mean-variance standpoint because of a relatively high expected return and low 
standard deviation. Moreover, unlike in developed countries, investors could still expect 
substantial growth from a social security asset, because there is substantial room for 
labour force growth even in absence of population growth and because, if Chile is to 
close the wealth gap with Europe or the US, as a Solow (1957) growth model would 
predict, real salary growth will have to be substantially higher than in the developed 
world. 
However, these conclusions would change if the individual salary profile is 
included as an additional state variable. Among others, Heaton and Lucas (2000) and 
Davis and Willen (2000) show how the presence of a non-tradable asset such as labour 
income affects portfolio allocation decisions. Intuitively, if labour income growth is 
uncertain, investors will invest lower proportion of their wealth in assets whose return 
profile is positively correlated with labour income and invest more in assets which 
hedge labour income risk. 
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In the case of Chilean investors, the optimal share invested in the social security 
asset would likely to be lower, the extent to which will depend on how age-related and 
individual-specific salary profiles are correlated with the growth of aggregate earnings. 
Alongside the social security asset, the optimal allocation between fmancial 
assets would be likely to change as a result of including human capital investments. 
Table 1.23 shows estimated cross-correlations between real salary and both domestic 
and international assets estimated in the 1901-2002 sample, while Table 1.24 display the 
same using monthly data for the sample 1980-2002 (salaries are measured by the 
headline IGSS real index calculated by INE). 
In the annual sample, contemporaneous correlation suggests a high positive 
dependency between real salaries and the domestic real interest rate, while other assets 
are practically uncorrelated with real salaries. However, if fmancial assets returns are 
calculated with a lag of 1 or 2 years, correlation becomes negative with domestic bills 
and positive with the domestic stock market. 
In the monthly sample the picture is more clear-cut: there appears to be a link 
between the aggregate component of salary growth and domestic assets, while 
international assets are practically uncorrelated with Chilean real salaries. 
Overall, the picture seems to support Baxter and Jermann (1995) claim that the 
international diversification puzzle is worse than you think. If human capital is included 
in the analysis, optimal portfolios are likely to be more tilted towards international 
assets with respect to the mean-variance solution. 
1.8 Conclusion 
This chapter studied 101 years of investment returns from domestic and foreign 
assets from the point of view of a Chilean investor. A mean-variance portfolio choice 
problem suggests that loss of investment efficiency caused by restrictions on overseas 
investments is substantial. The chapter also showed that even minimum risk portfolios 
have a significant component of foreign currency investments, in fact higher than the 
threshold established for older investors by the new law introducing a multiple funds 
system (15%). Figure 1.6 shows that historically 100 real pesos invested in the 
unconstrained portfolio would have grown to over 400 by 2002, although experiencing 
a drop in value between the 1930s and the 1970s, compared to 250 if foreign 
investments exposure were capped at 10% and below 200 if no international exposure 
were allowed. 
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However, minimum risk portfolios for Chilean investors, if the future turns out 
to be similar to the last 101 years, involve a significant degree of risk, given that 
standard deviations of optimal minimum risk portfolios, even with no international 
investment restrictions, are still in the range of 10%. An efficient pay-as-you-go 
investment paying a rate of return equal to the rate of growth of the labour force plus 
that of real salaries, if combined with a fmancial portfolio, would have in fact enabled to 
achieve a standard deviation of returns around 3% lower than a fmancial assets only 
portfolio. Moreover, as shown in Figure 1.7, an investment of 100 real pesos in 1901 in 
the minimum risk portfolio with social security would have grown to over 3000 by 2002 
compared to 400 with an unconstrained fmancial portfolio. 
In addition to that, unless history before the 1981 pension reform is disregarded, 
only by allocating to overseas investments approximately 40% of the total, historical 
portfolios of domestic and foreign assets would have achieved the 4% real benchmark 
set by the pension reform without a massive increase in risk. Although mean-variance 
optimisation has several shortcomings, the discussion in the previous section showed 
that key conclusions on international diversifications would likely to be reinforced, if 
time-varying returns and volatilities, investibility issues and labour income are taken 
into account. In fact only if conditional expectations of domestic investment returns are 
temporarily higher, as it has arguably happened in the last 20 years because of a 
transition from chaos to macroeconomic stability, a larger allocation to domestic assets 
might have been temporarily justified. Even in this case, however, parameter 
uncertainty might reverse this result. Transition to a stable environment as a result of 
implementation of reforms, including pension reforms, may not be a smooth process as 
the recent Argentinean experience suggests. 
There are two main implications of the analysis for the debate about the benefits 
of funded pensions and optimal pension investments. First, funded pension schemes 
may not be intrinsically superior in terms of rates of returns to pay-as-you-go systems, 
as the Chilean experience suggests. Reforms may be necessary because of design flaws 
in public pension schemes, which have contributed to create imbalances in the systems. 
However, consistently with Orszag and Stiglitz (1999), it appears that a pay-as-you-go 
system, if managed efficiently, may offer an attractive risk-return profile. The realised 
rate of return of Chilean AFPs after the pension reform is not in itself proof of 
superiority of funded schemes because returns from a pay-as-you-go investment would 
have also been very high over the same period as a result of real salary and participation 
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rates growth. In order to show the superiority of funded schemes one would need to 
show a causal link between pension reform and economic growth, separating the effect 
of pension reform from macroeconomic stabilisation programmes, which might have 
been achieved also through parametric reforms of a pay-as-you-go system. 
Second, there is a substantial degree of risk in funded pension systems and, if 
there is no long-term hedge for domestic price inflation and exchange rates are volatile, 
even returns from minimum risk portfolios are likely to be characterised by a high 
degree of dispersion. Governments introducing funded pension schemes should 
therefore make the development of a long-term inflation-indexed bond market a key 
priority (instead of the current Chilean policy of "nominalisation") and, in absence of 
this, relax overseas investment restrictions enabling investors to hedge, albeit 
imperfectly, inflation risk by raising exposure to foreign currency. The problem with the 
inflation-indexed bond market is in fact that, when countries like Chile pursue a 
programme of macroeconomic stability and government debt reduction, the corollary in 
the long-run is likely to be that a large government debt market will not be available 
and, unless companies are willing to issue long-term inflation-indexed debt, supply of 
index-linked bonds will not be sufficient to fulfil the requirements of a funded pension 
system. Because of this, and also because a government-sponsored inflation-linked debt 
market still carries residual (i.e. default) risk, allowing international investment 
exposure appears of paramount importance. 
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1.9 Appendix: log return and simple returns 
Let Pt be the value of a stock, bond or bill market index at time t and Pt+i be the value of 
the same index at time t+1. The simple return calculated over the period (t,t+1) is equal 
to: 
P T +1 1 _ 
RT,T+1- n .0 r 
The log or continuously compounded return is defined as: 
DP 
IVT,T+1 = 
L41+ RT,T+1) l'n(PT-1)  
PT 
From (2), we have that log returns satisfy the time-related additivity property. 
DP 	 nP 	P 
ICT,T +2 = Ln (1 + RT , T+1 X 1+ RT+1,T+2)= A T,T+1 4- RT+1,T+2 
The relationship between log returns and simple returns defined over the period (t,t+1) 
can be expressed as follows: 
P 
RT ,T +1= 
P T+1  
1= exp(RT,T+1)— l 
i T 
In general there is no functional relationship to transform the moments of the log returns 
distribution into corresponding moments of the simple return distribution. However, in 
the special case of normally distributed log returns, a functional relationship exists, as 
showed by Dorfleitner, (2003) and Pokier (1995). 
Let p, be the mean and a2 the variance of the log return normal distribution. By using the 
density function of the normal distribution, the expected simple return under the 
assumption of normal log returns can be calculated as follows: 
/ 	2\ 
S 	i 	 f_ 1 1 p = Ekexpve )— 1 p exp(R P )— 1 = exp p + a —1 
2 \ 	i 
(5) 
By integrating the density function of the normal distribution, one can also fmd a 






A B . 	 A B . distributions R D given two normal log return distributions r ,r with means u , iv i A 
2 	2 and  p ' variances a and ab and covariance a AB  B 
	
asAB = Cov(RA ,R8) = Cov[exp(rA) exp(rB)]. ePA+/-18-402A+028)(ecrAB —1) 	(6) 
Using (6) the variance of a log-normally distributed simple return distribution R whose 
log return distribution has mean equal to 1.1 and variance equal to a2 can be derived as: 
, 	2 	2 
Var(R)= e`P+a (ea -1) (7) 
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1.11 Tables and Figures 
TABLE 1.1: QUANTITATIVE INVESTMENT RESTRICTIONS IN CHILE 
AFTER 2002 
Domestic equities Unhedged foreign currency 
Foreign  instruments 




20% of aggregate 
value of funds of all 
types offered by 
one AFP 




20% of aggregate 
value of funds of all 
types offered by 
one AFP 




20% of aggregate 
value of funds of all 
types offered by 
one AFP 
Funds type D 15% 15% (13%  provisionally 
until 31/10/03 
20% of aggregate 
value of funds of all 
types offered by 
one AFP 
Funds type E 0% 10% (9%  provisionally 
until 31/10/03) 
20% of aggregate 
value of funds of all 
types offered by 
one AFP 	 
Notes: 
1. This refers to the multiple funds system introduced in 2002. Percentages represent 
maximum allowed exposure to the asset class. Source: SAFP website. 
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TABLE 1.2: QUANTITATIVE INVESTMENT RESTRICTIONS IN CHILE 
BEFORE 2002 









1981-1985 0% 1% 0% 1% 
1985-1991 30% 1% 0% 1% 
1991-1995 40% 10% 0% 10% 
1995-2002 40% 12% 6% 12% 
Notes: 
1. Percentages represent maximum allowed exposure to the asset class. Source: SAFP 
website. 
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TABLE 1.3: NOMINAL RETURNS IN PESOS FOR A CHILEAN INVESTOR 

























US equities 22.72% 29.21% 46.14% -47.13% (1931) 
265.07% 
(1974) 
US bonds 22.73% 29.13% 54.55% -34.59% (1933) 
440.20% 
(1974) 
US bills 21.69% 27.61% 53.76% -35.49% (1933) 
460.97% 
(1974) 
UK equities 19.96% 25.93% 42.26% -46.81% (1931) 
184.69% 
(1974) 
UK bonds 22.53% 29.62% 55.50% -31.29% (1916) 
422.49% 
(1974) 




1. Equity returns are not adjusted for dividends 
2. 1973 and 1975 are excluded from the sample (see text) 
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TABLE 1.4: REAL RETURNS IN PESOS FOR A CHILEAN INVESTOR AND 


































US equities 2.91% 6.56% 30.36% -47.55% (1972) 
181.30% 
(1935) 
US bonds 2.92% 5.81% 26.74% -53.66% (1972) 
121.75% 
(1982) 
US bills 2.04% 4.35% 23.03% -52.73% (1972) 
99.12% 
(1935) 
UK equities 0.60% 4.44% 29.59% -52.92% (1972) 
122.04% 
(1971) 
UK bonds 2.75% 6.34% 29.55% -58.81% (1972) 
123.45% 
(1932) 




1. Equity returns are not adjusted for dividends 
2. 1973 and 1975 are excluded from the sample (see text) 
3. Chilean bill (PUC) is calculated using real interest rates on short term loans until 
1982 assuming monthly rollover and then using interest rates on 1-year inflation 
indexed bonds 
4. Chilean bill (GFD) is calculated using the real interest rate on short term loans until 
1925 (which corresponded to the reference rate in that period), the official discount 
rate in Global Financial Data until 1977, the interest rate on short term deposits in 
Global Financial Data from 1977 to 1981 and the interest rate on 1-year inflation 
indexed bonds since 1982. Because inflation-indexed rates are used since 1982 there 
is a slight discrepancy between nominal returns minus inflation and real returns 
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TABLE 1.5: USD OR GBP RETURNS OF INTERNATIONAL ASSETS AND 













Peso/USD 17.00% 22.46% 49.99% -35.82% (1933) 
419.44% 
(1974) 
Peso/GBP 15.90% 21.64% 50.88% -30.54% (1931) 
424.92%  (1974) 
US equities 4.64% 6.77% 19.36% -47.04% (1931) 
46.62% 
(1933) 
US bonds 4.88% 5.15% 7.77% -7.51% (1999) 
44.28%  (1982) 
US bills 4.03% 4.04% 2.83% 0.04% (1940) 
14.60% 
(1981) 
UK equities 3.50% 4.82% 16.25% -55.33% (1974) 
43.39% 
(1959) 
UK bonds 5.71% 6.02% 8.35% -19.11% (1915) 
39.76% 
(1932) 




1. Equity returns are not adjusted for dividends 
2. 1973 and 1975 are excluded from the sample (see text) 
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TABLE 1.6: REAL RETURNS OF DOMESTIC ASSETS, INFLATION AND USD 
EXCHANGE RATE CHANGES IN DIFFERENT SUB-PERIODS (1973 AND 







Peso/USD 1901-1929 3.69% 5.21% 18.39% 
1930-1969 19.84% 23.96% 34.89% 
1970-1979 12.97% 142.31% 244.99% 
1980-2002 13.51% 14.86% 19.82% 
Inflation 1901-1929 5.17% 5.47% 8.25% 
1930-1969 20.48% 21.62% 18.54% 
1970-1979 150.06% 199.77% 194.19% 




1901-1929 1.86% 2.36% 10.15% 
1930-1969 18.42% 19.63% 18.45% 
1970-1979 141.36% 192.36% 193.67% 
1980-2002 10.02% 10.29% 7.83% 
Chilean 
equities 1901-1929 -1.95% -0.61% 16.49% 
1930-1969 -4.17% -1.93% 21.49% 
1970-1979 -69.43% 26.82% 97.78% 
1980-2002 6.97% 11.64% 34.56% 
Chilean bill 
(PUC) 1901-1929 3.69% 3.98% 7.82% 
1930-1969 -6.52% -5.92% 10.53% 
1970-1979 -5.72% 2.72% 41.48% 
1980-2002 8.74% 9.01% 8.60% 
Notes: 
1. Equity returns are not adjusted for dividends 
2. 1973 and 1975 are included from the sample 
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TABLE 1.7: REAL RETURNS OF US ASSETS BY SUB-PERIODS (1973 AND 







US equities 1901-1929 2.54% 5.02% 23.14% 
1930-1969 3.16% 8.07% 37.58% 
1970-1979 -13.34% -17.75% 40.27% 
1980-2002 9.29% 11.37% 22.73% 
US bonds 1901-1929 2.11% 3.85% 19.30% 
1930-1969 1.78% 4.79% 28.39% 
1970-1979 -8.73% -10.74% 44.04% 
1980-2002 10.49% 13.31% 29.12% 
US bills 1901-1929 2.96% 4.70% 19.34% 
1930-1969 1.23% 4.02% 26.83% 
1970-1979 -8.62% -10.61% 42.76% 
1980-2002 6.32% 7.39% 17.01% 
Notes: 
1. Equity returns are not adjusted for dividends 
2. 1973 and 1975 are included from the sample 
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TABLE 1.8: CORRELATION OF REAL RETURNS FROM DOMESTIC AND 












IGPA REAL 1.000000 -0.069449 0.223032 0.210226 0.249701 
BILL REAL (PUC) -0.069449 1.000000 -0.010093 0.007677 -0.021904 
SP500 NODIVREAL 0.223032 -0.010093 1.000000 0.758676 0.756428 
USBOND REAL 0.210226 0.007677 0.758676 1.000000 0.959590 












IGPA REAL 1.000000 0.646182 0.272741 0.082192 0.084064 
BILL REAL (PUC) 0.646182 1.000000 0.282185 0.327904 0.258722 
SP500 NODIVREAL 0.272741 0.282185 1.000000 0.619045 0.571193 
USBOND REAL 0.082192 0.327904 0.619045 1.000000 0.984254 












IGPA REAL 1.000000 -0.242122 0.462288 0.384260 0.390923 
BILL REAL (PUC) -0.242122 1.000000 -0.005029 0.142325 0.100459 
SP500 NODIVREAL 0.462288 -0.005029 1.000000 0.750186 0.758413 
USBOND REAL 0.384260 0.142325 0.750186 1.000000 0.988276 












IGPA REAL 1.000000 -0.152758 0.441782 0.495824 0.570724 
BILL REAL (PUC) -0.152758 1.000000 -0.082376 -0.232731 -0.240644 
SP500 NODIVREAL 0.441782 -0.082376 1.000000 0.940667 0.919035 
USBOND REAL 0.495824 -0.232731 0.940667 1.000000 0.986703 









IGPA REAL 1.000000 -0.308113 -0.056608 -0.185803 -0.313890 
BILL REAL (PUC) -0.308113 1.000000 -0.132630 -0.014490 0.093319 
SP500 NODIVREAL -0.056608 -0.132630 1.000000 0.744800 0.715477 
USBOND REAL -0.185803 -0.014490 0.744800 1.000000 0.929575 
USBILL REAL -0.313890 0.093319 0.715477 0.929575 1.000000 
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TABLE 1.9: CORRELATION BETWEEN CHILEAN AND US EQUITY 
RETURNS (NOMINAL, REAL, DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN CURRENCY) 
1901-2002 





IGPA 1.000000 0.756366 -0.112711 -0.011145 0.877733 
IGPA REAL 0.756366 1.000000 0.021567 0.223032 0.595417 
SP500NODIV -0.112711 0.021567 1.000000 0.477033 -0.208917 
SP500NODIV 
REAL -0.011145 0.223032 0.477033 1.000000 0.144829 
PESO 0.877733 0.595417 -0.208917 0.144829 1.000000 
1980-2002 






IGPA 1.000000 0.975437 0.271531 -0.029678 -0.056714 
IGPAREAL 0.975437 1.000000 0.233997 -0.056608 -0.145490 
SP500NODIV 0.271531 0.233997 1.000000 0.664088 0.061076 
SP500NODIV 
REAL 
-0.029678 -0.056608 0.664088 1.000000 0.713163 
PESO -0.056714 -0.145490 0.061076 0.713163 1.000000 
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TABLE 1.10: MINIMUM RISK PORTFOLIOS (1901-2002) WITH NO 



































bonds and US 
T-Bills 













bonds and US 
T-Bills 












bonds and US 
T-Bills 













bond and UK 
bills 



































bonds and US 
T-Bills 





















bonds and US 
T-Bills 
69.8% 6.6% 7.4% 16.3% 3.7% 10.9% 








1. All variables are in real pesos and stock returns are price indices only unless 
otherwise specified 
2. Based on annual log returns converted into simple returns (1901-2002) 
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TABLE 1.11: MINIMUM RISK PORTFOLIOS (1901-2002) WITH NO 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS ALLOWED 












IGPA index and 
money market 
index (PUC) 
86.0% 14.0% 2.0% 12.2% 
1901-2002 
excluding 
1973 and 1975 
IGPA index and 
money market 
index (PUC) 




IGPA index and 
money market 
index (GFD) 




IGPA index (with 
dividend 
adjustment 
assumed to be 









IGPA index (with 
dividend 
adjustment 
assumed to be 2% 
higher than S&P 




88.1% 11.9% 2.8% 12.3% 
Notes: 
1. All variables are in real pesos and stock returns are price indices only unless 
otherwise specified 
2. Based on annual log returns converted into simple returns (1901-2002) 
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TABLE 1.12: MINIMUM RISK PORTFOLIOS (1901-2002) WITH 10% 




































bonds and US 
T-Bills 













bonds and US 
T-Bills 













bonds and US 
T-Bills 














bond and UK 
bills 































assumed to be 
equal to S&P 









bonds and US 
T-Bills 





































bonds and US 
2% higher T-Bills 





81.1% 8.9% 6.7% 3.3% 3.4% 11.4% 
(PUC) 
Notes: 
1. All variables are in real pesos and stock returns are price indices only unless 
otherwise specified 
2. Based on annual log returns converted into simple returns (1901-2002) 
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TABLE 1.13: OPTIMAL PORTFOLIOS WITH EXPECTED RETURN IN THE 





































bonds and US 
T-Bills 












bonds and US 
T-Bills 











bonds and US 
T-Bills 












bond and UK 
bills 



























assumed to be 
equal to S&P 








bonds and US 
T-Bills 


































assumed to be 
2% higher 









bonds and US 
T-Bills 
67.5% 8.1% 9.8% 14.7% 4% 11.0% 
Notes: 
1. All variables are in real pesos and stock returns are price indices only unless 
otherwise specified 
2. Based on annual log returns converted into simple returns (1901-2002) 
TABLE 1.14: CHILEAN POPULATION, LABOUR FORCE AND REAL 
SALARY GROWTH (1901-2002): BASIC SAMPLE STATISTICS 
Mean Median Standard deviation 
Population 1.65% 1.55% 0.45% 
Labour force 1.67% 1.53% 0.97% 
Real salary 2.68% 3.00% 9.84% 
Social security 4.35% 4.45% 9.85% 
Notes: 
1. Population data are for 1901-2001. 
2. Social security is labour force plus real salary growth. 
3. Source: Braun et al. (2000). 
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TABLE 1:15: MEAN-VARIANCE OPTIMAL PORTFOLIOS WITH A SOCIAL 

























203% 5.6% 60.5% 0% 13.7% 4.1% 7.5% 
Minimum risk. No 
international 
investments 
26.2% 7.6% 66.3% 0% 0% 3.9% 8.1% 
Minimum risk. Up to 
10% international 
21.8% 6.1% 62.0% 0% 10.0% 4.1% 7.5% 
Expected return 5% 
No restriction 
0% 3.1% 76.7% 7.3% 12.9% 5% 8.4% 

















Expected return 5%. 
Up to 10% 
international 
0% 3.8% 86.2% 8.7% 1.3% 5% 8.7% 
Notes: 
1. Domestic assets are IGPA index, money market index (PUC) and social security 
index 
2. International assets are S&P500 and US T-Bills 
3. Based on annual log returns converted into simple returns (1901-2002) 
91 
TABLE 1.16: IGPA AND SECTOR INDICES PERFORMANCE (1928-2002) 





IGPA 73 4.33% 30.02% 1 23.42% 0 
Industrials 73 4.52% 31.08% 91.59% 18.41% 0.004 
Mineral & 
Mining 73 1.18% 45.68% 56.32% 15.50% -0.025 
Banks 73 1.54% 31.83% 64.75% 8.79% -0.014 
IGPA 57 0.97% 29.23% 1 31.80% 0 
Utilities 57 2.24% 39.64% 31.80% 13.46% 0.018 
Notes: 
1. Annual data in real terms 1928-2002 
2. 1973 and 1975 excluded from the sample 
3. The Utilities index is not available between 1976 and 1981 and after 1993 
4. Source: Global Financial Data. 
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TABLE 1.17: SKEWNESS, KURTOSIS AND JARQUE BERA TESTS FOR LOG 
RETURN (1901-2002). 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque Bera P-value 
Bill 
(PUC) -0.13 5.02 16.86 0.0002 
Bill 
(GFD) -0.93 4.61 24.62 0.0000 
Social 
security -1.77 9.95 245.9 0.0000 
IGPA 0.17 3.31 0.88 0.6445 
S&P 500 0.37 4.63 13.06 0.0015 
FTSE 0.22 4.26 7.20 0.0273 
US bond 0.82 4.78 23.82 0.0000 
UK 
bond 0.60 4.49 14.88 0.0006 
US bill 0.62 4.51 15.55 0.0004 
UK bill 0.44 4.14 8.33 0.0155 
Notes: 
1. Variables expressed in pesos and real terms 
2. Years when annualised inflation was higher than 100% are excluded from the 
sample 
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TABLE 1.18: SAMPLE STATISTICS BY SUB-PERIODS (MONTHLY SIMPLE 
REAL RETURNS) 
Sample Mean Standard deviation 
Sharpe 
ratio 
IGPA 1927-1979 0.26% 7.04% 0.04 
1980-2002 0.81% 6.67% 0.12 
1927-2002 0.44% 6.93% 0.06 
IPSA 1980-2002 1.65% 10.90% 0.15 
Chile bill 
(GFD series) 1927-1979 -0.48% 2.39% -0.20 
1980-2002 0.58% 0.99% 0.59 
1927-2002 -0.14% 2.11% -0.07 
US bond 1927-1979 0.55% 8.65% 0.06 
1980-2002 0.95% 4.80% 0.20 
1927-2002 0.67% 7.64% 0.09 
S&P 500 
price index 1927-1979 0.77% 9.67% 0.08 
1980-2002 0.92% 5.75% 0.16 
1927-2002 0.82% 8.61% 0.10 
S&P 500 total 
return 1927-1979 1.16% 9.71% 0.12 
1980-2002 1.19% 5.78% 0.21 
1927-2002 1.17% 8.65% 0.14 
US bill 1927-1979 0.49% 8.49% 0.06 
1980-2002 0.57% 3.43% 0.17 
1927-2002 0.51% 7.27% 0.07 
Notes: 
1. Variables are expressed in real terms 
2. US assets are unhedged 
3. Years when annualised inflation was higher than 100% are excluded from the 
sample 
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TABLE 1.19: CORRELATION MATRICES BY SUB-PERIODS (MONTHLY 
SIMPLE REAL RETURNS) 
1927-1979 





IGPA REAL 1 15.24% 10.59% 20.45% 11.74% 
BILL REAL 15.24% 1 17.53% 15.73% 18.32% 
USBOND 
REAL 10.59% 
17.53% 1 76.70% 99.03% 
SP500NODIV 
REAL 
20.45% 15.73% 76.70% 1 76.61% 














IGPA REAL 1 2.99% -0.88% 16.90% 1.39% 54.04% 
BILL REAL 2.99% 1 0.97% 3.38% 11.30% -6.49% 
USBOND 
REAL -0.88% 0.97% 1 57.75% 79.87% -3.64% 
SP500NODIV 
REAL 16.90% 3.38% 57.75% 1 60.52% 12.06% 
USBILL REAL 1.39% 11.30% 79.87% 60.52% 1 -6.30% 
IPSA REAL 54.04% -6.49% -3.64% 12.06% -6.30% 1 
Notes: 
1. Chilean share price indices IGPA and IPSA are defined in the text. 
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TABLE 1.20: MEAN-VARIANCE OPTIMAL PORTFOLIOS FOR SUB-PERIOD 





































bonds and US 
T-Bills 













bonds and US 
T-Bills 

















bonds and US 
T-Bills 













bonds and US 
T-Bills 
0% 37.8% 23.7% 38.5% 4% 20.8% 
Notes: 
1. Based on annual log returns converted into simple returns (1927-1979) 
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TABLE 1.21: MEAN-VARIANCE OPTIMAL PORTFOLIOS FOR SUB-PERIOD 

































bonds and US 
T-Bills 
96.2% 0% 0% 3.8% 6.2% 6.5% 








bonds and US 
T-Bills 














bonds and US 
T-Bills 
39.6% 50.4% 0% 10.0% 8% 14.5 % 









bonds and US 
T-Bills 
95.7% 0.4% 0% 3.9% 6.3% 6.5% 









bonds and US 
T-Bills 















bonds and US 
T-Bills 
82.4% 7.6% 7.1% 2.9% 8% 7.8% 
Notes: 
1. Based on annual log returns converted into simple returns (1980-2002) 
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TABLE 1.22: REAL IGPA HISTORICAL MODEL: REGRESSION RESULTS 
AND GRANGER CAUSALITY TEST 
Dependent Variable: IGPAREAL 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1901 2001 
Included observations: 101 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error 	t-Statistic Prob. 
C -0.047200 0.035308 	-1.336838 0.1844 
INFL -0.124537 0.058034 	-2.145950 0.0344 
REALGDP 0.832637 0.365538 	2.277843 0.0249 
PESO 0.363092 0.054065 	6.715800 0.0000 
R-squared 0.422224 Mean dependent var 0.044672 
Adjusted R-squared 0.404355 S.D. dependent var 0.382482 
S.E. of regression 0.295192 Akaike info criterion 0.436417 
Sum squared resid 8.452415 Schwarz criterion 0.539986 
Log likelihood -18.03904 F-statistic 23.62837 
Durbi n-Watson stat 1.910064 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
Granger causality (5 lags) 
X= X Granger cause IGPA Real Probability 
IGPA Real 
Granger cause X Probability 
Inflation 4.20 0.019 0.32 0.901 
Real GDP 1.26 0.291 1.29 0.275 
Peso 3.00 0.016 2.50 0.037 
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TABLE 1.23: REAL SALARIES AND FINANCIAL ASSETS: CROSS-
CORRELATIONS WITH LAGS (1901-2002, ANNUAL DATA) 
Lag=0 Lag=1 Lag=2 Lead=1 
IGPA -3.09% 15.98% 22.30% -8.86% 
Bill (PUC) 20.21% -14.66% -17.32% 16.10% 
Bill (GFD) 16.04% -18.59% -21.34% 14.69% 
S&P 500 9.14% -2.82% 10.49% 7.79% 
US T-BILL -4.34% -18.92% -2.63% 6.98% 
Notes: 
1. 	Lag and leads of financial assets' returns with respect to real salary growth 
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TABLE 1.24: REAL SALARIES AND FINANCIAL ASSETS: CROSS-
CORRELATIONS WITH LAGS (1980-2002, MONTHLY DATA) 
Lag=0 Lag=12 Lag=24 Lead=12 
IGPA 24.37% 11.10% 14.20% 16.75% 
Bill (PUC) 32.52% 3.09% 9.74% 11.59% 
S&P 500 -5.64% 0.77% 0.09% 16.91% 
US T-BILL -10.08% -7.74% 1.13% 15.06% 
Notes: 
1. Lag and leads of fmancial assets' returns with respect to real salary growth 
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1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1!95 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
-5 
Notes: 
1. SOURCE: SAFP (www.safp.gob.cl) 
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FIGURE 1.2: BREAKDOWN OF TOTAL AFPs INVESTMENTS AS OF 




El Government Bills and Bonds inc. Central Bank 
	
0 Corporate and Mortgage Bonds 
0 Term Deposits 	 0 Domestic Equities 
IN Mutual Funds and Other Domestic 
	
■Foreign Fixed Income 
■ Foreign Equities,Mutual Funds and Other Foreign 
Notes: 
1. SOURCE: SAFP (www.safp.gob.c1) 
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Notes: 
1. SOURCE: Elaboration on Braun et al. (2000) 
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FIGURE 1.4: REAL SALARY, LABOUR FORCE AND POPULATION 
GROWTH (10-YEAR MOVING AVERAGES) 
20 30 40 60 60 70 80 90 00 
Real Salary — Labor Force — Population 
Notes: 












FIGURE 1.5: CONDITIONAL STANDARD DEVIATION GRAPHS FROM 
GARCH(1,1) MODEL OF CHILEAN REAL STOCK RETURNS 
(1927-2002) 
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1. Dependent variable is Chilean real stock returns (IGPA) 










FIGURE 1.6: COMPARISON OF WEALTH DERIVING FROM 100 PESOS 
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— No social security no restrictions 	—No soc. security max. 10% restriction 








FIGURE 1.7: COMPARISON OF WEALTH DERIVING FROM 100 PESOS 
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Chapter 2 
The Long-run Relationship Between Pension 
Liabilities and Asset Prices: a Cointegration 
Approach 
Summary 
This chapter explores the long-term relationship between 
salaries and asset prices and relates it to the asset allocation decisions 
of defined benefit pension funds. In particular, it discusses whether a 
100% bond allocation is indeed the minimum risk position for an 
ongoing scheme whose benefits accruing to active members rise in 
line with their wages. The main finding is that, while shorter-run 
correlation evidence is less consistent, there is indeed a long-run link 
between the evolution of salary-linked liabilities and a range of asset 
classes including equities. This long-run positive linkage is consistent 
with economic theory. The implications for effective practice in 
minimum risk asset allocation depend on portfolio rebalancing costs; 
how much short and medium-run asset allocations move around the 
long-term equilibrium; as well as how significant active liabilities are 
as a proportion of total pension liabilities. 
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2.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the long-term relationship between salaries and asset prices 
and relates it to asset allocation decisions of defmed benefit pension funds. In particular 
it discusses whether a 100% bond allocation is indeed the minimum risk position for an 
ongoing scheme, where benefits accruing to active members are rising in line with their 
wages. 
This is a slightly different question from the issue of optimal asset allocation, or, 
in other words, from the discussion on whether pension funds should take any extra risk 
relative to their minimum risk position, usually referred to as the liability-matching 
portfolio. The latter debate, spurred by a prolonged bear equity market and by the Boots 
pension fund's decision in 2001 to move its entire portfolio into long-term bonds, 
implicitly assumes that the minimum risk position is a portfolio fully invested in bonds 
(ideally index-linked). Underlying this view is the idea is that a bond portfolio can be 
constructed to match projected liabilities by cash flow, term structure and duration. 
Ryan and Fabozzi (2002) in their discussion of corporate pension funds liabilities in the 
US use the Ryan Labs liability index as a liability benchmark, an index constructed 
using the term structure of zero-coupon Treasury securities, Treasury STRIP S. 
One of the key issues in determining minimum risk portfolios for pension funds 
is to define the liability. If the liability is defmed on an accrued benefit obligation 
(ABO) or accrued rights basis, this is somewhat different than if the liability is defmed 
on a projected benefit obligation (PBO) or on the basis of accrued rights with projected 
salary increases (Bulow, 1985). The liability could also be defmed on a prospective 
benefits basis and in other ways. Each definition of the liability conceivably can result 
in different minimum risk portfolios. 
Under any definition of liabilities, it is important to recognise that there will be 
residual risk. To begin with, bonds carry inflation risk unless an index-linked term 
structure (which is not available in many countries) is used. Furthermore, there is 
reinvestment risk if bonds are not available of long enough duration. Moreover, 
liabilities also carry significant mortality risk. 
The focus of this chapter is on the relationship between salaries and asset returns, 
which is an issue pertinent if the focus is matching liabilities on an ongoing basis. In 
fact, where a scheme is still open to new entrants or accruals, the expectation is 
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normally that it will continue to remain so and therefore one should try to minimise 
risks on the basis of the most likely scenario rather than a scenario with more limited 
liabilities. 
While the implications for pension fund asset allocation of these results depend 
on the objectives and situation of the pension fund, the core results of this chapter are 
about the relationship between salaries and asset returns. The key contribution of the 
chapter is to challenge the assumption of no correlation between aggregate wages and 
asset markets in the long-run. If there is a long-run relationship between wages and 
assets other than bonds and companies have no control over the wage-setting process, a 
100% bond portfolio would no longer be a perfect match for active members' liabilities. 
This leads one to argue that an asset liability modelling exercise should carefully 
consider, alongside the relationship between prices and asset markets (extensively 
studied since Fisher, 1930), a separate relationship between wages and asset prices. The 
Appendix explicitly relates long-run relationships to pension funds minimum risk 
portfolios and shows that the results apply not only to traditional fmal salary pension 
schemes but also to career average plans. 
There are two main approaches that can be taken when evaluating the 
relationship between asset returns and wages: a micro approach using household data, 
typically applied to individual lifestyle asset allocation in a defined contribution setting, 
and a macro approach, which investigates the economic forces shaping the aggregate 
relationship between wages, the stock and the bond market. Although a significant 
divergence arises when it comes to specifying the nature of the relationship between 
asset prices and wages, both approaches generally fmd that a relationship indeed exists. 
Section 2.2 reviews the existing literature which fmds that the hypothesis of zero 
correlation has very limited support in both economic theory and the empirical 
literature. 
This chapter takes a macroeconomic approach and focuses on the long-run. 
There are clear reasons for this. Short-run dynamics are complex and contemporaneous 
correlations may not reflect adjustment to long-run predictions, particularly in markets 
such as labour markets where adjustments take time. Economic theory, nevertheless, 
suggests that correlations should appear in the long-run. An extension of this approach, 
which lies beyond the scope of this chapter, would consider the dynamic relationship 
between wages and asset returns, explicitly taking into account deviations from the 
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long-run equilibrium path and the implications such deviations have for shorter term 
asset allocation. 
With a shorter term focus it would also be possible to assess an actively managed 
strategy relative to an index-tracking strategy, while this chapter's focus is on passive 
strategies. However the extent to which active strategies, exploiting shorter terms 
deviations from the equilibrium, are applicable in the context of pension funds can be 
disputed. The choice between passive and active strategies ultimately depends on the 
frequency of rebalancings. Here governance constraints can play an important role, as 
trustees might not have the time and expertise required to effectively supervise the 
implementation of active market-timing strategies, as highlighted by a recent survey 
performed by Watson Wyatt and Cranfield School of Management (Kakabadse and 
Robinson, 2001) 
The empirical investigation in the chapter is performed using macro data 
referring to the entire UK economy with the objective of shedding some light on the 
nature of the long-term relationship between the level of salary, the bond market, the 
stock market and other asset classes such as property. In order to relate economic theory 
and empirical results to the current debate on pension funds asset allocation, one should 
consider whether an aggregate salary index coupled with the use of salary scales is 
representative of the liability profile of pension funds. 
A fmal salary or a career average pension fund may consider something in 
between the micro and macro approach as being most appropriate, because liabilities are 
affected by salary growth within the scheme members, which is obviously different 
from both individual wage profiles and the rise in aggregate earningsl. Even aggregate 
pension fund liabilities do not rise in line with aggregate earnings because aggregate 
earnings comprise companies and other entities that do not have a defined benefit 
pension scheme. 
However, the bigger the population considered, the smaller will be the margin of 
error caused by using an aggregate earnings index. Moreover, aggregate earnings 
indices such as the Average Earnings Index calculated by the ONS in the UK are 
themselves based on a sample drawn out of all UK companies. There is a classical 
Differences are likely to be less severe if the scheme comprises members with heterogeneous income 
profiles and occupations as well as an age profile of the workforce similar to that of the aggregate index 
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sampling theory issue here: to the extent that there is no systematic difference between 
individual wage profiles and demographic composition within the ONS sample and 
those at a specific firm or group of firms (i.e. one large company or all companies with 
a defmed benefit scheme), an aggregate index is an acceptable proxy. 
In particular, if the age composition of the scheme members deviates 
significantly from that of the general working population, there may be reasons to 
believe that wage growth within the scheme will follow a different path from aggregate 
earnings. If companies enter into long-term contracts with their employees and pay 
them less than their marginal product when they are young and more than their marginal 
product when they are old (Lazear, 1979), other things being equal, companies with a 
younger workforce will experience higher than average wage growth and companies 
with an older workforce will experience lower than average salary increases. 
In addition to that, there might also be industry or regional patterns that will 
affect future earnings growth. While more disaggregated data would be useful in a 
pension liability context, the constraint here is lack of data availability as well as 
comparability of historical data referring to a sub-group, as sub-groups have undergone 
significant transformation over time (mergers & acquisition, closure of DB funds etc.). 
An interesting line for future research would be to investigate in more detail whether 
there are systematic differences between salary increases within companies with defmed 
benefit funds and the broader population, after correcting for other relevant factors. 
Bulow (1985) discusses why the age distribution of earnings may be different in 
companies with final salary pension schemes. His argument is that because in defmed 
benefit pension plans the employer gives higher pension benefits to older workers, this 
should be counterbalanced by lower salaries towards the end of the career than in firms 
without pension plans or with defmed contribution arrangements. This would imply that 
companies with defmed benefit schemes retain a margin of discretion over future wage 
increases and might be able to convince workers to accept lower than average salary 
increases to compensate for more generous pension benefits. However, whilst this is an 
important theoretical argument, there is little empirical evidence in support of this view 
at the present time. 
From a company perspective, the conclusions of the chapter on correlation 
between aggregate earnings and asset markets would be a key reference point, from 
which departures may be justified only to the extent that there are reasons to believe that 
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salary increases within the firm will be systematically different from aggregate salaries 
(e.g. because the age structure of the workforce does not match the age structure of the 
salary index). 
2.2 Review of the Literature 
The traditional Markovitz (1959) portfolio choice framework hinges upon the 
two-fund separation theorem, which states that every investor holds the same risky 
assets portfolio, combined with the risk-free asset in different proportions, depending on 
individual risk aversion. Besides the problems arising when it comes to translating this 
result, based on a one-period optimisation, into long-term portfolio choice (see 
Campbell and Viceira, 2002), there is another simplifying assumption in this 
framework: the portfolio of financial assets is considered in isolation, without 
attempting to incorporate the labour income process. Bodie et al. (1992), Heaton and 
Lucas (1997), and subsequently Campbell et al. (1999), Heaton and Lucas (2000) and 
Davis and Willen (2000), have argued that individuals, in addition to their fmancial 
holdings, have an implicit holding in a non-tradable assets (human capital), whose 
dividends are typically paid every month in the form of salaries. In this context, 
portfolio choice can be significantly affected by the nature of the stochastic process for 
labour income. 
Bodie et al. (1992) argue that labour supply flexibility, the risk profile of human 
capital returns and correlation between wages and risky asset returns influence 
individual investment strategy decisions. Davis and Willen (2000) show that the two-
fund separation theorem breaks down if risky assets returns are correlated with the 
labour income process. They estimate occupational level income changes for 10 
different occupations using US data from the Current Population Survey from 1967 to 
1994. While they do not find significant correlation between aggregate earnings and a 
broad stock market index, they report significant evidence of co-movements between 
earnings in certain occupational categories and both the bond market and the Fama and 
French (1993) small cap stock portfolio (the SMB portfolio). Campbell et al. (2000) 
find that the correlation between occupational earnings changes and both long-term 
bonds and aggregate stock returns is higher for workers with higher education. Benzoni 
et al. (2005) investigate the implication for portfolio choice of long-run correlation 
between labour income and market returns and conclude that, under plausible 
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calibration, the optimal portfolio choice for young investors is to take a short position in 
the risky portfolio. 
Using these micro approaches, the extent to which there is a pattern of 
correlation between asset returns and earnings innovations, or salary growth, is 
ultimately an empirical question. Macroeconomic approaches on the other hand look at 
the aggregate picture to discuss why there should be a correlation between the labour 
market and asset markets. 
Textbook economics teaches that, given appropriate assumptions on the 
aggregate production function of an economy (i.e. constant returns to scale), the value 
of human capital should move in line with the value of the capital stock, unless factor 
income shares vary significantly over time. And, if asset prices reflect fundamentals and 
both future salaries and future dividends are discounted at similar rates, the outcome 
should be a fairly high positive correlation between salary growth and domestic stock 
returns (see for instance Baxter and Jermann, 1995). 
However, complications arise when demand factors and savings-consumption 
decisions are incorporated into the model. Lucas (1978) assumed a long-run one-to-one 
relationship between dividends, consumption and output in the context of a pure 
exchange economy, where dividends are seen as a claim on the overall output of the 
economy. In a general equilibrium model of asset prices, productivity shocks are 
associated with the behaviour of asset prices, where assets are defined as "claims to all 
or part of the output" produced in a number of different productive units. In particular, 
Lucas (1978) showed that the relationship between asset prices and productivity shocks 
is complex even in a highly simplified economy with identical consumers and a single 
good produced. This is because a rise in productivity increases the demand for assets on 
the one hand, as individuals have more resources through higher wages, (the income 
effect), but on the other hand higher productivity carries new optimistic information 
about future dividends (the information effect), which may in principle have either a 
positive or a negative effect on asset prices2. The bottom line is that, even in the 
simplest economy one could think of, Lucas argues that "the relationship between real 
output and asset prices is far from simple and possible not even monotonic." 
2 The positive effect arises because individuals would demand more assets in anticipation of higher 
dividends, while the negative effect has to do with the fact people would consume more and save less as 
they anticipate higher salaries in the future 
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In a similar setting, Barsky (1989) attempted to shed more light on the 
relationship between the real economy and bond and stock prices. Barsky considers the 
effect on asset prices of (1) a fall in expected growth of productivity and (2) an increase 
in the dispersion (risk) of the future productivity growth probability distribution. The 
conclusions arising from the analysis are: 
1. The real risk free interest rate falls when expected productivity growth decreases or 
its risk increases, for a given expected value. This is because individuals would save 
more in order to compensate for lower expected income or higher income risk in the 
future, raising prices and depressing yields on riskless securities (precautionary 
demand for saving). Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990) reach a similar conclusion. 
2. The effect on nominal bond returns is ambiguous because this depends on the 
stochastic process of money supply and money demand. 
3. The effect on stock prices is also ambiguous because negative productivity shocks 
imply lower demand for stocks on the one hand, as future dividends are expected to 
be lower but, on the other hand, higher demand for stocks as a result of the 
precautionary saving motive, which tends to lower the required rate of return on 
stocks3. 
It appears therefore that there is indeed a link between the real economy and 
asset prices but it is a very difficult exercise to predict asset prices through productivity 
shocks. This might explain why most attempts to predict the behaviour of the stock 
market used valuation ratios such as the dividend yield or the price earnings ratio as 
predictors (see Campbell and Thompson, 2005 for a review of alternative models), 
rather than explicitly relating asset prices with trends in the real economy proxied by 
variables such as productivity or real salary growth. 
Santos and Veronesi (2001) is one of the few empirical attempts to relate stock 
return predictability with the real economy. They estimate a model with a time-varying 
equity risk premium depending on the ratio between labour income and consumption. 
The intuition behind their approach is that the required rate of returns on stocks will be 
lower when labour income as a percentage of total income is high because in this case 
the bulk of consumption is not related to stock market returns. Another example is 
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Lettau and Ludvigson (2001), which estimates a cointegrating relationship between 
consumption, aggregate labour income and fmancial wealth to predict stock returns. 
The macroeconomic empirical literature has thus far failed to reach a consensus 
on the nature of the relationship between asset prices and salaries. Fama and Schwert 
(1977a) found little evidence of correlation between income and stock returns with post 
WWII data because, while income provided a reasonable inflation hedge, in the same 
period stock returns and inflation had been negatively correlated. Subsequent studies, 
focusing on correlation between wages and domestic equities have come to different 
conclusions. 
Bottazzi, Pesenti and van Wincoop (1996) even found a negative correlation 
pattern in most countries and argued that wages could move in the opposite direction to 
stock prices due to shocks affecting the bargaining power of workers or positive 
demand shocks asymmetrically affecting real wages and real profits, when wages are 
less flexible than prices. The problem with this approach is that, although it appears to 
represent an accurate description of certain observed patterns (i.e. the 1970s in Britain), 
a negative correlation becomes problematic if its long-run implications are considered. 
If stock prices grow in the long-term, the counterintuitive implication is that real wages 
should fall and this would be probably consistent only with a neo-Marxist interpretation 
of capitalist economies. 
It is probably more appropriate to consider these results as the product of 
relatively short-term dynamics, whereby demand factors (as in Barsky, 1989) play a key 
role or real wages and productivity are not aligned. Ball and Moffitt (2001), Blanchard 
and Katz (1997) and Stiglitz (1997) argue that real wages are tied closely to labour 
productivity in the long-run, although they can deviate substantially in the short-term 
because shifts in productivity may not be immediately reflected in shifts in wage 
aspirations. Conversely, in a Barsky (1989)-type of model, if a productivity shock 
causing present and future productivity to rise leads people to save less, depressing 
stock prices, this could eventually depress productivity, maintaining a long-term 
relationship between the equity market and productivity. 
3 This is true only if productivity shocks do not increase the correlation between stock market returns and 
consumption because in this case the required rate of return would tend to increase to reflect the higher 
risk of investing in the stock market 
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The implications of the discussion so far are the following: portfolio choices 
would be significantly affected if human capital returns are correlated with fmancial 
returns and economic theory would suggest a positive long-term relationship between 
stock returns and wage growth. 
If this is indeed the case, a 100% investment in bonds may not be the minimum 
risk portfolio to hedge defined benefit liabilities. Sharpe (2002) shows that pension fund 
liabilities can be incorporated in an asset-only optimisation problem by taking into 
account the covariance between asset returns and the growth of liabilities. Within this 
framework, a positive allocation to stocks would probably have risk-reducing properties 
if there is a link between wage-related liabilities and equities. 
There is an ongoing debate within the actuarial community on the correlation 
between equities and salaries and its implications for defined benefit plans asset 
allocation. Wilkie (1995) developed a stochastic model for actuarial use which does not 
include a relationship between equities and salaries in real terms, although he fmds 
some evidence of correlation between dividends and wages. The chapter also considers 
a vector autoregressive model of wages and prices and, although the estimated 
coefficient in the price-salary relationship is greater than 1, a one-to-one relationship 
model is recommended. 
Exley, Mehta and Smith (1997) attempt to price a hypothetical National Average 
Earnings-linked bond and argue that wage growth has been historically better hedged by 
index-linked bond income as opposed to equity income (dividends). They also estimate 
a regression model to investigate the nature of the hedging portfolio for NAE growth if 
index-linked instruments are not available and find no substantial equity component. 
Smith (1998) derived a discrete representation of a continuous time stationary process 
driving salary increases and fitted an ARMA (1,1) model, finding a coefficient lower 
than one for prices and an insignificant relationship between salaries and dividends. 
This would prove the hedging portfolio for salaries is made up by a mixture of index-
linked as well as conventional gilts, given that wage increases are muted at times of 
high inflation. 
However, these contributions hardly provide a defmite conclusion on the role of 
equities in minimum risk portfolios of defined benefit pension funds. Firstly, hedging 
portfolios have not been stable over time and may also depend on the mix of assets 
included in the analysis. Randall and Satchell (1999) show that the equity share rises to 
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25% if the period 1981-1996 is considered and the 1970s are excluded. It is worth 
noting that correlation between earnings and prices may also depend on institutional 
features of the labour market, such as union-sponsored pay deals or collective 
agreements with compulsory indexation, which are the norm in France and Germany 
(the other two countries considered by Exley, Mehta and Smith, 1997) and in the UK 
were more prevalent in the 1970s than today. 
Secondly, hedging portfolios essentially rely on short-term correlation of returns. 
However, pension funds do not make payments indexed to the National Average 
Earnings Index and therefore do not need to match salary growth on a period by period 
basis. If one takes this into account the question becomes: what is the most appropriate 
mix of assets matching liabilities indexed to the long-term growth in the salary index? 
Clearly, the exact definition of long-term depends on the specific characteristics of the 
fund (maturity of active members' liabilities). 
2.3 Data 
Ideally, to be able to test the relationship between wages, productivity and the 
equity market, we should use indices referring to the same companies. In practice, this 
is not possible because aggregate earnings indices and the broadest stock market index 
do not include the same firms: some listed firms will not be accounted for in the wage 
index, if it is calculated from survey data, while the salary index will comprise several 
non-listed firms. This is an important methodological caveat and, when interpreting 
patterns in the data, it must not be forgotten that measurement errors can arise there. 
This is also why we focused on the broadest available indices, rather than considering 
sub-groups, in which the likelihood of measurement error is significantly higher. 
Three UK data sets are considered in most of the analysis: a monthly and a 
quarterly one for the period 1963-20024, and a long-term annual data set (1850-2001). 
In the quarterly sample two alternative salary indices are considered: the longest index 
based on survey data: the Average Earnings Index (AEI) with base 1995=100, supplied 
by the Office of National Statistics5, and the total compensation of employees series out 
of UK national accounts (from now on referred to as wages). The latter enable to track 
4 The quarterly sample comprise data from the first quarter of 1963 to the third quarter of 2002 (1963:1 to 
2002:3), while the monthly one is from January 1963 to October 2002 (1963:1 to 2002:10) 
5 Both the seasonally adjusted and the non-seasonally adjusted versions of the index are considered, but 
the results presented in the paper use the seasonally adjusted version 
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the evolution over time of the share of total output accruing to workers. Figure 2.1 
shows the two indices are broadly similar, although during the recession of the early 
1990s the AEI index is smoother than the national accounts series. In the monthly 
sample only the Average Earnings Index (AEI) series is available. 
In the annual sample, a wage index is derived using the historical index in 
Mitchell (1994), until 1963, consistently with other studies of long-run economic 
relationships in the UK (i.e. Chadha and Nolan, 2002), and the average earnings index 
thereafter. There are two series for real wages: real wages (1), created by deflating 
Mitchell (1994) money wages using the consumer price index in Global Financial Data6 
and real wages (2), which uses the real wage index in Mitchell (1994) until 1913, and is 
equal to real wages (1) thereafter. The results are presented using real wages (2), which 
employs a consistent approach to track historical money wages and prices. 
A historical stock market index developed by Global Financial Data tracks the 
performance of Bank of England stocks until 1917 and the broadest available panel of 
companies thereafter. For bonds a composite index was constructed using total return on 
consols before 1932 and 10-year government bonds thereafter, both supplied by Global 
Financial Data. This is because until the 1930s consols were the only segment of the UK 
bond market with substantial liquidity, as documented by Dimson, Marsh and Staunton 
(2002). In the quarterly and monthly data sets the equity index corresponds to the FTSE 
Actuaries General/All-Share index and the bond index is the 10-year gilt total return 
index. For index-linked bonds, a price index available from Global Financial Data and a 
total return index based on CAPS data were used since 1981, when the first index-
linked bond was issued. 
As a proxy for short-term investments we chose the bill total return index 
calculated by Global Financial Data, which uses the 3-month yield on commercial bills 
from 1800 to 1899 and the yield on treasury bills from 1900 onwards. As a proxy for 
international equity investments the chapter uses the S&P 500 both converted in pound 
sterling with end of month USD/GBP historical exchange rates from Global Financial 
Data. 
6 This index uses a variety of sources including Mitchell (1998) for the 19th century and until 1915 and is 
equal to the retail price index calculated by the Central Statistical Office (Office of National Statistics 
after 1996) thereafter 
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Finally, a house price index, the Nationwide House Price index, which is 
available from the early 1950s is also considered in the quarterly and monthly data sets. 
Unlike the other indices, this is not a total return index but reflects only the capital 
appreciation component of property investments. A reliable historical total return index 
incorporating rental yields is however not available. In this context, house prices were 
chosen as a proxy for the behaviour of pension fund property portfolios, which are 
however largely made up of commercial property. However, indices of commercial 
property total return are not available on a consistent basis since the 1960s, as discussed 
by Cardinale (2003) in more detail. 
Real salary, equity, bond, bill and house prices series are constructed using the 
Retail Price Index (RPI), calculated by the Central Statistical Office (Office of National 
Statistics after 1996), as a deflator. 
In order to better understand the relationship between wages and the stock 
market the chapter also considers measures of corporate profits, dividends and 
productivity, which are available on a consistent basis for the quarterly data set. There 
are two indices of corporate profits: earnings per share of listed companies, calculated 
as the ratio of FTSE All Share price index and its Price/Earnings ratio, both supplied by 
Global Financial Data, and gross profits of corporations from national accounts. The 
two series differ mainly because the second includes profits of non-listed companies and 
self-employed. Dividends are calculated as the product of the Dividend Yield series and 
the FTSE All Share price index, both supplied by Global Financial Data. For 
productivity the two most widely employed productivity measures calculated by the 
Central Statistical Office (Office of National Statistics after 1996) are employed: output 
per filled job and output per job. 
Finally, the last section makes reference to a longer-term monthly sample 
(January 1920-March 2003), which uses a historical inflation and stock market total 
return indices from Global Financial Data, in conjunction with a historical wage index, 
calculated by Watson Wyatt combining historical aggregate wage indices from Central 
Statistical Office (interpolated between 1920 and 1934), and a longer term bond index, 
calculated by Watson Wyatt using consols until 1981 and over 15 years bonds thereafter 
(Global Financial Data uses 10-year bonds). 
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2.4 Time-series properties of wages and asset prices 
This section focuses on basic time-series properties of wages and assets using the 
quarterly and the annual data sets described in the previous section. Figures 2.1-2.3 plot 
nominal and real series in the quarterly data set. Nominal wages, bonds and bills display 
almost uninterrupted increases, while UK and US equities as well as house prices 
appear to be characterised by breaks in their growth process. For UK and US equities 
this happened with the market downturn in the late 1990s, while for property the same 
can be said for the fall in house prices of the early 1990s. With variables in real terms 
the pattern is even less predictable. Real salaries, bonds and bills fell in the 1970s while 
real property display three clear 'boom and bust' cycles, consistently with the Grenadier 
(1995) hypothesis. 
Figures 2.4-2.6 take a longer term view and plot nominal and real seal series 
from 1850 using the annual data set. We broke the sample in two for nominal variables 
(1850-1949 in Figure 2.4 and 1950-2001 in Figure 2.5) for convenience because wages 
and nominal assets have grown with unprecedented speed after WWII. Interestingly, no 
series displays a steady growth pattern if pre-WWII data are included in the sample. 
Equities displayed two 'boom and bust' cycles between the 1920s and 1930s, while 
salaries saw a spectacular increase in the 1910s, followed by a drop in the early 1920s, 
and nominal bonds suffered between 1900 and 1930. Interestingly, real bonds display a 
steady growth only after the 1970s, given that before they fell twice (mid 1920s and mid 
1970s) and were stable in between. Real equities on the other hand display an 
unprecedented growth after the 1950s, in line with the pattern observed for the nominal 
series. 
Assuming that the series are difference stationary (e.g., 41)) 7, a reasonable 
assumption for many economic series, we can focus on the properties of the first 
difference series (the assumption will be formally verified in Section 2.7 with unit root 
tests). As the analysis is carried out in log terms, first difference series will be 
equivalent to log returns (or log salary inflation) series. Log or continuosly compounded 
returns are widely used in fmance because the assumption of normality is empirically 
7 Difference stationarity means that although the series in levels trend over time, the series obtained by 
taking the first difference of each element of the original series (if the original series is y, the first 
difference series is obtaining by working out y, —y,_, for each t) is stationary. Nelson and Plosser (1982) 
were the first to show that important macroeconomic variables are difference stationary rather than trend 
stationary 
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more robust for log rather than simple returns. However log returns underestimate true 
underlying simple returns and the magnitude of underestimation is higher the higher is 
the variance in absolute terms (i.e. with annual returns). Fama (1976) is a key reference 
on this. 
Basic sample statistics are presented in Table 2.1 (nominal returns) and 2.2 (real 
returns) for the quarterly sample and in Table 2.3 for the annual data set. As already 
observed before, stocks have grown at unprecedented speed after the 1950s8. In the 
1963-2002 quarterly sample UK equity log returns have been on average 2.95% 
quarterly in nominal terms (11.8% annually) against an overall 7.2% average in the 
annual 1850-2001 sample. Similar results arise for bonds and wages, both in nominal 
and real terms, suggesting that the economy as a whole has experienced a faster rate of 
growth between the early 1960s and 2002. 
Contemporaneous correlation matrices between nominal and real variables are 
presented in Tables 2.4-2.6. Interestingly, in the 1963-2002 sample only bills and house 
price growth have been highly positively correlated with nominal wage growth, both 
using the AEI and the total compensation index. In real terms bonds were also 
positively correlated with wages, especially using the national accounts index. Equity 
returns on the other hand have been negatively correlated or uncorrelated with salary 
growth, both in real and nominal terms. 
With the annual sample neither bonds nor stocks have been highly correlated 
with nominal wages while in real terms both real bonds and real stocks were highly 
correlated with real wages (1) (derived using the Global Financial Data price deflator). 
We also considered contemporaneous correlation in real terms using index-linked bonds 
(with monthly data), but the results are only referred to the sub-sample 1982-2002 and 
are not shown in the table. Index-linked bond returns are highly correlated with real 
bond returns using the deflated 10-year government bond series (around 50%) while 
correlation between index-linked returns and real salary growth is lower than with real 
bonds (less than 10%). 
However, contemporaneous correlation is not an adequate yardstick when it 
comes to evaluate a long-run pattern of dependency because co-movements are not 
likely to be contemporaneous. We therefore considered the time-series properties of 
8 Cardinale (2002) shows this in detail by considering two centuries of stock and bond markets data 
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wages and asset returns, in particular autocorrelations and cross-correlations. Partial 
autocorrelation computed with quarterly data are presented in Table 2.7. 
With the 1963-2002 quarterly data set nominal salary returns are highly 
positively correlated with returns in the previous quarter (around 60% correlation both 
with AEI and national accounts) and with returns with a lag of 4 or 5 quarters (over 
20% partial autocorrelation). House price growth displays a similar pattern (62% 
positive correlation with previous quarter growth and partial autocorrelation of 21% 
with three quarter lagged growth). Bill returns are characterised by a very high positive 
correlation with returns in the previous quarter (94%) but they display signs of mean 
reversion at lag 2 (-24% partial autocorrelation). 
Conversely, bond and equity quarterly returns are not significantly correlated 
with returns in the previous quarter and present a lower degree of correlation even at 
higher lags. Bond returns are only significantly negatively correlated with returns 8 and 
9 quarters before, perhaps indicating a pattern of mean reversion with a length 
comparable to a business cycle. For equity returns there appears to be a positive 
dependency at lag 1 and a negative correlation at lag 4 but none of these 
autocorrelations is significant at conventional levels (5%) because they all lie within 
two standard error bounds. 
In real terms, salary growth displays a high and significant negative correlation 
with two- quarters lagged growth (three-quarters with the national accounts index) and a 
positive correlation with four and eight-quarters lagged growth. With both indices 
autocorrelation at lag 1 is no longer significant. 
Interestingly, real property and stocks returns are characterised by a very similar 
autocorrelation pattern to their corresponding nominal returns. Real bonds on the other 
hand display significant partial autocorrelation at lag 2 and 4 (positive) and 9 (negative). 
Finally real bills characterised by high positive dependency at lag 1, 2, 4 and 8. 
With the annual data set (not shown), salary growth is significantly positively 
correlated with 1-year lagged previous year salary increases (58%), and with 5-year 
lagged salary growth (19%). Nominal stocks display positive dependency at lag 4 while 
signs of long-term mean reversion (negative partial autocorrelation) are visible only 
with a 15-year lag. Nominal bonds are characterised by positive and significant 
dependency at lag 1, 2, 5 and 8. 
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In real terms using both price deflators, wages display a pattern of long-run mean 
reversion at higher lags, similar to real stocks, while real bonds are only characterised 
by positive dependency at lag 1. 
In summary, the analysis of autocorrelation functions suggests a similarity 
between the process driving nominal wages and house price growth in the quarterly data 
set. In the annual data set nominal bond returns appear to be characterised by a more 
similar process to nominal wages with respect to equities. In real terms however no 
asset return process closely resembled real salary growth in the quarterly 1963-2002 
sample, although real bonds have been a better proxy than real stocks, while in the 
annual long-term data set real equities have been a better proxy than real bonds. 
The next step is to consider explicitly the correlation between asset returns and 
salary growth using both lags and leads. This is performed using cross correlograms and 
the results (using the average earnings index and the quarterly data set) are shown in 
Figures 2.7 and 2.8. Positive lags refers to the relationship between salary growth and 
past asset returns, while negative lags represent the relationship between asset returns 
and past salary growth. 
In nominal terms the most striking patterns of dependence in the quarterly data 
set are those between salary growth and property returns and between salary growth and 
bill returns. With house prices, positive correlation between salary growth and up to 12-
quarter lagged property returns is always higher than 20% (reaching 50% with a lag of 9 
quarters) and is statistically significant. Conversely, correlation between property 
returns and past salary growth is not as strong. With bills, there is a stronger relationship 
between bill returns and past salary growth. This overall pattern might be interpreted as 
follows: housing booms lead to higher nominal wages and higher inflation, which put 
pressure on interest rates. Finally, with bond and equities there appears to be a positive, 
albeit weaker, relationship between bond and stock returns with past salary increases 
(especially at lag 2 or 3 and 10). 
In real terms the pattern is different. There is evidence of negative correlations of 
bills, bonds and equity returns with past salary increases. This is evident at shorter lags 
for bills (2 and 3 quarters) and higher lags for stocks and bonds (7 quarters). This can be 
read as evidence of a negative effect of high real salary increases on subsequent real 
interest rates, possibly because of increasing demand for savings (income effect). There 
appears also to be further evidence of mean reversion for the real bond process, given 
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that contemporaneous correlation with wages is positive and significant, while it is less 
straightforward to justify for equities given that correlation at shorter lags was not 
significant. 
Real salary increases on the other hand appear to be positively correlated with 
past stock and bond returns 12 quarters before (16%), 2 quarters lagged bond returns 
(21%), 8 quarters lagged house price growth (17%) and real bills returns 4 and 8 
quarters before (respectively 26% and 32%). This would suggest that healthy real 
returns in asset markets contribute to create the conditions for real salary growth, 
although this pattern of dependency does not follow symmetrical cycles in different 
asset markets. 
With the annual long-term data set, cross correlogram analysis shows a stronger 
positive relationship between bond and equity returns with past nominal wages (with a 
peak corresponding to a 7-year lag, 37% correlation for bonds and 28% for equities). 
Nominal wages on the other hand display a moderate level of positive correlation with 
lagged bond returns (18% with a lag of 3 and 7 years) and no significant correlation 
with past stock returns. 
In real terms there are little signs of a significant pattern of cross-correlation both 
between bonds and salaries and between equities and salaries. The only exceptions are 
negative correlation between real salary growth and 1-year lagged bonds and positive 
correlation between real bonds and 4-year lagged real salary growth. 
In conclusion, cross-correlation analysis suggests a complex pattern of 
dependency and interactions between salary growth and asset markets and not a perfect 
relationship with any of the assets taken individually. 
2.5 Long-term Economic Relationships: 
Cointegration 
At the heart of economic theory is the notion of equilibrium and most theoretical 
models describe patterns of dependency or interaction between economic variables 
when markets are in equilibrium. Examples of equilibrium relationships are equations 
linking market prices (i.e. stock prices, bond prices, exchange rates) to "fundamentals", 
which are the factors believed to be relevant to determine prices. 
Granger (1981) argues that many economic variables may drift apart in the short-
run, but, if they continue to be too far apart in the long-run, economic forces (the market 
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itself or in some cases even government intervention) will act to bring them together 
again. Examples of this could be interest rates on assets of different maturities, prices 
and wages or prices of a commodity in different parts of the same country. 
However, assessing whether long-term relationships truly hold is essentially an 
empirical question. Markets may not reflect fundamentals because either they are 
irrational even in the long-term or because fundamentals are not correctly specified. 
Granger (1981) introduced cointegration as a way of statistically characterising 
equilibrium. Cointegration in itself does not imply equilibrium in any behavioural sense, 
it just describes the tendency of two or more economic variables to move towards a 
particular region of the possible outcome space. Furthermore, as shown by Campbell 
and Shiller (1988) deviations from long run relationships or equilibrium errors could 
causes changes in the variables of the model or could themselves result from agents' 
forecast of these changes (e.g. the long term interest may reflect agents' rational 
expectation on the future of the short interest rate). 
The concept of cointegration is an extension of the theory of non-stationary time-
series. The starting point is that most economic variables are characterised by the 
presence of a stochastic trend or, in other words, they exhibit systematic variations over 
time, which are hardly predictable (Maddala and In-Moo Kim, 1998). This leads to the 
famous problem of spurious regression first mentioned by Yule (1926), the fact standard 
regression analysis is not applicable to judge dependency between two non-stationary 
series. However, Engle and Granger (1987) showed that, if a linear combination of two 
or more non-stationary series (i.e. y- A x) displays a mean-reverting behaviour, then 
there is a long-term equilibrium between the series as they share a common stochastic 
trend. It has also been showed that the cointegrating coefficient A, can be efficiently 
estimated using ordinary least squares9 and that cointegration is consistent with both 
discrete time and continuous time models19. 
Cointegration between two variables implies that, if the system is to return to its 
long-run equilibrium, at least one of the two responds to the magnitude of the 
disequilibrium. For instance, if we believe wages and the stock market are cointegrated, 
9 Stock (1987) showed that not only least squares is consistent for the true cointegrating coefficient but 
also that it converges to its true value faster than a coefficients estimated with stationary variables 
because of the infinite variance of all other linear combinations 
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then, when the positive gap between the two is large relative to the long-run 
relationship, at least one of the following must be true: 1) wages decrease and/or stock 
prices increase, 2) wages decrease more than stock prices, 3) stock prices increase more 
than wages. 
This intuition can be formalised with a full error correction model of the form: 
L 	 L 
A yt =oti -Fay(y,- A .0+ Ea ll(i) A Y,_,+ E a i,(0A 
i=1 1=1 
where ay, is the adjustment coefficient capturing the speed at which variable y converge 
to its long-term equilibrium position. Bearing in mind the example above, it is clear that 
not all adjustments coefficients need to be significantly different from zero, that is not 
all the variables in the system necessarily respond to deviations from the equilibrium (if 
they do not they are said to be block exogeneous). An important corollary to the error 
correction representation of two cointegrated series is that Granger causality (Granger, 
1969) must run at least in one direction. This means that past values of one variable 
must help forecast the other". 
Since the 1980s when the concept of cointegration was formalised, a significant 
empirical literature has emerged applying the theory to a vast number of economic 
relationships. Some significant papers were Friedman and Kuttner (1992), who looked 
at the long-term relationship between monetary policy variables (money, income, prices 
and interest rates), Kremers (1989) who argued that there is a long-term equilibrium 
between government debt and GNP, Johansen and Juselius (1990), who introduced a 
new procedure to test for cointegration and applied it to a demand for money equation 
with Danish data and Diebold, Gardeazabal and Yilmaz (1994), who used cointegration 
to study exchange rate dynamics. 
There has been recently a growing interest in cointegration models to study the 
behaviour of financial markets. An early reference in this area is Campbell and Shiller 
(1986), who estimated a long-term relationship between long-term and short-term 
interest rates as well as between stock prices and dividends. Tokat, Rachev and Schwatz 
(2003) estimate a long-run cointegrating relationship between the S&P 500 price index, 
inflation, the dividend yield (under the assumption that it is non stationary), Treasury 
m Phillips (1988) showed that the long-run parameter of a continuous time model can be estimated from 
discrete data by formulating and estimating the corresponding discrete time error correction model 
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bill and bond rates. Bessler and Young (2003) extended Kasa (1992) work using 
cointegration and error correction models to estimate dynamic relationships between 
nine major stock markets. Finally, Cassola and Morana (2002) investigate, among 
others, the relationship between stock market and economic growth in the Euro area. 
Finally, as discussed previously, Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) apply cointegration to 
forecast stock returns using a combination of consumption, income and wealth. 
In the actuarial literature Sherris, Tedesco and Zenwirth (1999) worked on 
cointegration with Australian data, exploring whether there was evidence of a long-run 
equilibrium relationship between short and long-term interest rates, dividends and 
consumer prices as well as the stock market and consumer prices. Kuo, Tsai and Chen 
(2003) applied cointegration to the study of insurance policy lapse ratios to capture the 
dynamics between lapse rates, interest rates and unemployment in the US. 
Little work has been carried out so far on the implications of cointegration 
between asset prices for asset allocations of long-term investors. One example here is 
Andre Lucas (1997) which illustrates implications of cointegration for strategic and 
tactical asset allocation using the example of foreign exchange management, relating 
strategic asset allocation to the long-run equilibrium relationship and tactical asset 
allocation to the error correction model. Another significant example is Benzoni et al. 
(2005), which calibrates a theoretical risky asset model with cointegrated labour income 
and finds empirical evidence to support the hypothesis of stationary labour to capital 
income ratio in the US. 
2.6 Key properties of the series: trends and unit roots 
Cointegration theory is built on the premise that each individual series is non-
stationary and cointegration tests (Section 2.6 will expand on this) provide different 
results depending on assumptions about the data generating process of the individual 
series (i.e. presence of an intercept and/or of a linear deterministic time trend). This 
section will focus on the key properties of salary and asset return series. All series 
considered are in log terms. 
In order to test the hypothesis of non-stationarity we apply to all series of interest 
the two most widely used unit root tests: Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Phillips- 
11 See Granger (1991) for a proof 
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Perron12. Both tests require the estimation of parameters in the regression (1) below 
using an appropriate number of lags to eliminate residual autocorrelation and including 
both intercept and trend. 
A xt = ao+alt +7 	E 0, A xt_i+i -F 6, 
i=2 
(2) 
where Ax, is the series constructed taking first differences of the variable of interest 
(xt-xt_i), t is a time trend and p is the number of lags chosen (in general we chose four 
lags with quarterly and one lag with annual data as no significant residual 
autocorrelation appeared). 
Using the ADF or Phillips-Perron regression, testing the hypothesis of non-
stationarity is equivalent to testing the hypothesis y =0 using ad-hoc critical values 13. At 
the same time, the ADF and Phillips-Perron framework enable to test whether, under the 
hypothesis of non-stationarity, the process is likely to contain an intercept and a linear 
deterministic trend component (this involve testing the hypotheses ao=ai=0 and a0=0 
given a1=0 in the regression above, again using ad-hoc critical values). 
Unit root test statistics on wages and assets were calculated using an appropriate 
number of lags to control for residual autocorrelation, starting with the assumption of 
both intercept and trend in the data generating process. Table 2.8 reports the results 
using Phillips Perron test statistics with four lags (as it is recommended with quarterly 
data), which appears to be more appropriate because residuals from several of the ADF 
regressions display signs of heteroskedasticity. Most conclusions do not change 
employing ADF test statistics, but, when differences arise, these are reported in the text. 
Table 2.9 reports the results obtained with the annual data set (Phillips Perron tests with 
1-year lag). 
12 In general the Augmented Dickey Fuller test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) is more powerful with 
autoregressive processes or processes with negative moving average components, while Phillips Perron 
(Phillips and Perron, 1988) is recommended for processes containing positive moving average terms (see 
Enders, 1995). The main difference between the two is that Phillips-Perron allows less restrictive 
assumption on the distribution of the error terms 
13 If 7=0 the series in level would be characterised by a unit root process (xt=Xt- t+Et), which implies non-
stationarity 
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2.6.1 Earnings and wages 
The monthly and quarterly data sets are considered first. The reported results are 
based on variables in logs and the quarterly data set but no significant differences arise 
using monthly data. Nominal salaries increased faster during the 1970s (an average of 
over 3.5% on a quarter to quarter basis compared to just above 2% in the overall 
sample), slowly in the 1980s and 1990s and were almost flat in the 1960s. In fact a 
regression of quarterly salary growth on 4 time dummy variables representing each 
decade explain almost 40% of the variance of nominal salary growth14. 
From the ADF regression we concluded that the data generating process was not 
likely to include an intercept or deterministic time trend component, while the Phillips 
Perron test suggested a time trend might be present. In this case we believe Phillips 
Perron is defmitely more appropriate because residuals from the ADF equation appear 
clearly heteroskedastic. 
It is not straightforward to determine the order of integration of the data-
generating process of nominal wages because the Augmented Dickey Fuller tests cannot 
reject the hypothesis of a second unit root for both wage indices, although the test 
statistic is not far from the rejection area. Phillips-Perron on the other hand suggest the 
process is 41), or difference stationary15. The long-term data set should provide more 
clues as to whether the nominal salary returns series can be considered stationary, 
although the rate of growth has been so remarkably different across sub-periods after 
the 1960s. 
The picture is different when we consider real salaries because there is no 
evidence of a significantly different rate of growth across sub-periods. We can also 
confirm that inflation and not real salaries caused nominal wage growth to differ 
significantly across decades. If we regress inflation on the 4 period dummies, we obtain 
in fact highly significant coefficients and a R-squared of 35%. 
With real salaries on the other hand, there is some evidence of a possible 
structural change occurring shortly after the 1975 oil crisis when real salary growth has 
been negative for a number of quarters. If we perform Perron (1989) regression on UK 
real wages (the total compensation series) using the fourth quarter of 1975 as a 
14 Similar results were obtained with the AEI and the wage index from national accounts 
15 This means that the series constructing by taking first differences of the nominal salary index (the log 
return series given that the original index is in log terms) is stationary 
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breakpoint we fmd some support for the structural change hypothesis. The conclusion 
would be that the oil shock has led to a permanent change in the intercept and slope of 
the real wages process. The intercept appears to have gone up after 1975 while the slope 
seems to have decreased. However, both coefficient and slope in the Perron regression 
turns out to be insignificant if we use the real average earnings index and therefore we 
are unable draw a defmite conclusion. 
Aside from the issue of structural breaks, the Phillips Perron test cannot reject 
the hypothesis of stationarity around a time trend16 for AEI salaries, while the ADF test 
reaches the opposite conclusion. The two tests however agree in strongly rejecting the 
hypothesis of an I(2) process17 for both real indices. Similarly to what happens with 
nominal data, the Phillips Perron test cannot reject, under the hypothesis of a unit root, 
the null hypothesis of no linear trend for the AEI index. Moreover with real data also 
the null hypothesis of no intercept is rejected at 95% confidence level, but even in this 
case, this happens only with the average earnings index. The conclusion appears to be 
that the presence of a deterministic linear trend component in the salary process may 
depend on how salaries are actually measured. This is because an index arising from 
survey data is likely to be characterised by a smoother path than national accounts 
wages. 
With the annual data set, we have one nominal salary series and two alternative 
real salary indices constructed with different price deflators. Interestingly, visual 
inspection of the return series suggests all processes are stationary, although some 
unusual periods can be identified. With nominal salaries, growth was higher than 
normal in the 1920s, later followed by a severe contraction, and in the 1970s. With real 
wages, volatility was higher in the 19th century18 and the same pattern of nominal 
salaries was recorded in the 1920s (but not in the 1970s where higher than normal 
growth was caused by inflation). 
Unit root tests confirm this view suggesting wages both in nominal and real 
terms are difference stationary. The hypothesis of non-stationarity of the return series is 
16 At 90% confidence level, while it is very close to the 95% threshold 
17 I(2) would imply that not only the series in levels but also the first difference (or log return/growth) 
series is non-stationary 
18 This can be due to the unreliability of price data, the problem is in fact more severe with Global 
Financial Data as opposed to Mitchell (1994) deflator 
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however strongly rejected in the case of real earnings, while the conclusion is less clear-
cut for money wages, probably to the influence of the 1970s. The hypothesis of no 
linear time trend cannot be rejected for the three series but test statistics are close to the 
rejection area for real wages deflated with the Global Financial Data price series. 
Finally, all processes are likely to contain an intercept because the model with no 
intercept would imply explosive dynamics. 
2.6.2 Equities 
Turning our attention to fmancial assets we start examining the properties of the 
equity total return series. The hypothesis of a different rate of growth across sub-periods 
is not supported by the data for both nominal and real returns, although a dummy 
variable, which takes the value of one in 1975, is highly significant for both nominal 
and real returns. The average nominal return was in fact 23% higher in 1975 than in the 
rest of the sample and the real return 16% higher. Interestingly, also a dummy for the 
period 2001:1-2002:3 is significant indicating that average nominal returns after the 
millennium were 10% lower than in the rest of the sample (and real returns almost 9% 
lower). 
The 1970s apparently did not bring a structural break but a one-off temporary 
shock to the mean of the process following the first oil shock (and quite evidently also 
to its variance given the large movements recorded in 1974-75). Conversely a structural 
break may have occurred in 2000 but, although it appears to be more persistent than in 
the 1970s, it is difficult to say whether it is temporary or permanent. 
Both unit root tests suggest nominal and real processes are I(1) and they have no 
significant deterministic trend component. It must be highlighted that this does not 
imply stock prices are a random walk with no stationary component, it simply says the 
predictable component of equity prices, if exists, is something more complex than a 
simple linear trend. 
With the annual long-term data set the nominal equity returns are characterised 
by rising volatility, especially after the 1920s with a peak in the mid-1970s where very 
large swings were recorded. Phillips-Perron test statistics are likely to be a better 
guidance here because the error terms in unit root regression are likely to be 
heteroskedastic. Unit root tests suggest the equity process is likely to be difference 
stationary and to contain an intercept but no linear trend component. 
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Real equity returns are characterised by rising volatility like the nominal process 
and unit root tests achieve similar results. 
2.6.3 Bonds 
For nominal bond returns a dummy for the period 1980:1-1990:4 is positive and 
significant (1.2% higher average returns) indicating a possible structural break in the 
early 1980s with the start of a process of transition towards lower interest rates. For real 
bond returns a dummy for the 1970s is also negative and significant due to inflationary 
pressures depressing real bond returns. 
Both unit root tests suggest nominal bonds are difference stationary, while less 
clear-cut is the conclusion on the presence of a linear trend and an intercept component. 
The hypothesis of no trend and no intercept cannot be rejected using the ADF and 
Phillips Perron critical values but the test statistic are very close to the rejection area, 
especially for the linear trend hypothesis (2.69 against 2.79 critical value at 95% using 
Phillips Perron). In addition to that, it appears unwise to assume no intercept and no 
trend because this would lead to an explosive process ( y >0 and statistically significant). 
Real bonds are found to be difference stationary and with a possible linear trend 
component, as the test statistics for the hypothesis a1=0 are higher than 2 both with the 
ADF and Phillips Perron test (although the likelihood of a linear trend is slightly weaker 
than with nominal data) 
In the annual data set nominal bonds appear to be difference stationary as well, 
although the ADF test (but not Phillips Perron) cannot reject the hypothesis of a second 
unit root. This is because the process has a relatively long memory, as it can be 
observed in the 1970s with a sustained period of high interest rates and since the 1980s 
with a decreasing trend fuelled by low inflation. Conversely, no doubts arise for real 
bonds as both ADF and Phillips Perron strongly reject the hypothesis of a second unit 
root. The tests with annual data for both nominal and real bonds suggest the processes 
are likely to contain an intercept but do not provide much support for the linear trend 
component hypothesis. 
Finally, with index-linked19 bonds, although monthly data are employed, 
although it is hard to draw meaningful conclusions from only 20 years of data, unit root 
19 These results are not reported in the tables 
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tests suggest the process is difference stationary and the linear trend component is 
significant. 
2.6.4 Other asset classes 
We consider here bills, house prices and US equities using only the 1963-2002 
quarterly data set (monthly for US equities). For nominal bills the regression on dummy 
variables representing each decade explain 40% of return variation across the sample. 
For real bills the conclusion is similar to real bonds indicating that high inflation in the 
1970s has had a negative impact on real returns. 
The nominal process appears to be characterised by a constant and no time trend 
while the real process appears to have a significant positive linear trend component20 . 
Both unit root tests cannot reject the presence of a second unit root for the nominal bill 
index, while for the real bill Index the 1(2) hypothesis is rejected by Phillips-Perron but 
not ADF. 
With nominal house prices a regression of index returns on decades' dummies 
explain about 18% of the total variation and mean returns are significantly higher in the 
1970s and the 1980s than in the 1990s and the 1960s. However this could be misleading 
unless we take a closer look at a simple historical graph. Nominal house prices 
experienced in fact three clear 'boom and bust' cycles: early 1970s, late 1970s and late 
1980s. For real house prices a similar regression yield non-significant coefficients, 
while dummies representing peaks and lows of the three cycles are highly significant. 
The ADF test cannot reject the hypothesis of a second unit root for nominal 
house prices, while Phillips Perron, which is more appropriate because of 
heteroskedasticity in the residuals, would suggest nominal house prices are I(1) and 
display a significant intercept but not linear trend component. 
With real house prices, the hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at 10% 
confidence level by the ADF test (but not by Phillips Perron) suggesting the hypothesis 
property investments have been a reasonable inflation hedge. Cardinale (2003) explores 
this issue in more detail. Both the ADF and Phillips Perron tests suggest real returns are 
stationary and the ADF equation in levels suggests the presence of an intercept and a 
time trend, while Phillips Perron reaches the opposite conclusion. 
20 We used Philips Perron critical values because a White test for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) 
suggests the mean of the residuals is different across periods (higher in the 1970s due to higher volatility) 
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US equity returns were significantly correlated with the UK stock market (48% 
unhedged and 58% hedged) and the correlation increases if the sub-sample 1980-2002 is 
considered (52% unhedged and 71% hedged). Diversification benefits of unhedged 
equities arose because the pound has displayed a tendency to depreciate against the 
dollar since the 1960s (and the trend accelerated in the 1980s when US equity returns 
were very high). 
Unit root tests on the S&P 500 nominal and real total return series (hedged and 
unhedged) display a broadly similar picture to the one depicted for UK equities: 
difference stationarity and no significant linear trend component. With US equities even 
the presence of an intercept in the data generating process is rejected by both the ADF 
and the Phillips Perron tests. 
2.7 Pairwise bivariate relationships and multivariate 
cointegration models 
In this section we focus our attention on four asset classes in which UK pension 
funds can invest: bonds, bills, UK equities, property and US equities. The objective is to 
ascertain whether there is evidence of long-run equilibrium relationships between 
domestic wages and a range of assets, applying the cointegration theory framework 
discussed in Section 2.4. This is clearly a relevant question when it comes to assess 
long-term investment strategies for a fmal salary pension scheme, whose active 
members' liabilities rise in line with wages. This will be explored considering both 
variables in real and nominal terms. 
We will also briefly focus on the relationship between domestic salary and 
domestic equity returns and look more closely at the long-run equilibrium between 
wages and productivity, the stock market and productivity, wages and corporate profits 
and finally wages and dividends. 
Intuitively, when two series are cointegrated, there should be a meaningful 
association between values in one sequence and values in the second sequence, which 
could be approximated by a regression line. There would be random but not systematic 
deviations from the estimated regression line. Figures 2.9-2.12 display scatter plots with 
band regression lines to visualise the historical relationship between salaries and a range 
of assets both in nominal and real terms. The graphs can provide a snapshot to judge the 
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extent to which there might be a long-term equilibrium between assets and salaries. The 
graphs are presented in levels but no significant differences arise if the log scale is used. 
The graphs suggest in most cases the presence of meaningful positive 
relationships between salary and asset indices, although not surprisingly there appears to 
be substantial departures from long-term trends in some occasions. For instance, the 
equity market downturn after 2000 represents the most substantial exception to an 
overall positive relationship between nominal salaries and nominal equities. This is 
evident both in the 1963-2002 and in the 1850-2001 data sets. However this can also be 
read as a correction towards a more realistic long-term relationship following a marked 
rise in the steepness of the estimated regression line after the end of the 1980s. A similar 
pattern can be detected in the house prices/wages scatter plot, which displays an evident 
hump-shaped behaviour in the years of the property market crash of the end 1980s. 
Even in the relationship between nominal bonds and nominal salaries there have been 
deviations from an overall positive correlation: the late 1990s, as it appears evident from 
the 1963-2002 graph, and the 25 years between WWI and WWII, as shown in the 
annual sample graph. 
In real terms the picture is even more complex to read. There is indeed some 
evidence of positive relationships between salaries and assets but, using the 1963-2002 
data set, the 1970s represents a problem for all estimated relationships, the property 
crash of the late 1980s is a further problem for house prices and the equity market 
downturn after 2000 is an additional problem for equities. It appears that no single asset 
class is a perfect hedge for salary increases. To investigate this further we plotted a 
similar graph using index-linked bonds, which should be a better indicator of real 
returns than ex post inflation-adjusted nominal returns21. It is difficult to draw 
conclusions from such a limited sample but it appears that after 1998 it was increasingly 
difficult to detect a positive relationship. With an index-linked bond price index the 
regression line is flat after 1998 and this may be due to depressed real yields because of 
distortions in the market (i.e. flight to safe assets by pension funds and insurance 
companies). 
Interestingly, using the long-term annual data set there appears to be a more 
evident positive long-term relationship between real equities and real salaries rather 
21 See for instance Arak and Kreicher (1985) 
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than between real bonds and real salaries, although this is challenged by recent market 
movements. With real bonds there was in fact little evidence of a positive relationship 
between the 1920s and 1950s, because the real bond total return index has been almost 
flat (except in the early 1920s when real bond returns were negative). 
The evidence presented in the previous section showed that almost all series 
considered appeared to be difference stationary, except perhaps the nominal bill index 
for which the hypothesis of an I(2) process could not be rejected. Cointegration tests 
usually assume that variables are integrated of the same order. We use two main 
cointegration tests here: the Engle Granger (1987) methodology and the Johansen 
(1988) estimator. 
Engle and Granger (1987) rely on a two-step procedure involving estimating the 
long-run equilibrium relationship by ordinary least square and then perform unit root 
tests on the residuals22. If the residuals appear to be 'white noise'23, the hypothesis of 
cointegration cannot be rejected and an error correction model can then be estimated. 
Two-steps procedures have been criticised because they are sensitive to the variable 
chosen for the normalisation, an essentially arbitrary assumption. 
Johansen (1988) introduced a new procedure based on full information 
maximum likelihood to estimate the linear space spanned by the cointegrating vectors. 
Unlike residual based tests (e. g. the Engle and Granger methodology), the procedure 
was also found to be reasonably robust to deviations from classical regression 
assumptions, such as residual autocorrelation, non-Gaussian errors, ARCH effects or 
unconditionally leptokurtic innovations (see Gonzalo, 1994). The Johansen test requires 
assumptions on whether the data-generating process contains an intercept and a linear 
time trend or drift. In reality however the data-generating process is not known and 
therefore results should be analysed both with and without a time trend, as suggested by 
Diebold, Gardeazabal and Yilmaz (1994). 
The Johansen procedure hinges on a multivariate extension of the Dickey Fuller 
test, as it focuses on the rank of the matrix at, constructed as the difference between the 
matrix of parameters and the identity matrix. Under the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration the rank of 7t will be equal to zero and the procedure can be repeated to 
22 Unit root test statistics must however by compared with critical values computed by Engle and Granger 
(1987) and not with the ordinary Dickey Fuller table 
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test for the presence of more than one cointegrating relationship if at least three 
variables are included in the system. The Johansen test procedure yields two statistics to 
test for the hypothesis of no correlation: the trace and the maximum eigenvalue 
statistics. The two typically give the same answer but careful attention must be made 
where conflicting results arise. 
We now test for the presence of a long-run equilibrium relationship for UK 
salaries (using both the AEI and the national accounts measure) and five asset classes: 
bonds, UK equities, bills, house prices and US equities. 
2.7.1 Salaries and UK bonds 
This is a very important relationship to focus on in order to judge the claim 
bonds are a good hedge for final salary schemes active members' liabilities. Cross-
correlogram analysis of differenced series did not provide a clear answer, although it 
found some evidence, especially in the quarterly data set, of a relationship between 
bond returns and past salary increases. However, differencing a series and considering 
only the return (or growth) process means losing a lot of information present in the 
original data. Cointegration is designed to address this issue by investigating the 
stationarity of linear combinations of the series in levels, whilst attempting to explain 
the return or growth process in terms of an adjustment towards a long-run equilibrium. 
As shown in Tables 2.10 and 2.15 the Johansen procedure provides strong 
evidence of a cointegration relationship between real bonds and both salary indices in 
real terms if quarterly or monthly data sets are considered. If the sample is broken into 
two, the null of no cointegration cannot be rejected for the sub-period 1964-1979, while 
the opposite is true for the subsequent period (1980-2002). The sample is divided up 
non-symmetrically because, as discussed in Section 2.4, there is evidence of a possible 
structural break at the end of the 1970s. In fact a dummy for the 1970s was found to be 
negative and significant for real bond returns, while a dummy for the 1980s was 
positive and significant for nominal bond returns. 
The results are highly sensitive to the trend assumption, as outlined in Table 
2.13, which shows that the hypothesis of cointegration is rejected if a linear time trend 
is allowed for. In Section 2.5 we showed that it was unclear whether the real salary 
process contained a deterministic trend component. The no trend hypothesis could in 
23 'White noise' is a stationary process with no autocorrelation 
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fact be rejected with the Phillips Perron test with the average earnings index but not 
using national accounts real wages. 
The long-term relationship linking real bonds to real wages estimated with 
monthly data (see Table 2.17) and assuming no trend suggests a long-term positive co-
movement, and this could be interpreted as the result of a common factor affecting the 
labour and the bond market, possibly the real interest rate or the bond maturity 
premium. There could be in other words a pattern of dependency between the rate of 
intertemporal substitution affecting consumption/savings decision and the rate of 
substitution between work and leisure. Moreover, LM restriction tests24 suggest that the 
hypothesis of a one-to-one relationship cannot be rejected for the overall sample, while 
for the sub-sample 1980-2002 the coefficient estimate is significantly higher than 1. 
Quarterly data are however more problematic because coefficient estimates are 
not significant at conventional level (Table 2.12), even assuming no trend, unless the 
relationship is re-estimated using only the sub-sample 1980-2002. This suggests that 
either a structural change has occurred in the relationship during the 1970s or the true 
relationship cannot be inferred due to small sample bias. In particular, if a dummy equal 
to 1 from the fourth quarter of 1975 onwards and a dummy for the decade of the 1970s 
are added to the cointegrating regression, a positive and significant relationship between 
real bond and real national accounts wages can be estimated25. 
In general the inclusion of a dummy variable in multivariate regression models 
(and this applies to the error correction model of a cointegrating relationship as well), 
measures the impact on the dependent variable of a switch between categories defined 
by the dummy variable, controlling for all the other predictors. The inclusion of dummy 
variables, whose presence help make residuals from the long-run relationship visually 
more stationary, highlights the potential impact of extraordinary events on long-run 
relationships. If extraordinary events are simply one-off factors, cointegration does not 
break down; however if they occur with random periodicity, cointegration analysis 
would have to be extended with Markov switching model (see for instance Miles and 
Timmermann, 1999). This however would lie outside the scope of this chapter. 
24 LM restriction tests are standard econometric tests of coefficient restrictions. In this case the null 
hypothesis is that the coefficient associated to the bond index in the cointegrating vector is equal to one 
25 The results with dummy variables are not shown in the table but available upon request 
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The instability of the estimated long run relationship can also be inferred by the 
adjustment coefficients in the error correction models, which represent the sensitivity of 
endogenous variables to the disequilibrium from the long run relationship (a positive 
coefficient means that when the system is above the equilibrium the endogenous 
variable will tend to rise). These are positive for both real salaries and real bonds and 
the real bonds coefficient is also higher in magnitude (see Table 2.14 for quarterly data, 
similar results arise with monthly data). This suggests that when real bonds are higher 
than what would be implied by the long-term equilibrium, real salaries tend to rise to 
restore the equilibrium, but at the same time real bonds tend to continue rising driving 
the system away from the equilibrium. 
For nominal bonds, the results suggest a long-term one-to-one relationship with 
nominal salaries and this is a more robust fmding as it does not depend on trend 
assumptions (the graph in Figure 2.9 confirms this). This is clear however if the entire 
sample is considered, while mixed evidence arises (even a negative relationship with 
monthly data between 1980 and 2002) if the sample is broken down in two. And even 
with the full sample the relationship may be subject to potential instability because the 
two adjustment coefficients are both negative (see Table 2.14) indicating that positive 
deviations from the equilibrium (nominal bonds higher than the equilibrium level) cause 
bond prices but also salaries to fall. However, in absolute terms, the magnitude of the 
speed of adjustment coefficient for the bond market is substantially higher (at least with 
quarterly data), indicating a better probability of restoring the equilibrium than in the 
case of the variables in real terms. 
Interestingly, residual based tests would achieve a different conclusion on 
cointegration, both with nominal and real data, as shown in Table 2.11. With the Engle 
Granger two-steps methodology, the hypothesis of no long-term relationship cannot be 
rejected, although with the sub-sample 1980-2002 and the national accounts series, both 
ADF and Phillips Perron test statistics are closer to the rejection area. Failure of residual 
based tests to reject non-stationarity could be interpreted as evidence of a long memory 
process26, in which the effect of a shock declines at a slow rate and deviations from 
equilibrium are likely to persist for a reasonably long time. 
26 This was highlighted by Baillie and Bollerslev (1994), who argued that fractional cointegration, which 
allows for a long memory adjustment, could be an interpretation of these conflicting results. Fractional 
cointegration postulates that the residual series is neither 1(0) nor I(1) but 1(d) with d<1 and is 
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With the long-term annual data set (see Table 2.18-2.20) the results are broadly 
consistent, but there is stronger evidence of cointegration with the variables in nominal 
terms, consistently with visual inspection of the data (Figures 2.10 and 2.11). 
Cointegration tests using the full 1850-2002 sample suggest the presence of a common 
stochastic trend between salaries and bonds both in real and nominal terms. Estimated 
coefficients are higher than 1 but the hypothesis of a long-run one-to-one relationship 
cannot be rejected with variables in nominal term. The evidence is weaker if the 19th 
century is removed from the sample, because with 20th century data the Johansen test 
would suggest the hypothesis of a common stochastic trend only between nominal 
bonds and nominal wages. With annual data (both nominal and real) adjustment 
coefficients (Table 2.14) are negative indicating a potential source of instability in the 
systems (wages falling instead of rising to catch up with the equilibrium), although the 
bond market coefficients are greater in magnitude. 
Figures 2.13 and 2.14 plot the long-run equilibrium estimated respectively in real 
and nominal terms with annual data and no linear trend (but adding a dummy variable 
for 1924 onwards to remove the effect of the unusual behaviour of real bond and real 
wages in the 1920s). 
In real terms, although cointegration is not rejected by the two tests, the evidence 
does not appear conclusive, mainly because of the 1920s and the 1970s, when real 
bonds were far below the level implied by the cointegrating relationship. However, 
whilst in the 1920s the equilibrium was quickly restored, the system has stayed below 
the equilibrium for over 50 years after WWII shedding doubts on the existence of a true 
adjustment process. Only at the end of the 1990s the equilibrium was finally restored 
after a period of falling inflationary expectations and rising real ex post bond returns. 
In nominal terms the relationship appears to be characterised by a very slow 
adjustment process, because salaries have been below their long-run equilibrium with 
bonds throughout the post WWII years and only after the 1980s there has been a gradual 
convergence through higher bond returns. 
Ideally one would want to estimate a cointegrating relationship between salaries 
and index-linked bonds but, as outlined in the previous section, reliable estimates with 
characterised by slow adjustment and long-term cycles. A full test of the hypothesis however would 
require a greater number of observations to detect cycles 
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the index-linked series are not possible because no index-linked bonds were available 
before the 1980s. However the index-linked return profile can be proxied by inflation 
and a cointegrating model can be estimated with the RPI price index series. This is 
essentially a test of whether a stable long-run equilibrium exists between nominal wages 
and prices. 
Figure 2.15 provide a visual illustration of the deviations from the long-run 
relationship between prices and national accounts wages (1963-2002 quarterly sample) 
and between prices and the historical wage index (1850-2001 annual sample). The 
estimated cointegrating equation is also reported, although at conventional levels the 
null hypothesis of no cointegration cannot be rejected due to the length of the 
adjustment process. 
With the quarterly sample the system appears to be above the equilibrium 
position until the beginning of the 1970s, while the reverse was true after the mid-1970s 
when anti-inflationary policies aimed at cutting the transmission mechanism between 
wage and price inflation were implemented. The long-run equilibrium however does not 
seem to be stable, and not surprisingly the estimated adjustment coefficient of the salary 
error correction model is positive suggesting salaries displayed a tendency to increase 
when they were already above the equilibrium level. With the annual sample the 
relationship appear even less stationary by visual inspection (even if a dummy for 1924 
onwards is included), with the exception of the period between 1900 and 1950. In fact, 
wages have been below the long-run equilibrium before 1900, while after 1950 they 
have been above it, indicating a possible structural change (e.g. higher productivity 
leading salaries to grow faster than in the past relative to prices). 
2.7.2 Salaries and UK equities 
We are testing here the hypothesis of a common stochastic factor driving the 
labour market and the stock market. This could be interpreted as productivity, which 
would exercise an upward pressure on real salaries while at the same time raising the 
expectations for future real dividend growth. Tables 2.21-2.28 show a similar picture to 
what discussed concerning the bond market. With the entire sample, there is evidence of 
cointegration between real equity and both indices of wages, but, as with bonds, the 
results depend on the linear trend assumption. With equities however the appropriate 
Dickey Fuller test statistics more clearly suggested the absence of a linear trend 
component in the data generating process, as outlined in Section 2.5. 
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Similar to what happened with bonds, results are different across sub-samples 
with rejection of cointegration in the period 1964-1979 and strong evidence of 
cointegration in the period 1980-2002. Interestingly, with national accounts real wages 
and quarterly data, the hypothesis of one cointegrating vector in the sub-sample 1980-
2002 cannot be rejected even if we allow for the presence of a deterministic time trend. 
Estimated cointegrating relationships, both with the quarterly and monthly data 
set, suggest the coefficients in the equilibrium relationship between real equity and real 
salary are higher than 1. This can be interpreted as evidence of companies' ability to 
generate real revenues, which in the long-run have exceeded their labour costs in real 
terms. 
Error-correction models suggest that adjustment to the long-run equilibrium is 
generally performed through higher salary growth rather than a fall in the stock market 
given that the adjustment coefficients associated with real equities are not significant 
(see Table 2.25). In a model in which both the stock market and wages are moved by 
underlying productivity changes, this pattern could be interpreted if equities adjust more 
swiftly to productivity rises, while real salaries tend to catch up with a lag, because 
workers' aspirations adjust slowly, as discussed by Ball and Moffitt (2001). However, 
in Barsky (1989) framework, this long-run relationship may break up if the substitution 
effect prevails, leading individuals to consume more, save less and shun the equity 
market when growth prospects are higher. This could explain a slow adjustment to a 
long-run equilibrium position in which the stock market reflects its underlying 
fundamentals. 
With nominal equities and nominal salaries, cointegration evidence is stronger 
and the trend assumption is irrelevant, as it happens with bonds. However, the 
relationship is negative in the 1964-1979 sub-sample and strongly positive after the 
1980s suggesting that in a higher inflation environment such as the 1970s salary growth 
still keeps up with prices while the equity market suffers. There is a whole literature 
discussing the fact that equities are a poor inflation hedge when inflation is high, 
highlighting that inflation causes capital market inefficiencies negatively affecting 
stocks (see Barnes, Boyd and Smith, 1999). Another hypothesis is that the stock market 
irrationally discount real dividends at nominal interest rates undervaluing stocks when 
inflation is high and overvaluing them when inflation is low (Modigliani and Cohn, 
1979). 
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In real terms, on the other hand, there was no significant relationship between 
equities and salaries in the 1964-1979 sub-sample, and this could be explained if real 
salary growth was not aligned with productivity, but rather helped fuel inflationary 
pressures (Engle, 1982 explored a similar hypothesis with 1958-1977 data in his model 
of UK inflation in which lagged real wage helps predict inflation). 
Finally, even with nominal and real equities, the Engle Granger methodology 
achieves a different conclusion (no cointegration), providing support for the hypothesis 
of slow adjustment towards the equilibrium (see the discussion in 6.1). Even here this 
might suggest fractional integration for the residuals, that is a slowly decaying 
stationary process rather than a pure random walk. 
With the long-term annual data set, cointegration tests depict a similar picture, as 
they reject the null of no cointegration for equities and salaries both in nominal and real 
terms. Interestingly, using the full 1850-2002 sample the evidence is even stronger 
because the result does not even depend on trend assumptions. In other words, even 
assuming that equities and salaries shared a common deterministic trend, cointegration 
between the detrended series could still not be rejected. The shape of the cointegrating 
vector in the real term equation confirms a positive association with a coefficient 
significantly higher than 1. With nominal variables on the other hand, the magnitude of 
the coefficient is higher than 2, unlike with quarterly and monthly data whereby the 
hypothesis of a long-run one-to-one relationship could not be rejected. Finally, unlike 
with quarterly and monthly data, the adjustment coefficients suggest the equilibrium is 
restored mainly by the stock market, both using nominal and real variables (Table 6.16). 
Figures 2.16 and 2.17 show the equilibrium errors from the long-run 
cointegrating relationship estimated respectively in real and nominal terms with annual 
data and no linear trend (but inserting a dummy from 1975 onwards to remove the 
effects of the extreme swings recorded in that year). The adjustment pattern appears 
particularly evident in the late 1940s, when real equities were below their long-run 
position, given that the stock market experienced a healthy growth in the subsequent 
years, and in the early 1970s, when real equities were above the level implied by the 
cointegrating relationship, just before a fall in the stock market index. After the 1980s 
real equities have been above the level implied by the cointegrating relationship, even 
during the recent bear market. 
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In nominal terms Figure 2.17 shows that equities were above the equilibrium 
between the 1930s and the 1970s as adjustments were not large enough in magnitude to 
restore the equilibrium until the 1970s. Since the 1970s the adjustment was quicker in 
real terms, while in nominal terms the equilibrium was restored only in the mid 1990s. 
2.7.3 Salaries, profits and productivity 
The discussion in Section 2.2 suggests that introducing measures of productivity 
could help better understand the relationship between the labour market and the stock 
market. Corporate profits in the short-run can grow because of higher prices, lower 
wages or higher output per worker. This may justify the observed negative relationship 
between wages and stock prices described by Bottazzi, Pesenti and van Wincoop 
(1996). However we argued that to consistently achieve higher profits while wages 
decrease or remain flat appears unlikely to be sustainable in the long-run. 
One should therefore expect to observe a positive long-run relationship between 
productivity and both real salaries and real profits. This would imply that productivity 
shocks would affect both the labour and the stock market, and this could help explain a 
positive relationship between stock prices and wages (assuming that the substitution 
effect in Barsky, 1989 framework prevails, leading individuals to buy more equities if 
profits are expected to grow faster in the future). 
In the short-term however profits and wages growth may not be aligned and, as a 
consequence, a positive relationship between them may not necessarily hold when 
short-term considerations play a substantial role in moving equity prices and influencing 
company salary policies. In this framework, when real salaries increase faster than 
productivity, like in the early 1970s in the UK, they are likely to contribute fuelling 
inflationary pressures, which will eventually be curbed through restrictive monetary and 
fiscal policies leading to a contraction in real salary growth. Conversely, with 
competitive labour and products markets, higher productivity is unlikely to result in 
faster growth in company profits without an increase in real salaries. 
Tables 2.32-2.34 show estimated bivariate cointegrating relationships between 
real profits and productivity and, separately, between real salaries and productivity. 
With the full 1964-2002 sample, a one-to-one cointegrating relationship appears to exist 
between both national accounts and AEI real salaries with productivity measured by 
output per job (similar results would arise using output per filled job). This conclusion 
holds even if the sample is broken in two indicating that equilibrium positions are 
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restored in less than 20 years through lower real salary growth. This is precisely what 
occurred in the 1970s when real salary had grown faster than productivity until 1975, 
but this was compensated by negative real salary growth between 1975 and 1979. 
At the same time, a positive cointe grating relationship cannot be ruled out for 
real profits (measured as either national accounts profits or earnings per share of listed 
companies, the latter being more comparable to a per capita measure such as output per 
job) and also real dividends with productivity, but the coefficients are not significant 
with the full sample because of the pattern observed between the 1960s and 1970s. In 
fact, if the estimation is performed using the 1964-1979 sub-sample the null of no-
cointegration cannot be rejected at 95% level and the estimated regression coefficients 
are negative. This might suggest that the increase in oil prices and inflation had 
significant real effects, depressing profits even in the absence of a significant 
productivity slowdown. 
Furthermore, if dividends are considered the null of no cointegration cannot be 
rejected even in the 1980-2002 sub-sample due to the well documented international 
trend towards lower dividend yields (see Campbell and Shiller, 2001 for a review and 
Cardinale, 2002 for UK evidence). In essence, the lack of a relationship between 
dividend growth and productivity after the 1980s may just be due to a temporary 
departure from a long-run relationship or may be due to the fact dividends 
underestimate total shareholder compensation which includes share buyback 
programmes. 
2.7.4 Salaries and other asset classes 
We examine here whether the hypothesis of a common stochastic trend with UK 
salaries holds only for domestic bonds and domestic equities or whether similar patterns 
arise with other asset classes in which defined benefit pension funds might invest. 
First of all, we consider short-term money market instruments (Table 2.35-2.37), 
because we might expect a similar pattern to that observed for nominal bonds, if we 
believe a long-run relationship between short and long-term bonds holds, consistently 
with the expectation hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates27. 
27 See Campbell and Shiller (1986) for a first empirical test of the cointegrating relationship between 
long-term bonds and bills in the US 
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With variables in real terms, the picture is broadly similar to the one depicted for 
bonds. There appears to be evidence of a long-term positive co-movement but the 
relationship does not hold if the sample is broken down in two (if the estimate is carried 
out between 1964 and 1979 there is virtually no relationship while after the 1980s there 
is a positive association with an estimated coefficient not significantly higher than 1). 
Moreover, cointegration test results are sensitive to trend assumptions and both 
adjustment coefficients are positive suggesting instability. 
With variables in nominal terms, the evidence of cointegration is slightly 
stronger, suggesting a one-to-one long-run relationship. The adjustment coefficient is 
negative and significant for bills while it is insignificant for AEI salaries and negative 
and significant for total compensation wages. However, a closer look at the result 
suggests a single full cycle in the period considered: a trend away from the equilibrium 
until 1980, as salaries grew more than bills, and a gradual move towards the equilibrium 
since then, within a lower inflation environment. 
Secondly, we investigate whether UK property is correlated with wages (Tables 
2.38-2.40). There may be a mortgage financing argument here, as most house purchases 
in the UK are financed through mortgages based on multiples of individual wages. One 
could argue that house prices in the long-run cannot grow too fast with respect to wages 
and when house prices are too high economic forces would restore the long-term 
equilibrium. 
The results are encouraging in real terms as cointegration cannot be ruled out for 
the entire 1963-2002 sample and the two sub-samples in the hypothesis of no linear 
trend (except for the total compensation index after 1980). Interestingly, unlike with 
bonds, equities and bills, the evidence of cointegration is even stronger (it holds 
independently of trend assumptions) for the period 1964-1979, indicating that in the 
high inflationary environment of the 1970s real properties have been the best hedge for 
real salary growth. Coefficient estimates are broadly consistent across sub-samples and 
the adjustment coefficients suggest that the equilibrium is more likely to be restored 
through a higher growth in wages rather than through a property crash28. Interestingly, 
the opposite conclusion on adjustment arises if a dummy variable equal to 1 from 1989 
onwards, which is significant in the error correction equations, is included in the model. 
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This implies that the property crash in the early 1990s has induced a one-time change in 
the mean of the house prices series. Figure 2.18, which plots the equilibrium errors for 
the model with a dummy for 1989 onwards, suggests that, after the property crash of the 
early 1990s, house prices have been below their equilibrium level with wages, although 
the gap has recently been narrowing due to strong property returns. 
In nominal terms, however, the evidence on cointegration is strong only if the 
sub-sample 1964-1979 is considered, unless a dummy for 1989 onwards is added as an 
exogenous variable. If a dummy is added to the regression the results suggest a one-to-
one relationship in the long-run, although with a slow adjustment in the 1990s. 
Finally, with unhedged US equities (Tables 2.41-2.43) coefficients estimates are 
broadly in line with those estimated with UK equities, given the significant positive 
correlation between UK equities and US equities, but the evidence of a cointegrating 
relationship with UK wages is weaker, both in nominal and real terms. This is consistent 
with the argument of Baxter and Jermann (1995) on the international diversification 
puzzle. They posited that individuals should invest more abroad than in domestic assets 
because they have an implicit holding in a domestic assets (human capital) whose 
returns (salaries) depend on domestic factors. Final salary pension schemes have 
however a different perspective on this, as their liabilities are tied to domestic salary 
growth. 
2.7.5 Towards a multivariate long-run model 
After assessing pairwise relationship between UK salaries and a range of asset 
classes, this section focuses on combining asset classes together to compare alternative 
long-term multivariate models of wages. The estimations were carried out using 
quarterly data between 1963 and 2002. 
Table 2.44 compares results of alternative models to capture the long-term 
behaviour of UK real salaries, starting from bivariate models (Model 1, lb and 2) to 
alternative multivariate specifications (Model 3-6b). No dummy variables were added to 
these specifications and the estimation is carried out using 4 lags in the error correction 
model and with the assumption of no linear trend. 
28 The adjustment coefficient is positive for real wages (or real AEI) and not significantly different from 
zero for real property 
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Interestingly, in all models the hypothesis of no long-term equilibrium is rejected 
using the Johansen procedure while the hypothesis of at most one cointegrating 
relationship cannot be rejected. This would suggest the presence of a single stochastic 
trend driving real salaries and up to five assets, showing a high degree of 
interdepedence between the UK labour market, the economy (i.e. exchange rate) and 
asset markets. Moreover, a closer examination of the long-run equilibrium coefficients 
suggests: 
1) A positive and significant long-term relationship between real salaries and the stock 
market in real terms, independently of what other assets are considered at the same time. 
Coefficient estimates range from 0.29 to 0.53, depending on the menu of assets and the 
index used to measure wages. 
2) A negative and significant relationship between real salaries and real bonds, when the 
real equity index is controlled for, in all Models, except Model 5. Coefficient estimates 
vary, ranging from -0.45 to -0.67, again depending on the menu of assets and the index 
used to measure wages. This pattern suggests the real interest rate may be negatively 
associated with productivity and real wages29, through lower labour demand from 
companies facing higher borrowing costs, perhaps combined with higher supply from 
impatient individuals requiring a high compensation to defer their consumption. Model 
5 provides support for this interpretation as the relationship turns out to be negative for 
short-term bills while it is insignificant for bonds. However in a bivariate model the 
coefficient linking real salaries and real bills is not significantly different from zero 
(Model lb) suggesting the presence of a pro-cyclical component in real bills, which is 
removed by controlling for the stock market. 
3) A positive relationship between real salaries and the housing market in real terms, 
which is only significant if real bills are included in the model (Model 5). 
4) A residual positive, but not always significant, relationship between US unhedged 
equities deflated using UK prices and real salaries when the positive impact of the 
domestic stock market is controlled for. This would suggest a linkage between domestic 
wages and international factors, such as the exchange rate or the performance of US 
29 In the long run one would expect to find a positive association between real interest rates and total 
returns on bonds even if in the short terms bond returns fall when interest rates rise 
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companies, which employ a large number of people through direct subsidiaries in the 
UK. 
Figure 2.19 shows the equilibrium errors arising from the key models presented 
in Table 2.44. The graphs enable to compare simple bivariate models with more 
complex multivariate structure by looking at the extent to which a stable adjustment 
pattern can be inferred. 
Bivariate relationships linking real wages and either real bonds or real equities 
(Model 1 and Model 2) do not provide convincing evidence of a stable adjustment 
pattern, although the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected in both cases. 
Firstly, real bonds and real equities have been below the estimated cointegrating 
relationship throughout the entire sample (except real equities in the mid 1970s). The 
latter could be addressed by including one-off exogenous factors to control for the 
impact of unusual market movements (e.g. a dummy variable for 1975) or by estimating 
the models with a linear trend. More fundamentally, the forces which should bring the 
systems back to the equilibrium through the error correction models do not seem 
particularly strong, especially from the 1980s onwards. In fact, since the 1980s, both 
systems have either stayed far from the equilibrium or departed from it (the bond 
model). From Table 2.45, which displays error correction adjustment coefficients from 
all estimated models30, it appears evident that the adjustment in Model 1 and Model 2 
was carried out through lower salary growth (negative coefficient) rather than higher 
bond or stock returns (coefficients for bonds and equities are either negative or not 
significant). This is in line with the results of the previous section. 
Multivariate models (in particular Models 5 and 6) provide a more interesting 
picture. The magnitude of the errors is lower in absolute terms and there is a more 
evident pattern of adjustment to restore the equilibrium. As shown in the last graph of 
Figure 2.19, with a dummy variable for the year 1975 and one from 1975 onwards 
included as exogenous factors, the adjustment pattern is even more evident, because the 
unusual behaviour of both labour and fmancial markets in the mid 1970s may have 
pushed upwards the estimated long-run equilibrium position of Models 5 and 6. 
3° The coefficients reported in the table are derived from each endogenous variable error correction model 
and represent the sensitivity of each endogenous variable to the disequilibrium between the level of the 
salary index and its equilibrium position. Because the nature of the dynamic adjustment process is not the 
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However, because adding ad-hoc dummy variables to control for unusual events is 
essentially an arbitrary exercise, it was deemed preferable to focus on models estimated 
with no exogenous dummy variables. 
From Model 5 or 6, one could read the dynamic relationship between wages and 
asset markets as follows: when wages are above the equilibrium the adjustment can take 
place in three alternative ways: 1) one or more of the variables with a positive long-term 
relationship with salaries (e.g. equities) grow faster than real wages, 2) one or more of 
the variables with a negative long-term relationship with salaries (e.g. bonds) grow 
slower than real wages, 3) real salaries fall. Clearly, the reverse would be true when 
wages are below their long-term equilibrium. 
To illustrate this, from the graph referred to Model 6 in Figure 2.19, one could 
argue real wages were very high in the mid 1970s compared to their long-run position 
(possibly because they did not reflect underlying productivity gains but only union-
sponsored pay deals). Subsequently, a fall in average earnings between 1975 and 1979 
has helped the system restore the equilibrium. Real salaries were then below their long-
run level in the early 1980s, perhaps due to strong equity returns, but a combination of 
factors (higher real salary growth and bond returns, together with the housing market 
crash) have once again brought the system back towards the equilibrium in the early 
1990s. Finally, slow real salary growth at the beginning of the 1990s and strong equity 
returns after 1995 have pushed the system again below the long-run equilibrium, 
leaving it to the prolonged bear market after 2000 to correct the imbalance. 
However, from Table 2.45 only the adjustment coefficient for real salaries, real 
bonds and US equities are significant at 95% level. In fact, between the 1980s and 2000 
the system has been below its equilibrium and one could argue rising bond returns, with 
a shift in inflationary expectations, have played a major role in restoring the equilibrium 
position. 
If Models 5 and 6 appear to have the best long-run properties, in the short-term 
models should be assessed using the error correction equation for wages and 
considering their ability to predict movements in the wage index. Models can also be 
compared the predicting power of the wage error-correction models using different asset 
main focus of this paper (Clements and Galvao, 2004 is a reference on the latter), coefficients referred to 
autoregressive factors in the error correction models are not reported 
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classes. The dependent variable here is wage growth (equal to first difference as we are 
working in logs) and the independent variables are the distance from the long-run 
equilibrium and lagged asset returns (up to lag 4). All of the eight wage growth models 
considered in Table 2.46 are significant (F test rejects the hypothesis all coefficient are 
equal to zero). The R-square, which captures the proportion of salary growth explained 
by the model (and the adjusted R-square, which penalises the introduction of 
unnecessary variables), is highest in Model 5 which includes bills alongside bonds 
(40.8%), while all of the other models have an R-square in the range of 20%. 
Interestingly, Model 1 has a higher R-square than Model 2, confirming that in the short-
term (but not in the long-term as discussed before) bonds have a higher correlation with 
wages than equities. 
Finally, because cointegration analysis involves the estimation of error correction 
models for all variables in the system, it is important to consider the correlation between 
the residuals from each error-correction equation and the response implied by the error 
correction models to innovations (random shocks to one of the variables in the system), 
which are transmitted from an equation to another through the correlation structure 
between residuals. 
Table 2.47 shows residual correlation implied by Model 6 and Figure 2.20 shows 
impulse-response functions to a real salary innovation, implied by a standard Cholesky 
decomposition of the covariance matrix of residuals. The portion of real salary variance 
unaccounted for by the model appears to be correlated with the unexpected component 
of real house prices, perhaps indicating an additional common factor between the 
property market and wages not captured by the model. Arguably, the interrelation 
between labour demand pressures and property supply constraints could be candidates 
for the missing variable in this context. Table 2.47 also shows basic residual-based mis-
specification tests carried out on the error correction model using Model 6. 
Autocorrelation and non-normalities are rejected at conventional levels, while there are 
signs of heteroskedasticity due to the pattern observed in the 1970s, which led to a 
concentration of high residuals in absolute value. 
Figure 2.20 shows the response implied by the cointegrating model (Model 6) to 
a positive unexpected shock to real wages. Following Sims (1980), residuals are 
orthogonalised using the Cholesky decomposition to enable identification (common 
components are attributed to the variable that comes first in the Cholesky ordering). 
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Interestingly, while the immediate response of the stock market is negative, in the 
longer term there is a positive co-movement between the two series (after 3 years both 
real salaries and real equities are above the level they would have reached in the 
absence of a shock). Conversely, real bonds and real house prices display a short-term 
positive correlation with real salaries. This provides further support to the hypothesis of 
a long-term (but not a short-term) link between real salaries and the stock market. Given 
that impulse-response results depend on the Cholesky order, the exercise was performed 
using alternative orders as a sensitivity test and no significantly different results 
emerged. 
As a second step, the multivariate analysis was replicated in nominal terms, with 
the inclusion of the price index in some specifications to proxy the return profile of 
index-linked bonds. The hypothesis of a common stochastic trend cannot be rejected at 
95% level for a range of alternative models, although the evidence is more mixed than 
in the case of variables in real terms (Table 2.48). With Models 5 and 6b, which include 
the price index, the hypothesis of at most one cointegrating relationship is rejected by 
the Trace Statistic (but not the Maximum Eigenvalue) test, suggesting the possibility of 
a more complex pattern with two long-run equilibrium relationships: one between bonds 
and wages and the other between equities and prices. 
Figure 2.21 shows the estimated relationships and the equilibrium errors for the 
key bivariate and multivariate models. In all cases the pattern of the 1970s has 
influenced the results, even more evidently than with variables in real terms. Model 3 
would suggest an insignificant relationship between wages and the stock market, but the 
equilibrium errors do not suggest it is a stable equilibrium. On the other hand, model 5b, 
which is estimated with a linear trend because the nominal AEI process is likely to be 
characterised by a trend (see the discussion in Section 2.6.1), suggests a positive and 
significant relationship with the stock market. Finally Model 6b, whose equilibrium 
errors are visually more stationary, suggests a close association between prices and 
wages, but a significant residual relationship between wages and US unhedged equities. 
Interestingly, adjustment coefficients in nominal models provide a mixed answer 
on the role of bonds in the adjustment process (Table 2.49). Whilst in Model 5 rising 
bond returns restore the equilibrium when wages are above it, the reverse is true in 
Model 6b, in which the adjustment coefficient for bonds is negative. 
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In nominal terms the residual component of salary growth is negatively 
correlated with US unhedged equities (Table 2.51), perhaps through an exchange rate 
effect (salary growth may slow down as the UK currency weakens). Finally, impulse-
response analysis (Figure 2.22) is consistent with the pattern observed in real terms: 
although there is a short-term negative response of the stock market to salary 
innovations, there is evidence of a positive longer-term association. The latter suggests 
that, although the behaviour of nominal salaries cannot be easily modelled through a 
single cointegrating relationship, a meaningful link with the stock market may indeed 
exist. 
2.7.6 A longer-term monthly sample 
This section replicates the analysis using a longer term sample (1920-2003), 
which is less influenced by the unusual behaviour of the 1970s. The key conclusions of 
Section 2.5 on trends and unit roots are confirmed with the longer sample, in particular 
the presence of a linear trend in the nominal and real average earnings process. In 
addition to this, there is also evidence of a linear trend in consumer prices, which 
suggests models in nominal terms are better estimated if a linear trend is allowed for. 
Table 2.52 displays the results and Figure 2.23 shows equilibrium errors from selected 
models. 
In real terms, the analysis of longer-term monthly data confirms the hypothesis 
of a long-run equilibrium with the stock market, while the results are more mixed for 
real bonds (first graph in Figure 2.23) due to lengthy adjustment process and some 
evidence of a structural break around the 1950s. On the other hand, as far as the stock 
market is concerned, the second graph in Figure 2.23 shows real salaries above the 
cointegrating relationship in the 1940s and 1950s as well as in the mid-1970s, leading to 
an adjustment process which predominantly relied on stronger equity returns. The 
reverse was true in the late 1990s, when the system was below the level implied by the 
cointegrating relationship just before the stock market downturn. 
In nominal terms, there is significant evidence of a long-term relationship 
between nominal salaries and consumer prices, as shown in the third graph of Figure 
2.23. Interestingly, although adjustment cycles are long (e.g. 20 years between the 
1950s and the 1970s), the evidence is here stronger than in the case of the quarterly and 
annual sample of Section 2.6.1. Ultimately, the existence of a stable equilibrium 
depends on whether the system moves because of secular changes due to stronger 
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underlying productivity growth or because of cyclical salary growth fuelling 
inflationary pressures. 
The fourth graph in Figure 2.23 shows a multivariate model with salary growth 
explained by prices and equity returns (as well as bonds whose coefficient is however 
not significant), which depicts a very similar picture to that of the real salary-real equity 
equilibrium (Model 5). Finally, a model to explain nominal salaries using nominal and 
index-linked bonds was also fitted, but, although a time span of just over 20 years is not 
enough from which to draw definite conclusions, there is little evidence of a stable 
relationship, as salaries have been far below the equilibrium in the early 1980s and 
above it since the mid-1990s (Model 6). 
2.7.7 Implications of results for pension fund asset allocation 
The results showed so far have displayed evidence of a long-term relationship 
between wages and a range of asset classes, including equities. The Appendix relates 
the results to minimum risk asset allocation by means of a simple model in which 
pension funds incorporate the long-term equilibrium relationship in a simple asset 
liability modelling exercise. This assumes non wage-related liabilities can be hedged by 
an appropriately structured bond portfolio, while the wage-related component is akin to 
a zero coupon bond maturing at retirement. 
The empirical implementation is closer to an ABO definition of liability, but the 
results are compatible with either an ABO or a PBO definition, given that whether the 
current or the projected wage is the variable of interest should not have a material 
impact on the estimated long-run relationships. This is because with an ABO (Accrued 
Benefit Obligation) definition the liability is re-calculated every time an actuarial 
valuation is performed using the current wage of active members, while in a PBO 
framework the liability is calculated each time using the projected wage at retirement of 
active members (the latter usually derived as a deterministic function of the current 
wage). An extension to this model could look at the relationship between current wages 
and lagged asset prices to proxy a PBO setting. 
The results suggest the long-run hedging portfolios for real active members' 
liabilities will have an equity share (including international equities) different from zero 
(in the multivariate estimated models the coefficients range from just below 30% to 
around 50%). There are however some important caveats to bear in mind when it comes 
to assessing the full implications for the overall risk management of a pension fund. 
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Firstly, liabilities can be easily broken down into a real and a nominal 
component if the volatility of inflation is low and there are stable relationships between 
prices and wages. Historically, the relationship between prices and wages as well as 
between prices and financial markets has been significantly more complex. In fact, 
whilst even with variables in nominal terms there is significant support for a bivariate 
long-run equilibrium with the stock market, results are more mixed if translated into 
multivariate models. Although with the longer-term monthly sample there is some 
evidence of a single stochastic trend shaping the relationship between salaries, equities, 
bonds and prices, the quarterly sample suggests there might be more than one 
cointegrating vector. The relationship between each asset class and consumer prices 
may in fact be characterised by different properties in terms of both the equilibrium and 
the adjustment process. Ahmed and Cardinale (2006) review the vast literature in this 
area (Fama and Schwert, 1977b and Boudoukh and Richardson, 1993 are two of the 
most important contributions) and explore the relationship between equities and prices 
in the four largest economies. Although they fmd some evidence of a dynamic 
relationship, no definite conclusion is reached on the existence of a stable adjustment 
pattern. Similar conclusions are reached by Cardinale (2003) on the relationship 
between property returns and inflation. 
Secondly, cointegrating equilibriums, similarly to other regression-based models, 
are estimated with linear models. The true underlying relationship may be non-linear, 
perhaps due to asymmetric behaviour for positive vs. negative shocks. An extension to 
this chapter may apply the framework proposed by Granger and Yoon (2002) to deal 
with non-linearities. Furthermore, cointegrating relationships may not be stable over 
time, as highlighted in several occasions in the chapter, and therefore historical 
equilibrium relationships should not be the only inputs to pension funds risk budgeting 
exercises. However, equilibrium relationships should still represent a key reference 
point, from which any departure would have to be justified with a reasonable 
explanation of why historical relationships no longer hold in a given economic 
environment. 
Thirdly, an asset allocation which tracks long-term equilibrium relationships 
leads to short-term volatility, because the system dynamically adjust to the long-term 
position and, as the results showed, adjustment lags can be significantly long. An 
alternative strategy would entail dynamically exploiting the deviations from the long- 
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run equilibrium position, using the information contained in the error correction model 
(e.g. adjustment coefficients). As anticipated in Section 2.1, the ultimate choice depends 
on rebalancing costs to follow the long term equilibrium strategy and the level of 
resources available within the pension fund, given that exploiting temporary deviations 
from the equilibrium is riskier and require more careful and frequent monitoring. 
Fourthly, the chapter considers the aggregate relationships between salaries and 
asset markets, implicitly assuming a high degree of correlation between firm-wide 
salary increases and the aggregate index. Pension funds should assess whether the age 
structure of the workforce within the company is significantly different from the 
aggregate earnings index or whether the age distribution of earnings is influenced by 
firmwide policies or sector patterns. 
Fifthly, the chapter used a portfolio of 10-year nominal bonds in the estimation 
of cointegrating equilibriums in the quarterly and annual sample, while, bonds with 
longer durations and consols are employed in the longer term monthly sample (Section 
2.7.6). Results may change using different maturities, although this is not expected to 
significantly alter the key implications. 
Finally, the chapter concentrates on active members' liabilities and therefore the 
above mentioned fmdings (positive equity share) relate to the portion of the total 
liability referring to active members. A portfolio close to 100% fixed income may 
therefore be justified as a minimum risk position in mature schemes with high 
proportion of pensioners and deferred members. 
2.8 Conclusion 
If active members' liabilities are defined on an ongoing basis, risk management 
for defined benefit pension schemes must take into serious consideration the 
relationship between salary increases and the return profile of alternative assets in which 
pension funds may invest. 
This chapter investigated whether a long-run equilibrium relationship exists 
between the labour market and asset markets using UK historical data. Consistently 
with economic theory, the chapter fmds evidence of a long-run link not only between 
salaries and bonds but also with other assets such as domestic and international equities. 
Long-run movements in real salaries can be captured by a multivariate equilibrium 
model which includes bonds, equities and property. In the short-term however the 
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evidence of correlation is more mixed, because, whilst there is evidence of a dynamic 
adjustment process towards the equilibrium, salaries have departed from the estimated 
long-term relationships for relatively long periods. This also translates into a significant 
long-run correlation between nominal salaries and nominal assets including equities, 
although the evidence is less conclusive as to whether the equilibrium between wages, 
prices and asset markets can be characterised by a single long-run equation. A more 
complex model could therefore incorporate the dynamic relationship between each asset 
class and consumer prices. 
From the point of view of defmed benefit pension funds, the implication of these 
results challenges the view according to which salary-linked liabilities can be perfectly 
hedged with fixed income instruments, as claimed by several influential papers in the 
actuarial literature (Wilkie, 1995 or Smith, 1998). The key contribution of the chapter is 
to show that no asset has historically been a perfect hedge for salary-linked liabilities 
and the best historical hedge was a composite portfolio, which included not only fixed 
income instruments, but also domestic equities, foreign equities and property. Although 
index linked bonds were not in the menu of assets because of lack of historical data, 
consumer prices have not been historically a perfect hedge for salaries and indeed long-
run coefficients associated with other assets including equities remained significant in 
multivariate models with the Retail Price Index among the predictors of wages. The 
Appendix reviews how long-run equilibrium relationships can be translated into 
minimum risk asset allocations. 
It is clear, however, that long-run relationships will not be the only factor driving 
minimum risk asset allocations for defmed benefit pension funds. Rebalancing costs and 
the extent to which salaries and assets deviate from the long-run equilibrium path in the 
short- and medium-term should also be taken into account. If deviations are substantial 
and persistent and rebalancing costs are high, minimum risk asset allocations will likely 
to look significantly different from those consistent with the long-run equilibrium. 
Moreover, salary-linked liabilities are only a fraction of defined benefit pension fund 
total liabilities and therefore an overall minimum risk portfolio will have also to take 
into account how significant is the proportion of salary-linked liabilities as a proportion 
of total pension liabilities. 
Whilst a breakdown of defmed benefit liabilities is not disclosed in company 
accounts, the ratio of current service cost (referred to active members) over interest cost 
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on pension scheme liabilities (referred to all members) can be employed as a proxy. 
Figure 2.24 display average values of the ratio by broad sectors using FRS 17 
disclosures for the accounting year 2002 collected by Watson Wyatt for companies in 
the FTSE 350 share index (the overall average within the sample is just above 60% and 
the median is slightly below 55%)31. The conclusions of the chapter will be of greater 
importance for relatively young schemes (e.g. in sectors such as IT & Telecom or Retail 
where the ratio is close or above 1) with a high proportion of active members as 
opposed to traditional sectors (e.g. General Industrials) were schemes are on average 
more mature. 
31 The first graphs considers only UK defined benefit schemes while the second includes non-UK 
schemes of UK companies' overseas subsidiaries 
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2.9 Appendix: Cointegration and Pension Liabilities 
This appendix illustrates the relationship between cointegrating relationships 
between wages and various asset classes indices. The level of accrued pension liability 
for an individual active member is proportional to the current level of the real wage 
index times an appropriately structured bond or bond portfolio32: 
L oc WB 	 (3) 
where W is the wage and B is the bond. Taking logarithms of Eq. (3), we have: 
log L= C + log W + log B 	 (4) 
or: 
1=C+w+b 	 (5) 
where w m. log(W) and b - log(B) 
2.9.1 Cointegrating vectors 
We separately have a cointegrating relationship: 
N 
w= 5 + ab +Efik Xk 	 (6) 
k=1 
where the xk are the level of various indices (e.g., equity index) which could be 
invested in, all expressed in either nominal or real terms. Under the assumption of 
cointegration, the difference between the level of the wage index and the cointegrating 
function in Eq. (6) is stationary. It must be noted that the difference equation does not 
have to be white noise and it will be typically an autocorrelated process with relatively 
short memory. Therefore, although (6) will not hold at every point in time, it will hold 
in the long-run. 
Substituting Eq. (6) into Eq. (5) we have: 
N 
1 = lc +(a +1)b+ E ,Bk Xk 	 (7) 
k=1 
where K = C + (5 . Suppose that fik =0, k =1...N then clearly a bond matched portfolio is 
the best match for the liability in the long-run. Whether this is so in practice is an 
empirical question. Cointegration allows tests of the joint null hypothesis: a =0 , f3k =0, 
k =1...N . 
32  In the case of the UK the bond portfolio will be closer to a real bond portfolio because pensions in 
payment are indexed to prices (albeit with a 5% cap) 
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2.9.2 Minimum risk asset allocation 
The next step from Eq. (7) is to determine the minimum risk asset allocation. 
Our assets are: 
EQk Xk +QbB+M 	 (8) 
k=1 
where Q are quantities (number of shares, bonds, properties etc.) and M is cash. We 
want to choose the Q and M to minimize the difference with liabilities. To do this we 
take logarithms so that: 
a=logriQk X k +QbB- (9)  
=1 
Hence: 
a — / = log [E, Qk Xk + QbB + 
k=1 
K+ (a +1) b + 	fikxk 
k=1 
(10)  
which can then be used to calculate sensitivities to levels of the indices and therefore to 
compute minimum risk asset allocations. 
2.9.3 Minimum risk portfolio 
To determine the minimum risk asset allocations, we compute sensitivities with respect 
to the levels of bond prices and asset market indices in Eq. (10). We fmd: 
a (a —1) = Qke  
axk A fik 
a(a-1)  = Qbeb (a+1) 
ab 	A 
	 (12) 
We choose asset allocations to set these sensitivities to zero, thereby achieving a 
minimum level of risk. Therefore, the minimum risk long-run asset allocations are a 
fraction (a +1) in bonds, fik in asset k and the remainder (which can be negative) in 
cash. 
2.9.4 Example 
We consider as an example the following cointegrating relationship: 
w = —4.501+ 0.483fise— 0.568b 	 (13) 
then in Eq. (7) we have: 
I= C-4.501+ (-0.568 +1)b + 0.483/Ise 	 (14) 
or: 
161 
Consider now the 
a — 1 = log[Qkeft- 
The sensitivity of this imbalance 
and with respect to ftse 
1= is +(0.422)b 
minimum risk portfolio. 
+ Qbeb + A/11—Dc 
to b is: 
a(a-1) 	Qbeb 
+0.483ftse 










a (a —1) 	Qfis  e
fise = 
aftse 	A 
Using Eq. (16), we have that for sensitivity to be zero, the share of bonds in total assets 
is 42.2%. Similarly, the share of equity in the minimum risk long-run portfolio is 
48.3%. The remainder of the portfolio is held in cash. 
2.9.5 Cointegration and career-average pension schemes 
For career-average schemes, the analysis is similar. The liability for a career-average 
scheme is: 
N 
LN CC B[Eqk --R— 	 (19) 
k=1 Wk 
where B is a bond, C'il, is the wage of individual i in period k and Wk is the value of 
the wage index and R is the projected retirement date. Taking logarithms of Eq. (19) 
we have: 
C. /=b+w+log[E---IL 	 (20) 
k=1 Wk 
where the last term is an idiosyncratic term capturing ratio of an individual's wages to 
the wage index. With the exception of the idiosyncratic term, the form of Eq. (20) is 
equivalent to our earlier analysis. Given we expect no relationship between an 
aggregation of idiosyncratic terms and asset allocations, the results above about 
minimum-risk portfolios follow. 
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2.11 Tables and Figures 
Table 2.1: Nominal quarterly log returns (quarterly sample): basic statistics 
BILL BOND FTSE HOUSE AEI WAGES SP500 
Mean 2.08% 2.36% 2.95% 2.33% 2.13% 2.21% 2.80% 
Median 1.86% 2.26% 4.65% 2.08% 1.77% 1.97% 3.19% 
Maximum 3.98% 19.57% 59.01% 11.96% 8.00% 10.47% 23.72% 
Minimum 0.92% -6.33% -32.00% -4.71% -1.65% -0.61% -40.51% 
Std. Dev. 0.78% 3.24% 10.39% 2.69% 1.48% 1.47% 9.61% 
Obs. 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 
Note: AEI is Average Earnings Index, seasonally adjusted 
Table 2.2: Real quarterly log returns (quarterly sample): basic statistics 
BILL BOND FTSE HOUSE AEI WAGES SP500 
Mean 0.47% 0.75% 1.32% 0.71% 0.50% 0.59% 1.18% 
Median 0.68% 0.99% 2.69% 0.81% 0.55% 0.67% 1.75% 
Maximum 2.78% 12.57% 49.70% 9.93% 5.61% 7.12% 22.51% 
Minimum -6.93% -9.31% -32.59% -5.95% -4.42% -7.08% -41.38% 
Std. Dev. 1.29% 3.46% 10.13% 2.75% 1.42% 1.47% 9.62% 
Obs. 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 
Note: AEI is Average Earnings Index, seasonally adjusted 











Mean 4.77% 2.18% 7.20% 4.62% 3.87% 1.29% 1.31% 
Median 3.78% 1.80% 5.47% 3.65% 3.54% 1.34% 1.23% 
Maximum 33.47% 49.85% 92.47% 70.16% 25.13% 19.49% 19.49% 
Minimum -21.20% -41.14% -72.89% -90.22% -25.66% -20.66% -18.09% 
Std. Dev. 6.76% 9.69% 15.31% 16.17% 6.33% 5.34% 4.25% 
Obs. 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 
Note: Real Wages (1) and Real Wages (2) are defined 'n Section 2.3 
Table 2.4: Correlation between nominal log returns (quarterly sample) 
SP500 BILL BOND FTSE HOUSE AEI WAGES 
SP500 1 4.28% 4.35% 62.81% -5.19% -4.34% -12.33% 
BILL 4.28% 1 15.18% 4.23% -13.00 41.05 33.52% 
BOND 4.35% 15.18% 1 51.79% -19.64% -4.03% 8.85% 
FTSE 62.81% 4.23% 51.79% 1 -5.43% -5.64% 4.50% 
HOUSE -5.19% -13.00% -19.64% -5.43% 1 21.01% 25.56% 
AEI -4.34 41.05% -4.03% -5.64% 21.01% 1 73.32% 
WAGES -12.33% 33.52% 8.85% 4.50% 25.56% 73.32% 1 
Note: AEI is Average Earnings Index, seasonally acOsted 
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Table 2.5: Correlation between real log returns (quarterly sample) 
SP500 BILL BOND FTSE HOUSE AEI WAGES 
SP500 1 8.72% 7.62% 63.41% -3.31% -4.28% -11.45% 
BILL 8.72% 1 42.79% 7.22% 15.36% 51.09% 48.99% 
BOND 7.62% 42.79% 1 49.39% -4.09% 14.99% 27.33% 
FTSE 63.41% 7.22% 49.39% 1 -4.18 -6.65 3.9% 
HOUSE -3.31 15.36% -4.09% -4.18% 1 26.36% 31.75% 
AEI -4.28 51.09% 14.99% -6.65 26.36% 1 72.06% 
WAGES -11.45% 48.99% 27.33% 3.9% 31.75% 72.06% 1 
Note: AEI is Average Earnings Index, seasonally adjusted 











BOND 1 72.27% 45.99% 46.01% 1.84% 5.05% 9.62% 
REAL 
BOND 72.27% 1 24.73% 52.96% -43.39% 9.9% 37.97% 
FTSE 45.99% 24.73% 1 91.49% 10.54% 2.93 2.78% 
REAL FTSE 46.01% 52.96% 91.49% 1 -16.55% 5.79% 20.79% 
WAGES 1.84% -43.39% 10.54% -16.55% 1 37.95% 38.09% 
REAL 
WAGES (2) 5.05% 9.9% 2.93 5.79% 37.95% 1 54.04% 
REAL 
WAGES (1) 9.62% 37.97% 2.78% 20.79% 38.09% 54.04% 1 
Note: Real Wages (1) and Real Wages (2) are defined 'n Section 2.3 
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Table 2.7: Autocorrelation of nominal and real returns (quarterly sample, partial 
autocorrelation at different lags) 
Series Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 Lag 7 Lag 8 Lag 9 
Nominal 
AEI 
0.58* 0.20* 0.22* 0.20* -0.09 0.02 0.06 0.17* 0.04 
Nominal 
wages 
0.64* 0.39 -0.09 -0.08 0.25* 0.06 0.01 -0.01 0.13 
Real AEI 0.04 -0.29* -0.10 0.14 -0.14 -0.101 0.01 0.18* 0.04 
Real wages -0.08 0.12 -0.18* 0.15* 0.02 -0.08 0.07 0.17* -0.15 
Nominal 
bonds 
-0.01 0.04 -0.03 0.10 -0.11 0.06 0.10 0.15* -0.15* 
Real bonds -0.02 0.18* -0.03 0.16* -0.05 0.13 0.08 0.13 -0.184* 
Nominal 
equities 
0.10 -0.05 0.07 -0.12 -0.08 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.04 
Real 
equities 




0.62* 0.064 0.20* 0.12 -0.14 -0.22* 0.17* -0.03 -0.07 
Real house 
prices 
0.60* 0.20* 0.06 0.04 -0.17* -0.20* 0.09 0.00 -0.05 
Nominal 
bills 
0.94* -0.24* -0.02 0.01 0.01 0..02 -0.06 0.03 -0.06 
Real bills 0.39* 0.29* 0.07 0.55* -0.20* 0.02 0.14 0.24* -0.07 
Note: * = within two standard errors bound 
Table 2.8: Phillips Perron unit root tests (quarterly sample, 4 lags, critical values 
at 95% level) 














Nominal AEI 0.93 -3.44 -3.10 2.79 1.33 3.11 
Nominal wages 0.37 -3.44 -2.30 2.79 -0.95 3.11 
Real AEI -3.36 -3.44 3.31 2.79 3.53 3.11 
Real wages -2.64 -3.44 2.61 2.79 2.49 3.11 
Nominal bonds -2.57 -3.44 2.69 2.79 2.89 3.11 
Real bonds -0.89 -3.44 2.28 2.79 0.76 3.11 
Nominal equities -2.19 -3.44 1.84 2.79 2.36 3.11 
Real equities -2.10 -3.44 1.82 2.79 2.01 3.11 
Nominal house prices -1.09 -3.44 0.27 2.79 1.85 3.11 
Real house prices -1.95 -3.44 0.98 2.79 0.90 3.11 
Nominal bills -0.85 -3.44 0.03 2.79 0.70 3.11 
Real bills -0.53 -3.44 3.04 2.79 0.18 3.11 
Nominal (unhedged) 
US equities 
-2.27 -3.44 2.06 2.79 2.60 3.11 
Real (unhedged) US 
equities 
-1.66 -3.44 1.52 2.79 1.61 3.11 
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Table 2.9: Phillips Perron unit root tests (annual sample, 1 lag, critical values at 
95% level) 














Nominal wages -0.17 -3.44 2.07 2.79 -0.57 3.11 
Real wages (1) -3.21 -3.44 3.26 2.79 3.11 3.11 
Real wages (2) -1.90 -3.44 1.95 2.79 1.83 3.11 
Nominal bonds 1.66 -3.44 -0.17 2.79 -1.53 3.11 
Real bonds -1.78 -3.44 1.59 2.79 1.66 3.11 
Nominal equities 0.02 -3.44 0.96 2.79 0.16 3.11 
Real equities -1.67 -3.44 1.84 2.79 0.80 3.11 
Table 2.10: Bonds and salaries: Johansen cointegration tests (4 lags, intercept, no 
linear trend, quarterly sample 1963-2002) 
1963:1-2002:3 1963:1-1979:4 1980:1-2002:3 






Real AEI 21.83** 28.38** 12.53 17.18 19.67* 23.32* 
Real Wages 27.96** 33.12** 11.43 16.95 22.18** 31.62** 
Bond 
AEI 26.39** 32.18** 12.22 18.41 20.75** 27.06** 
Wages 37.42** 43.46** 19.40* 28.00** 22.51** 30.69** 
Note: *=significant at 95% level, **=significant at 99% level. Dependent variables in bold 
AEI= Average Earnings Index, seasonally adjusted 
Table 2.11: Bonds and salaries: Engle and Granger cointegration tests (4 lags, 
intercept, no linear trend, quarterly sample 1963-2002),  
1963:1-2002:3 1963:1-1979:4 1980:1-2002:3 





Real AEI -1.19 -1.19 -1.42 -1.58 -1.72 -1.96 
Real Wages -1.48 -1.46 -1.67 -2.17 -2.66 -2.59 
Bond 
AEI -0.78 -0.67 -2.35 -2.32 -1.74 -1.90 
Wages -1.10 -0.99 -2.54 -2.21 -2.41 -2.12 
Note: *=significant at 95% level, **=significant at 99% level. Dependent variables in bold 
AEI= Average Earnings Index, seasonally adjusted 
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Table 2.12: Bonds and salaries cointegrating relationships: long-run coefficient 
estimates (4 lags, intercept, no linear trend, quarterly sample 1963-2002) 
1963:1-2002:3 1963:1-1979:4 1980:1-2002:3 
Real Bond a 13 a P a Ii 
Real AEI -4.57 2.15^ 5.68 0.14^ -11.90 4.13 
Real Wages -4.70 0.88^ 2.52^ 0.23^ -23.56 2.57 
Bond 
AEI 2.19 1.08 2.33 0.77 -21.97 5.20 
Wages 4.90 1.05 -3.51 0.85 6.33 0.22^ 
Note: A=Not significant at 95% level. Dependent variables in bold 
AEI= Average Earnings Index, seasonally adjusted 
Table 2.13: Bonds and salaries: Johansen cointegration tests (4 lags, intercept, 
linear trend, quarterly sample 1963-2002) 
1963:1-2002:3 1963:1-1979:4 1980:1-2002:3 






Real AEI 7.09 7.54 5.30 9.95 4.81 5.54 
Real Wages 7.11 11.68 5.57 8.72 9.78 9.79 
Bond 
AEI 14.54* 19.02* 10.38 13.54 9.55 15.19 
Wages 19.02** 23.71** 13.28 19.84* 11.94 18.93* 
Note: *=significant at 95% level, **=significant at 99% level. Dependent variables in bold 
AEI= Average Earnings Index, seasonally adjusted 
Table 2.14: Bonds and salaries: error correction models adjustment coefficients (4 
lags, intercept, no linear trend, quarterly sample 1963-2002) 
1963:1-2002:3 
Real Bond D(Real Bond) D(Real AEUWage) 
Real AEI 0.006 0.004 





Wages -0.044 -0.012 
1850-2001 
Real Bond D(Real Bond) D(Real Wage) 
-0.025 -0.013 
Bond D(Bond) D(Wage) 
-0.037 -0.011 
Note: A=Not significant at 95% level. Dependent variables of cointegrating models in bold 
AEI= Average Earnings Index, seasonally adjusted 
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Table 2.15: Bonds and salaries: Johansen cointegration tests (4 lags, intercept, no 
linear trend, monthly sample 1963-2002) 
1963:1-2002:12 1963:1-1979:12 1980:1-2002:09 
Real Bond Max Eigenvalue 
Trace Max 
Eigenv. 
Trace  Trace Max Eigenv. 
Real AEI 20.16** 26.51** 7.45 11.33 26.86** 31.55** 
Bond 
AEI 83.81** 92.56** 41.09** 45.69** 48.26** 53.25** 
Note: *=significant at 95% level, **=significant at 99% level. Dependent variables in bold 
AEI= Average Earnings Index, seasonally adjusted 
Table 2.16: Bonds and salaries: Engle and Granger cointegration tests (4 lags, 
intercept, no linear trend, monthly sample 1963-2002) 
1963:1-2002:12 1963:1-1979:12 1980:1-2002:09 
Real Bond Max Eigenvalue 
Trace Max 
Eigenv. 
Trace  Trace Max Eigenv. 
Real AEI 6.48 7.81 5.39 7.99 6.96 7.40 
Bond 
AEI 34.97** 43.55** 20.15** 23.08** 22.64** 26.55** 
Note: *=significant at 95% level, **=significant at 99% level. Dependent variables in bold 
AEI= Average Earnings Index, seasonally adjusted 
Table 2.17: Bonds and salaries cointegrating relationships: long-run coefficient 
estimates (4 lags, intercept, no linear trend, monthly sample 1963-2002) 
1963:1-2002:12 1963:1-1979:12 1980:1-2002:09 
Real Bond a D a 0 a 11  
Real AEI 2.85 0.35 8.88 -0.96 -10.11 3.78 
Bond 
AEI 2.39 1.01 2.28 0.84 22.16 -2.52 
Note: ^=Not significant at 95% level. Dependent variables in bold 
AEI= Average Earnings Index, seasonally adjusted 
Table 2.18: Bonds and salaries: Johansen cointegration tests (1 lag, intercept, no 
linear trend, annual sample 1850-2001) 
1850-2001 1900-2001 1932-2001 







(2) 20.28** 24.54* 15.21 18.83 15.46 16.65 
Bond 
Wages 66.07** 72.74** 45.98** 51.14** 43.54** 45.92** 
Note: *=significant at 95% level, **=significant at 99% level. Dependent variables in bold 
Real Wages (2) is defined in Section 2.3 
173 
Table 2.19: Bonds and salaries: Johansen cointegration tests (1 lag, intercept, 
linear trend, annual sample 1850-2001) 
1850-2001 1900-2001 1932-2001 







(2) 7.57 7.74 6.90 7.14 2.04 2.08 
Bond 
Wages 39A5** 45.20** 28.07** 30.94** 28.58** 28.75** 
Note: *=significant at 95% level, **=significant at 99% level. Dependent variables in bold 
Real Wages (2) is defined in Section 2.3 
Table 2.20: Bonds and salaries cointegrating relationships: long-run coefficient 
estimates (1 lag, intercept, no linear trend, annual sample 1850-2001) 
1850-2001 1900-2001 1932-2001 
Real Bond a 13 a P a P 
Real Wage (2) 1.55 1.76 2.06^ 1.66 0.86^ 2.11 
Bond 
Wage 4.75 1.57 4.96 1.45 6.22 1.05 
Note: A=Not significant at 95% level. Dependent variables in bold 
Real Wages (2) is defined in Section 2.3 
Table 2.21: Equities and salaries: Johansen cointegration tests (4 lags, intercept, no 
linear trend, quarterly sample 1963-2002) 
1963:1-2002:3 1963:1-1979:4 1980:1-2002:3 






Real AEI 21.08** 24.77** 10.34 15.45 21.83** 25.09** 
Real Wages 25.64** 28.52** 12.87 18.92 27.09** 36.68** 
Equity 
AEI 17.43* 22.39* 9.37 15.84 23.39** 30.20** 
Wages 24.67** 29.67** 16.26* 24.37* 26.62** 32.15** 
Note: *=significant at 95% level, **=significant at 99% level. Dependent variables in bold 
AEI= Average Earnings Index, seasonally adjusted 
Table 2.22: Equities and salaries: Engle and Granger cointegration tests (4 lags, 
intercept, no linear trend, quarterly sample 1963-2002 
1963:1-2002:3 1963:1-1979:4 1980:1-2002:3 





Real AEI -2.13 -2.24 -2.34 -2.23 -1.22 -1.50 
Real Wages -2.05 -2.07 -2.38 -2.26 -1.10 -1.60 
Equity 
AEI -1.76 -1.82 -2.42 -2.31 -1.51 -1.72 
Wages -1.82 -1.85 -2.43 -2.28 -1.07 -1.32 
Note: *=significant at 95% level, **=significant at 99% level. Dependent variables in bold 
AEI= Average Earnings Index, seasonally adjusted 
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Table 2.23: Equities and salaries cointegrating relationships: long-run coefficient 
estimates (4 lags, intercept, no linear trend, quarterly sample 1963-2002) 
1963:1-2002:3 1963:1-1979:4 1980:1-2002:3 
Real Equity a II a 0 a 13 
Real AEI -13.69 4.63 4.31 0.77^ -21.71 6.71 
Real Wages -34.13 3.60 4.25^ 0.83^ -50.83 5.17 
Equity 
AEI 2.15 1.28 2.59^ -1.07^ -7.73 3.14 
Wages -5.79 1.23 19.26 -2.32 -23.88 2.67 
Note: A=Not significant at 95% level. Dependent variables in bold 
AEI= Average Earnings Index, seasonally adjusted 
Table 2.24: Equities and salaries: Johansen cointegration tests (4 lags, intercept, 
linear trend, quarterly sample 1963-2002) 
1963:1-2002:3 1963:1-1979:4 1980:1-2002:3 






Real AEI 7.58 7.92 8.00 10.10 9.08 12.32 
Real Wages 11.56 11.67 7.80 9.74 20.33** 28.36** 
Equity 
AEI 11.33 14.08 6.61 10.71 19.17** 25.99** 
Wages 12.08 14.72 9.00 16.33* 19.32** 24.14** 
Note: *=significant at 95% level, **=significant at 99% level. Dependent variables in bold 
AEI= Average Earnings Index, seasonally adjusted 
Table 2.25: Equities and salaries: error correction models adjustment coefficients 
(4 lags, intercept, no linear trend, quarterly sample 1963-2002 and annual sample 
1850-2001) 
1963:1-2002:3 
Real Equity D(Real Equity) D(Real AEUVVage) 
Real AEI 0.003^ 0.006 
Real Wages 0.012^ 0.009 
Equity D(Equity) D(AEUWage) 
AEI -0.041 -0.006 
Wages -0.031 -0.006 
1850-2001 
Real Equity D(Real Equity) D(Wage) 
Real Wages -0.082 -0.010 
Equity D(Equity) D(Wage) 
Wages -0.043 -0.009 
Note: A=Not significant at 95% level. Dependent variables of the cointegrating model in bold 
AEI= Average Earnings Index, seasonally adjusted 
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Table 2.26: Equities and salaries: Johansen cointegration tests (4 lags, intercept, no 
linear trend, monthly sample 1963-2002) 
1963:1-2002:12 1963:1-1979:12 1980:1-2002:09 






Real AEI 22.71** 27.19** 9.46 13.08 28.60** 32.71** 
Equity 
AEI 72.27** 76.27** 9.37 15.84 23.39** 30.20** 
Note: *=significant at 95% level, **=significant at 99% level. Dependent variables in bold 
AEl= Average Earnings Index, seasonally adjusted 
Table 2.27: Equities and salaries: Engle and Granger cointegration tests (4 lags, 
intercept, no linear trend, monthly sample 1963-2002) 










Real AEI 8.03 8.17 7.61 9.06 9.14 13.24 
Equity 
AEI 34.96** 37.39** 14.16* 19.68* 25.27** 27.87** 
Note: *=significant at 95% level, **=significant at 99% level. Dependent variables in bold 
AEI= Average Earnings Index, seasonally adjusted 
Table 2.28: Equities and salaries cointegrating relationships: long-run coefficient 
estimates (4 lags, intercept, no linear trend, monthly sample 1963-2002) 
1963:1-2002:12 1963:1-1979:12 1980:1-2002:09 
Real Equity a 13 a 0 a 13 
Real AEI -12.71 4.43 1.96^ 0.76^ -21.18 6.60 
Equity 
AEI 2.11 1.28 1.26^ -1.83 -11.75 3.89 
Note: A=Not significant at 95% level. Dependent variables in bold 
AEI= Average Earnings Index, seasonally adjusted 
Table 2.29: Equities and salaries: Johansen cointegration tests (1 lag, intercept, no 
linear trend, annual sample 1850-2001) 











(2) 23.11** 36.34** 17.81* 27.61** 15.59 24.50* 
Equity 
Wages 37.66** 49.73** 23.76** 33.50** 20.02* 28.01** 
Note: *=significant at 95% level, **=significant at 99% level. Dependent variables in bold 
Real Wages (2) is defined in Section 2.3 
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Table 2.30: Equities and salaries: Johansen cointegration tests (1 lag, intercept, 
linear trend, annual sample 1850-2001) 












16.33* 17.28* 13.77 14.96 9.08 9.39 
Equity 
Wages 17.90* 27.73** 13.71 18.05* 12.94 13.16 
Note: *=significant at 95% level, **=significant at 99% level. Dependent variables in bold 
Real Wages (2) is defined in Section 2.3 
Table 2.31: Equities and salaries cointegrating relationships: long-run coefficient 
estimates (1 lag, intercept, no linear trend, annual sample 1850-2001 
1850-2001 1900-2001 1932-2001 
Real Equity a D a P a 13 
Real Wages (2) -20.97 3.82 -21.22 3.81 -16.47A 2.70^ 
Equity 
Wages -6.67 2.29 -6.23 2.05 -4.85 1.67 
Note: A=Not significant at 95% level. Dependent variables in bold 
Real Wages (2) is defined in Section 2.3 
Table 2.32: Profits, dividends, wages and productivity cointegrating relationships: 
Johansen cointegration tests (4 lags, intercept, no linear trend, quarterly sample 
1963-2002) 
1963:1-2002:3 1963:1-1979:4 1980:1-2002:3 







job 21.24** 31.13** 11.65 15.94 17.56** 25.09** 
Real EPS 




job 21.82** 24.15* 10.91 18.27 13.69 15.93 
Real AEI 
Output per 
job 30.74** 42.43** 18.54* 26.02** 14.02 18.06 
Real Wages 
Output per 
job 39.55** 48.85** 25.89** 32.93** 20.61** 31.40** 
Note: *=significant at 95% level, **=significant at 99%, level. Dependent variables in bold 
AEI= Average Earnings Index, seasonally adjusted 
EPS= Earnings per Share 
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Table 2.33: Profits, dividends, wages and productivity cointegrating relationships: 
long-run coefficient estimates (4 lags, intercept, no linear trend, quarterly sample 
1963-2002) 
1963:1-2002:3 1963:1-1979:4 1980:1-2002:3 
Real profits a 0 a P a P 
Output per job 14.33 0.51^ 12.84 -0.65^ 5.08 1.15 
Real EPS 
Real Wages -2.66 0.59 -0.47^ 0.39^ 2.25 0.15 
Real dividend 
Output per job 4.79^ 1.59^ 7.04 -0.94 -13.94^ 3.65 
Real AEI 
Output per job 0.20^ 0.89 0.44^ 0.82 0.95^ 0.76 
Real Wages 
Output per job 6.76 0.97 6.64 0.99 5.44 1.27 
Note: ^=Not significant at 95% level. Dependent variables in bold 
AEI= Average Earnings Index, seasonally adjusted 
EPS= Earnings per Share 
Table 2.34: Profits, dividends, wages and productivity cointegrating relationships: 
Johansen cointegration tests (4 lags, intercept, linear trend, quarterly sample 1963-
2002) 
1963:1-2002:3 1963:1-1979:4 1980:1-2002:3 






Output per job 9.90 11.81 4.53 8.68 10.96 11.25 
Real EPS 
Real Wages 13.54 13.78 8.43 9.34 9.54 10.59 
Real dividend 
Output per job 4.11 4.48 8.11 10.81 3.01 4.29 
Real AEI 
Output per job 14.86* 16.36* 12.29 14.37 4.38 5.10 
Real Wages 
Output per job 17.38* 18.69* 15.94* 18.08* 14.16 14.17* 
Note: *=significant at 95% level, **=significant at 99% level. Dependent variables in bold 
AEI= Average Earnings Index, seasonally adjusted 
EPS= Earnings per Share 
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Table 2.35: Treasury Bills and salaries cointegrating relationships: Johansen 
cointegration tests (4 lags, intercept, no linear trend, quarterly sample 1963-2002) 
1963:1-2002:3 1963:1-1979:4 1980:1-2002:3 






Real AEI 22.48** 26.15** 10.83 17.23 21.16** 27.38** 
Real Wages 22.05** 26.07** 13.53 20.04* 15.86* 20.18* 
Bill 
AEI 18.22* 23.38* 10.96 16.46 17.49** 25.38** 
Wages 17.91* 22.61* 11.07 14.66 7.92 11.41 
Note: *=significant at 95% level, **=significant at 99% level. Dependent variables in bold 
AEI= Average Earnings Index, seasonally adjusted 
Table 2.36: Treasury Bills and salaries cointegrating relationships: long-run 
coefficient estimates (4 lags, intercept, no linear trend, quarterly sample 1963-
2002) 
1963:1-2002:3 1963:1-1979:4 1980:1-2002:3 
Real Bills a p a 13 a ti 
Real AEI -12.15^ 4.34 9.27 -0.55^ 0.83^ 1.75 
Real Wages -3.66^ 0.97 12.37^ -0.50^ -6.14^ 1.29 
Bill 
AEI 4.36 0.97 4.43 1.00 1.93 1.39 
Wages -1.84 0.92 -2.24 0.98 25.98^ -1.18^ 
Note: A=Not significant at 95% level. Dependent variables in bold 
AEI= Average Earnings Index, seasonally adjusted 
Table 2.37: Treasury Bills and salaries cointegrating relationships: Johansen 
cointegration tests (4 lags, intercept, linear trend, quarterly sample 1963-2002) 
1963:1-2002:3 1963:1-1979:4 1980:1-2002:3 






Real AEI 5.43 6.12 6.84 8.67 8.39 12.33 
Real Wages 6.58 6.83 6.75 7.36 7.37 8.14 
Bill 
AEI 13.04 17.38* 7.58 13.08 17.45* 22.92** 
Wages 12.68* 16.74* 7.81 11.25 5.09 6.65 
Note: *=significant at 95% level, **=significant at 99% level. Dependent variables in bold 
AEI= Average Earnings Index, seasonally adjusted 
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Table 2.38: House prices and salaries cointegrating relationships: Johansen 
cointegration tests (4 lags, intercept, no linear trend, quarterly sample 1963-2002) 










Real AEI 19.21* 30.13** 17.84* 24.73** 20.62** 24.20* 
Real Wages 16.98* 28.03** 19.56* 27.48** 6.60 10.96 
Property 
AEI 13.29 21.20* 22.57** 28.49** 12.93 15.62 
Wages 14.88 26.46** 26.91** 37.08** 24.36** 27.10** 
Note: *=significant at 95% level, **=significant at 99% level. Dependent variables in bold 
AEI= Average Earnings Index, seasonally adjusted 
Table 2.39: House prices and salaries cointegrating relationships: long-run 
coefficient estimates (4 lags, intercept, no linear trend, quarterly sample 1963-
2002) 
1963:1-2002:3 1963:1-1979:4 1980:1-2002:3 
Real Property a P a P a P 
Real AEI -1.13 1.46 -1.08 1.59 -2.41 1.76 
Real Wages -11.67 1.34 -9.70 1.37 177.5 -17.6 
Property 
AEI 0.89 1.04 0.99 1.00 2.33 6.76 
Wages -7.92 1.14 -5.32 0.93 -11.87 1.41 
Note: A=Not significant at 95% level. Dependent variables in bold 
AEI= Average Earnings Index, seasonally adjusted 
Table 2.40: House prices and salaries cointegrating relationships: Johansen 
cointegration tests (4 lags, intercept, linear trend, quarterly sample 1963-2002) 
1963:1-2002:3 1963:1-1979:4 1980:1-2002:3 






Real AEI 11.97 12.74 17.78* 19.47* 10.24 10.41 
Real Wages 11.08 11.11 18.63** 19.25* 4.36 4.54 
Property 
AEI 13.23 15.54* 22.34** 25.64** 5.11 5.99 
Wages 12.13 14.73 26.20** 32.20** 6.39 6.85 
Note: *=significant at 95% level, **=significant at 99% level. Dependent variables in bold 
AEI= Average Earnings Index, seasonally adjusted 
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Table 2.41: US equities (unhedged) and salaries cointegrating relationships: 
Johansen cointegration tests (4 lags, intercept, no linear trend, quarterly sample 
1963-2002) 
1963:1-2002:3 1963:1-1979:4 1980:1-2002:3 
Real US Equities Max Eigenvalue 
Trace Max 
Eigenv. 
Trace  Trace Max Eigenv. 
Real AEI 20.03* 23.25* 8.55 14.24 18.92* 22.56* 
Real Wages 22.57** 25.09** 9.76 16.78 19.42** 25.56** 
US Equities 
AEI 14.82 18.58 9.94 16.64 9.30 14.83 
Wages 20.12* 23.73* 11.48 19.82 14.69 18.89 
Note: *- -significant at 95% level, **=significant at 99% level. Dependent variables in bold 
AEI= Average Earnings Index, seasonally adjusted 
Table 2.42: US equities (unhedged) and salaries cointegrating relationships: long-
run coefficient estimates (4 lags, intercept, no linear trend, quarterly sample 1963-
2002) 
1963:1-2002:3 1963:1-1979:4 1980:1-2002:3 
Real US Equities a II a 13 a 13 
Real AEI -12.58 3.96 4.24 -0.01" -23.90 6.90 
Real Wages -25.51 2.72 -322.10^ 29.79^ -45.73 4.61 
US Equities 
AEI 2.68 1.03 1.63 0.49 -18.44 4.89 
Wages -3.32^ 0.97 14.19^ -1.76^ -27.24 2.82 
Note: A=Not significant at 95% level. Dependent variables in bold 
AEI= Average Earnings Index, seasonally adjusted 
Table 2.43: US equities (unhedged) and salaries cointegrating relationships: 
Johansen cointegration tests (4 lags, intercept, linear trend, quarterly sample 1963-
2002) 
1963:1-2002:3 1963:1-1979:4 1980:1-2002:3 






Real AEI 5.37 5.41 6.29 8.99 7.12 9.31 
Real Wages 9.74 9.77 7.11 9.04 17.08* 18.85* 
US Equities 
AEI 6.74 9.69 8.95 11.02 5.74 11.16 
Wages 7.18 10.14 8.57 12.38 6.34 10.36 
Note: *=significant at 95% level, **=significant at 99% level. Dependent variables in bold 
AEI= Average Earnings Index, seasonally adjusted 
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Table 2.44: MULTIVARIATE MODELS (variables in real log terms): long-run 
coefficient estimates with standard errors in parenthesis and Johansen 
cointegration tests 
Model Max Eigenv. 
Trace 
Model 1 RS = 2.13(1.72) + 0.46(0.31)RB 21.83** 28.38** 
Model lb RS = 2.80(2.84) + 0.23(0.38)RBI 22.48** 26.15** 
Model 2 RS = 2.96(0.26) + 0.22(0.04)RE 21.08** 24.77** 
Model 3 RS = 4.50(0.54) - 0.57(0.17)RB + 0.48(0.08)RE 32.83** 47.13** 
Model 4 RS = 3.32(0.94) - 0.45(0.17)RB + 0.40(0.1)RE + 0.19(0.13)RH 39.35** 66.15
** 
RS = 4.03(0.86) + 0.27(0.21)RB - 0.53(0.20)RBI 
Model 5 + 0.32(0.06)RE + 0.25(0.06)RH + 43.62* 119.19** 
0.12(0.06)RUSE 
Model 6 RS = 3.53(1.05) - 0.53(0.24)RB + 0.38(0.09)RE + 0.21(0.12)RH + 0.06(0.12)RUSE 40.22** 82.95* 
RW = 10.25(1.56) - 0.67(0.36)RB + 
Model 6b 0.29(0.14)RE + 0.25(0.17)RH + 46.02** 82.14* 
0.32(0.17)RUSE 
Notes: 
1. With models 3-6b the hypothesis of at most one cointegrating relationship 
hypothesis cannot be rejected (no statistical support for more than one cointegrating 
relationship) 
2. *= significant at 95% level, **= significant at 99% level 
3. Estimation with quarterly 1963-2002 data 4 lags, intercept, no linear trend 
4. Variable defmition: 
RS= Real Salary (AEI index, seasonally adjusted) 
RW= Real Wages (National accounts) 
RB= Real 10-year Government Bond Total Return Index 
RE= Real FTSE All Share Total Return index 
RH= Real Nationwide House Price Index 
RBI= Real Bill Index 
RUSE= Real S&P 500 Index (in pound sterling) 
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Table 2.45: MULTIVARIATE MODELS (real): error-correction models 
adjustment coefficients deriving from cointegrating relationships in Table 2.44 
D(Real 
salary/wages) 








Model 1 -0.01(0.00) -0.01(0.00) 
Model lb -0.01(0.00) -0.00(0.00) 
Model 2 -0.03(0.01) -0.01(0.05) 
Model 3 -0.04(0.01) -0.07(0.02) 0.03(0.07) 
Model 4 -0.05(0.01) -0.10(0.03) 0.03(0.09) 0.01(0.02) 
Model 5 -0.12(0.02) -0.04(0.05) 0.01(0.02) -0.03(0.03) 0.04(0.16) -0.07(0.01) 
Model 6 -0.05(0.01) -0.10(0.03) 0.05(0.09) 0.01(0.02) 0.16(0.08) 
Model 6b -0.04(0.01) -0.08(0.02) 0.05(0.06) -0.01(0.01) 0.14(0.05) 
Notes: 
1. Standard errors in parenthesis 
2. Variables in real log terms 
Table 2.46: MULTIVARIATE MODELS (real): key statistics of salary error-
correction models deriving from cointegrating relationships in Table 2.44 
R-squared R-squared (adjusted) F test 
Model 1 24.7% 20.5% 5.94 
Model lb 26.1% 22.1% 6.42 
Model 2 17.5% 12.9% 3.83 
Model 3 28.5% 22.4% 4.69 
Model 4 29.5% 21.3% 3.59 
Model 5 40.8% 29.8% 3.70 
Model 6 31.6% 21.3% 3.07 
Model 6b 30.0% 19.4% 2.84 
Table 2.47: MULTIVARIATE MODELS (real): residual correlation and residual 











REALSALARYSA 1.00 -0.04 0.24 0.06 0.01 
REALFTSE -0.04 1.00 -0.01 0.43 0.62 
REALHOUSE 0.24 -0.01 1.00 0.04 -0.12 
REALBOND 0.06 0.43 0.04 1.00 0.00 
REALSP500POUND 0.01 0.62 -0.12 0.00 1.00 
Test Statistic P-value 
Autocorrelation 
(LM test) 23.29 (Lag 5) 0.5608 
Heteroskedasticity 
(White Test) 793.45 0.0000 
Normality 
(Jarque Bera) 17.50 0.0640 
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Table 2.48: MULTIVARIATE MODELS (variable in nominal log terms): long-run 





Model 1 S = -2.02(0.29) + 0.92(0.05)B 26.39** 32.18** 
Model lb S = -4.51(0.28) + 1.03(0.04)BI 18.22* 23.38* 
Model 2 S = -1.67(0.44) + 0.78(0.06)E 17.43* 22.39* 
Model 3 S = -1.93(0.70) + 0.81(0.52)B + 0.08(0.37)E 29.74** 47.60** 
Model 4 S = -4.34(1.01) + 0.33(0.49)B - 0.18(0.16)E + 0.91(0.44)BI 34.45** 63.61** 
Model 5 S = -2.47(0.62) + 0.98(0.51)B — 0.21(0.32)E + 0.33(0.23)RPI 35.54** 76.83** 
(allowing for linear trend) 
Model 5b S = -0.94 - 0.08(0.14)B + 0.28(0.09)E + 22.74 49.55* 
0.81(0.06)RPI 
S = 1.01(1.09) - 2.88(1.01)B + 0.34(0.53)E - 
Model 6 0.12(0.61)H + 1.12(0.48)USE + 35.03 108.43* 
2.87(0.86)RPI 
W = 5.48(0.13) + 0.06(0.12)B + 0.01(0.06)E 
Model 6b + 0.13(0.07)H + 0.11(0.05)USE + 45.85* 126.18** 
0.85(0.10)RPI 
Notes: 
1. With model 5 the hypothesis of at most one cointegrating relationship hypothesis is 
rejected at 99% confidence level only by Trace Statistic test, with model 6b the 
same hypothesis is rejected at 95% confidence level again only by Trace Statistic 
test 
2. *= significant at 95% level, **= significant at 99% level 
3. Estimation with quarterly 1963-2002 data 4 lags, intercept, no linear trend 
4. Variable definition: 
S= Nominal Salary (AEI index, seasonally adjusted) 
W= Nominal Wages (National accounts) 
B= Nominal 10-year Government Bond total return Index 
E= Nominal FTSE All Share total return index 
II= Nominal Nationwide House Price index 
BI= Nominal Bill Index 
USE= Nominal S&P 500 Index in pound sterling 
RPI= Retail Price Index 
184 
Table 2.49: MULTIVARIATE MODELS (nominal): error-correction models 
adjustment coefficients deriving from cointegrating relationships in Table 2.48 
D(Salary/ 
Wages) 
D(Bond) D(Equity) D(RPI) D(SP500) D(Bill) 
Model 1 0.01(0.00) 0.04 (0.01) 
Model lb 0.01(0.01) 0.01(0.00) 
Model 2 0.01(0.00) 0.05(0.01) 
Model 3 0.01(0.00) 0.04(0.01) 0.01(0.03) 
Model 4 0.01(0.01) -0.01(0.02) -0.02(0.08) 0.01(0.00) 
Model 5 0.01(0.00) 0.04(0.01) -0.00(0.04) 0.00(0.00) 
Model 5b -0.03(0.02) 0.13(0.05) 0.32(0.17) 0.04(0.01) 
Model 6 -0.00(0.00) -0.03(0.01) 0.01(0.03) 0.00(0.00) 0.06(0.02) 
Model 6b -0.06(0.02) -0.22(0.05) 0.01(0.19) 0.05(0.02) 0.31(0.18) 
Notes: 
3. Standard errors in parenthesis 
4. Variables in nominal log terms 
Table 2.50: MULTIVARIATE MODELS (nominal): key statistics of salary error-




Model 1 43.9% 40.8% 14.20 
Model lb 46.7% 43.8% 15.88 
Model 2 45.6% 42.6% 15.22 
Model 3 45.7% 41.1% 9.90 
Model 4 49.4% 43.5% 8.37 
Model 5 55.0% 49.8% 10.50 
Model 5b 56.9% 51.4% 10.55 
Model 6 59.0% 51.4% 7.74 
Model 6b 67.7% 61.7% 11.28 
Table 2.51: MULTIVARIATE MODELS (nominal): residual correlation (based on 
model 6b in Table 2.48) 




WAGES 1.00 -0.03 -0.05 0.08 -0.21 0.05 
FTSE -0.03 1.00 0.44 0.02 0.66 0.11 
BOND -0.05 0.44 1.00 -0.06 0.04 0.11 
HOUSE 0.08 0.02 -0.06 1.00 -0.10 0.09 
SP500POUND -0.21 0.66 0.04 -0.10 1.00 0.07 
RPI 0.05 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.07 1.00 
Table 2.52: MULTIVARIATE MODELS (monthly 1920-2003 sample, variables in 
real and nominal terms): long-run coefficient estimates with standard errors in 




RS = 2.00(0.67) + 0.04(0.15)RB 25.26** 27.36** 
Model 1 with linear trend 3.82 4.58 
RS = 2.75 + 0.16(0.07)RB 
Model lb RS = 1.97(0.27) + 0.20(0.05)RBI 7.31 11.09 
Model 2 
RS = 2.28(0.08) + 0.27(0.02)RE 
with linear trend 
18.43* 32.62** 
RS = 2.21 + 0.27(0.01)RE 17.31* 17.33* 
S = 2.49(0.06) + 0.28(0.02)RPI 20.22** 27.88** 
Model 3 with linear trend 
S = 2.60 + 0.28(0.02)RPI 17.11* 17.13* 
Model 4 RS = 2.26(0.10) — 0.04(0.07)RB + 0.26(0.06)RE 55.53** 31.94** 
with linear trend 
Model 5 S = -1.17 - 0.00(0.03)B + 0.24(0.03)E + 58.87** 28.38* 
0.77(0.06)RPI 
Model 6 with linear trend (1981-2003) S = -2.37 —1.64(0.62)B + 2.61(0.86)IL 18.26 33.09* 
Notes: 
1. Note: with models 4 the hypothesis of at most one cointegrating relationship 
hypothesis is rejected at 95% confidence level by Trace Statistic and Maximum 
Eigenvalue Test 
2. *= significant at 95% level, **= significant at 99% level 
3. Estimation with monthly 1920-2003 data, 12 lags, no trend unless specified 
4. Variable defmition: 
S= Nominal Salary (historical average earnings indices) 
B= Nominal Long-Term Government Bond Total Return Index 
E= Nominal FTSE All Share total return index 
BI= Nominal Bill Index 
RPI= Retail Price Index 
RS= Real Salary (historical average earnings indices) 
RB= Real Long-Term Government Bond Total Return Index 
RE= Real FTSE All Share Total Return index 
RBI= Real Bill Index 
IL= Index-Linked Total Return Index 
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Figure 2.1: National accounts wages and Average Earnings Index (AEI) in nominal 
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Figure 2.2: Asset indices in nominal pound sterling terms (UK, quarterly sample 
1963-2002) 
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Figure 2.3: Asset indices in real pound sterling terms (UK, quarterly sample 1963-
2002) 
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Figure 2.4: Asset and wage indices in nominal pound sterling terms (UK, annual 
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Figure 2.5: Asset and wage indices in nominal pound sterling terms (UK, annual 
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Figure 2.6: Asset and wage indices in real pound sterling terms (UK, annual 
sample 1850-2001) 
Notes: 
1. Real wages (1) is created by deflating Mitchell (1994) money wages using the 
consumer price index in Global Financial Data, while real wages (2) uses the real 
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Figure 2.7: Cross correlograms of nominal asset returns with nominal salary 
growth (UK, quarterly sample 1963-2002) 
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Figure 2.8: Cross correlograms of real asset returns and real salary growth (UK, 
quarterly sample 1963-2002) 
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Figure 2.9: Scatter plots of nominal asset indices and nominal salary index (UK, 
quarterly sample 1963-2002) 
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Figure 2.10: Scatter plots of real asset indices and real salary index (UK, quarterly 
sample 1963-2002) 
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1. Index-linked total return against real salaries is computed on monthly data since 
1981, when index-linked gilts were first introduced 
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Figure 2.11: Scatter plots of nominal asset indices and nominal salary index (UK, 
annual sample 1850-2001) 
Figure 2.12: Scatter plots of real asset indices and real salary index (UK, annual 
sample 1850-2001) 
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Figure 2.13: Long-term cointegrating equilibrium and equilibrium errors between 
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Notes: 
1. The estimated model (1850-2001 annual sample, 1 lag, no linear trend, dummy for 
1924 onwards) is RB = 4.23(3.01) + 1.25(0.50)RW 
Figure 2.14: Long-term cointegrating equilibrium and equilibrium errors between 
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Figure 2.15: Long-term cointegrating equilibrium and equilibrium errors between 
nominal wages and prices 




1. First estimated model (1963-2002 quarterly sample, 4 lags, linear trend) is 
W = 4.65 + 1.39(0.07)RPI 
2. Second estimated model (1850-2001 annual sample, 1 lag, linear trend, dummy for 
1924 onwards) is W = 1.30 + 1.23(0.18)RPI 
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Figure 2.16: Long-term cointegrating equilibrium and equilibrium errors between 
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Notes: 
1. The estimated model (1850-2001 annual sample, 1 lag, no linear trend, dummy for 
1975 onwards) is RE = -18.83(1.79) + 3.40(0.28)RW 
Figure 2.17: Long-term cointegrating equilibrium and equilibrium errors between 
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1. The estimated model (1850-2001 annual sample, 1 lag, no linear trend, dummy for 
1975 onwards) is E = 7.74(1.25) + 1.90(0.31)W 
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Figure 2.18: Long-term cointegrating equilibrium and equilibrium errors between 
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Notes: 
1. The estimated model (1963-2002 quarterly sample, 4 lags, no linear trend, dummy 
for 1989 onwards) is RH = -1.44(0.88) + 1.66(0.23)RS 
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Figure 2.19: Multivariate long-term cointegrating equilibriums (UK, quarterly 
sample 1963-2002) and equilibrium errors (Table 2.44, variables in real log terms) 
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Figure 2.20: Impulse-response functions from Cholesky decomposition arising 
from real salary innovations (Table 2.44, model 6, variables in real log terms) 
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Figure 2.21: Multivariate long-term cointegrating equilibriums (UK, quarterly 
sample 1963-2002) and equilibrium errors (Table 2.48, variables in nominal log 
terms) 
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Figure 2.22: Impulse-response functions from Cholesky decomposition arising 
from nominal salary innovations (Table 2.48, model 6b, variables in nominal log 
terms) 
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations 
Notes: 
1. Cholesky ordering is: WAGES-FTSE-BOND-HOUSE-SP500POUND-RPI 
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Figure 2.23: Multivariate long-term cointegrating equilibriums (UK, monthly 
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Figure 2.24: Average maturity of UK defined benefit pension schemes (current 
service cost over interest on pension liabilities reported in FRS 17 disclosures) 
Current service to interest cost ratio 
FTSE 350 UK schemes, average by broad sector 
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Chapter 3 
Corporate Pension Funding and Credit 
Spreads 
Summary 
This chapter tests empirically whether pension information derived by accounting 
disclosures is priced in corporate bond spreads. The model builds on the literature on 
structural models of bond spreads initiated by Merton (1974) and is tested using US 
corporate and bond data for the period 2001-2003. A key conclusion is that unfunded 
pension liabilities are incorporated in credit spreads and the sensitivity of market 
spreads to deficits is greater than the sensitivity to ordinary long-term debt. However 
this relationship is rather more complex than a linear monotonic function would suggest 
and there is some evidence that the bond market sees some residual risk even in funded 
obligations and gives lower weighting to off-balance sheet liabilities, while it does not 
seem to account for the asset mix of the pension plan. Finally, we test the model with 
UK and Japanese data and fmd that these bond markets also appear to respond to 
pension liabilities, albeit with some differences from the US. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Numerous studies have considered the relationship between pension funding 
and corporate financial policy (see e.g. Sharpe, 1976; Treynor, 1977; Black, 1980; 
Bulow, 1982; Bulow and Scholes, 1983; Ippolito, 1985, Pesando, 1985, Bodie, 1986; 
Bodie, 1990) and the stock market valuation of pension or other long term benefits 
liabilities (see e.g. Feldstein and Seligman, 1981; Bodie, 1985; Bulow et al.,1985; 
Mittelstaedt and Warshawsky, 1993; Coronado and Sharpe, 2003; Picconi, 2004; Jin et 
al. 2006). There are also some studies (see Martin and Henderson, 1983 and Carroll and 
Niehaus, 1998) which have investigated the bond market response to corporate pension 
liabilities by calibrating models of credit ratings. 
Whilst some previous studies (Coronado and Sharpe, 2003; Picconi, 2004; 
Franzoni and Marin, 2006) questioned the value transparency of the stock market when 
it comes to processing information derived from pension accounting data, no previous 
study has investigated the extent to which the bond market incorporates pension 
liabilities in its implicit assessment of company creditworthiness. 
This chapter tests whether pension information derived by accounting 
disclosures is priced in market spreads. The empirical model follows the literature on 
structural models of bond spreads initiated by Merton (1974). 
Whilst the main focus is on the US, which is by far the largest and most liquid 
corporate bond market, UK and Japanese data are also examined. For most of the 
analysis a three-year Watson Wyatt panel of pension and accounting disclosures 
referred to Fortune 1000 companies with defined benefit plans is matched with 
corporate spreads from Merrill Lynch investment grades and high yields indices. 
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 reviews structural models of 
credit spreads; Section 3.3 reviews the literature on nature and market assessment of 
pension liabilities; Section 3.4 describes the data employed in the analysis; Section 3.5 
presents the results using the baseline model specification; Section 3.6 assesses the 
robustness of the model to alternative specifications; Section 3.7 presents some 
extension of the baseline model and implements it with data from other countries; 
Section 3.8 concludes. 
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3.2 Structural models of credit spreads 
Structural models of default provide an intuitive framework to understand the 
theoretical determinants of credit spreads. Merton (1974) derived a functional 
relationships linking up credit spreads, for a given maturity and risk-free interest rate, to 
only two input variables: the leverage ratio and the volatility of the firm's operation. 
More formally, the yield to maturity for corporate debt maturing at time T under 
the Merton model is given by: 
D 
ln() 
y, (T)= 	TF 	(1) 
where D is the price of corporate debt maturing at time T and F is its face value. The 
yield spread can then be expressed as: 
1 	 V 	! cs(T)=--T  in [N(d2 )+ 	 
Fe-irT  Iv 
xi
' 
di )] 	(2) 
FrT 	 i where 1= 	s the promised payment (discounted to the present at the risk-less rate) 
Vt 
to the current value of the firm ratio (or leverage ratio), e-rr is the price of a risk-less 
bond which promises a payment of 1 dollar at time T (maturity date), r is the 
instantaneous rate of interest, N(x) is the standard normal cumulative density function 
and di andd2 can be expressed as follows: 
[— —1  cr2T — log(/)] 2 
(3) 
[--1 a2T + log(/)] 2 d2 
where cr2  is the variance (or volatility) of the firm's operations. 
As shown by Merton (1974), equations (2) and (3) imply a negative 
relationship between credit spreads and leverage, which means that raising debt 
exposure increases the cost of debt financing, as well as a negative relationship between 
credit spreads and the volatility of the firm's operations. A modified version of the 
original Merton model has been extensively used by practitioners following the 
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establishment of the credit analysis provider Moody's KMV (see Crosbie and Bohn, 
2003). 
Moreover, from Merton's credit spread equation (2) and applying Ito's lemma, 
one can also derive an expression for the instantaneous equity volatility in function of 
leverage and firm volatility 
v aE 6E
=a E —av (4)  
which can be written as 
= 
crN(d1 )   
N(di)-1N(d2) (5) 
where E is the value of the firm's equity aE is the instantaneous volatility of the firm's 
equity returnsl 
Since Merton's 1974 paper, the literature on structural models has focused on 
improving the modelling framework by relaxing one by one the assumptions of the 
original model: constant term structure of interest rates (e.g. Shimko et al., 1993; 
Longstaff and Schwartz, 1995; Nielsen, Saa-Requejo and Santa Clara, 1993), single 
zero-coupon bond debt structure (Geske, 1977), bankruptcy not allowed before maturity 
(first passage time models such as Black and Cox, 1976 and Longstaff and Schwartz, 
1995), constant volatility of the firm value process (Mason and Bhattacharya,1981 and 
Thou, 2001) and endogenous default process (e.g. Anderson and Sundaresan, 1996; 
Mella-Barral and Perraudin, 1997). Whilst these models differ in the specification of the 
credit spread function and in the number of state variables, they all predict a negative 
relationship between corporate spreads and leverage (or a distance to default measure 
which is in turn expected to be closely associated with leverage). 
Empirical studies on structural models such as Jones et al. (1984), Sarig and 
Varga (1989), Lardic and Rouzeau (2002) and Hull, Nelken and White (2004) supported 
the validity of the Merton model with real world data on credit spread levels. However, 
Dufresne et al. (2001) found structural models to explain only one quarter of credit 
spread changes and suggested that aggregate factors are more important than firm-level 
determinants of credit risk. The evidence is mixed on whether more complex structural 
models have greater predictive power than the simplified Merton framework. Anderson 
1 This follows Cossin and Pirotte (2001), chapter 16 
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and Sundaresan (2000) found that endogenous default models provide a better fit to 
historical default probabilities than the Merton model. On the other hand Wei and Guo 
(1997) found the original Merton model to perform at least as well as Longstaff and 
Schwartz (1995). 
One of the problems faced by empirical tests of structural models is that key 
input variables such as leverage, firm value and the volatility of a firm's operations are 
not directly observable. In particular, Merton's original model assumes a simplified 
capital structure with a single zero coupon bond maturing at a given maturity date, 
while empirical implementations need to deal with complex structures with multiple 
liabilities maturing at different points in time. Different approaches have been taken by 
the existing literature to resolve this: for instance Dufresne et al. (2001), who tested the 
empirical predictions of structural models relied on a traditional debt to enterprise 
value2 ratio, while Lardic and Rouzeau (2002), who calibrated the Merton model to the 
French bond market, used a more complex methodology to work out a measure of firm 
market value3 and the face value of a hypothetical zero coupon bond with nominal value 
calculated as the sum of accounting aggregates and maturity equal to the weighted 
average duration of liabilities. 
3.3 Pension liabilities and the market: a literature 
overview 
As discussed in the previous section, structural models predict a close 
relationship between corporate bond yields and firm leverage, which is a measure of the 
relative size of companies' obligations towards bondholders and other creditors. The 
question here is whether pension liabilities arising from defined benefit pension plans 
should be included in an aggregate measure of firmwide obligations. 
Defined benefit pension plans typically require companies to pay fixed 
pension benefits proportional to individual wages and length of service. Liabilities 
arising from the provision of such benefits are borne by the sponsoring company and in 
most cases there are segregated pools of capital or pension funds to secure them. There 
could also be a third-party guarantee alongside segregated assets provided by an 
2 Enterprise value is defined as the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt 
3 Market value is worked out using a two equations system derived from the Merton model which 
requires the market value of equity and the volatility of the stock price as inputs 
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insurance company or, as it is the case in the US, by a central guarantee fund (the 
PBGC)4. There are also cases, particularly in countries like Japan or Germany, where 
pension liabilities are instead covered by book reserves rather than specifically 
earmarked assets (Gerke and Pellens, 2003). 
There is a longstanding debate in the literature on the nature of pension 
liabilities and on whether they can be assimilated to other sets of fmancial liabilities. 
The two opposing positions are summarised by Bodie et al. (1986): the "traditional 
perspective", which sees pension funds as entirely separate entities from the 
corporation, and the "corporate financial perspective", which sees pension liabilities as 
another set of fixed fmancial liabilities for the firm. Friedman (1982) provided some 
empirical support to the "corporate fmancial perspective" by showing a link between 
balance sheet liabilities and unfunded pension obligations as well as between volatility 
of earnings, leverage and conservativeness in pension fund asset allocation. However, 
even accepting the "corporate financial perspective", there is no consensus in the 
literature on how the economic liability arising from defined benefit pension funds 
should be computed, given that the buy-out cost of pension liabilities in the market is 
often unknowns. 
The simplest approach that can be taken is the "consolidated balance sheet" 
model (Bulow et al., 1985) where pension liabilities are defined on a "quit" basis (what 
workers would receive if they individually quit the firm today) and accounted for as a 
corporate liability while pension assets are defined at market value and accounted for as 
an offsetting corporate asset. However, there are at least three important missing 
elements in such an approach: optionality features embedded in pension claims, labour 
contracts and institutional factors such as tax rules. 
Optionalities were first explored by Sharpe (1976) in one of the first attempts 
to investigate the link between pension funding policy and corporate fmancial 
management. The paper assumes that corporations are in principle not liable for any 
shortfall between liabilities when they fall due and the uncertain future value of pension 
Japan has a similar guarantee fund (Pension Guarantee Programme), while the UK Government has 
recently presented a proposal to create a PBGC-type central guarantee fund for defined benefit schemes 
(the PPF). 
s See Exley, Mehta and Smith (1997) for a discussion 
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assets6. Employees have therefore implicitly sold a put option and the company has 
implicitly bought a call option on the assets of the fund with a strike price equal to the 
future value of liabilities. Following this approach, the present value of a company's 
pension obligation towards employees would depend not only on the funding level but 
also on investment policy, which would impact upon the present value of the call 
option. Larger investments in equities through the pension plan would therefore increase 
the value of the option by raising embedded volatility and reduce pension liabilities. 
However, Sharpe assumes that workers would bid up their wages to compensate for this 
and the net effect would leave the value of the firm unchanged'. 
Treynor (1977) extended Sharpe's argument by constructing an economic 
balance sheet of the corporation with the pension claim discounted at the risk-less rate 
as a corporate liability, the pension asset as a corporate asset and the "pension put" 
against the pension claimants as another offsetting corporate asset, whose value is in 
function of the uncertainty surrounding the future value of two (often correlated) 
underlying assets: the employer's equity (in economic terms) and the market value of 
the pension asset portfolio. In Treynor's interpretation, pension claims are not in 
principle different from conventional lenders' claims, except for the fact they have 
typically a much longer maturity (or, in his words, a longer "foreclosure time"). 
However, considering the "pension put" effect in isolation, with the resulting 
implication that risky investments in the pension plan would reduce the underlying 
economic liability of defined benefit plans, could potentially be misleading. The relation 
between pension plan asset allocation and credit risk is a complex one. Companies 
cannot typically ditch their contractual pension liabilities and transfer the pension put 
asset to corporate borrowers unless they are insolvent and corporate debt is senior to 
pension claims8. Moreover, one could also argue that a risky investment strategy in the 
pension plan would increase firm-specific risk by raising the volatility of the fine's 
value under an extended balance sheet. Black (1980) argued that equity investments in 
the pension fund represent a further source of company leverage because stocks tend to 
6 This effect is particularly evident in the presence of a third-party guarantee (e.g. the PBGC): as argued 
by Bodie et al. (1986): in the US companies can shed their liabilities to the PBGC by paying the market 
value of the assets plus 30% of the firm's net worth 
7 However, this assumption is quite controversial because in practice deferred members and pensioners, 
who do not earn wages, lack bargaining power 
8 In the United States this is generally the case 
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behave pro-cyclically, causing pension contributions to rise when companies can least 
afford them. 
Labour contract approaches incorporate the bargaining process between firms 
and employees in the model. Firstly, as argued by studies such as Treynor (1977), 
Bulow (1982), Ippolito (1985) and Pesando (1985), there is an alternative to a pure 
wind-up measure of pension obligation. If companies enter into long-term or lifetime 
contracts with their employees the economic liability arising from a defined benefit 
pension plan should allow for future salary increases, which will be reflected in pension 
benefits given that they are proportional to years of service and wages at retirement9. 
Secondly, as part of the bargaining process between workers (or unions) and 
employers, employees may reclaim rights over surpluses in the pension asset portfolio. 
In the model of Bulow and Scholes (1983), part of the gain on the pension portfolio will 
fmd its way to workers, which effectively mean that only a portion of companies' 
excess pension assets belong to the firm. Bodie (1990) followed this approach by 
including only the employer's fraction of total pension assets in his version of the 
extended corporate balance sheet. 
Finally, there are important institutional factors which can potentially affect 
the size of the economic liability of defined benefit pension plans. Tax rules are 
probably the most significant example, given that in the US (and several other 
countries) contributions made by companies to discharge their pension liabilities are 
tax-deductible, whereas only interest but not principal repayments on other corporate 
debt are given the same preferential tax treatment (Dhaliwal, 1986). Another example is 
the ranking of creditors in the event of insolvency, given that PBGC claims generally 
fall behind senior secured lenders. 
Most empirical studies to test the implications of the "corporate financial perspective" 
have focused on "value transparency" or, in other words, on whether market players or 
the market incorporate pension liabilities in the valuation of firms. Studies such as 
Feldstein and Seligman (1981), Bodie (1985) and Bulow et al. (1985) showed that the 
equity market valuation of firms does take unfunded pension liabilities into account. 
9 In addition to salary increases there are also other elements (in particular minimum vesting rules) which 
make the wind-up liability different from the liability calculated under the assumption that the plan will 
not be terminated and benefits to current workers will be paid at retirement 
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Mittelstaedt and Warshawsky (1993) found that other off-balance sheet obligations, 
retiree health liabilities, affect stock prices. More recently, Jin et al. (2006) showed with 
US data for the period 1993-1998 that CAPM betas reflect risk embedded in companies' 
pension plans while Trivedi and Young (2004) concluded that pension plans' equity 
investments in the UK could affect systemic fmancial stability and aggregate stock 
market volatility. Finally, Yoshida and Horiba (2003) applied a GARCH estimation 
method to the Japanese equity market and found stock prices to respond to the specific 
characteristics of pension plans adopted by Japanese corporations. 
There are also studies that shed some doubts on perfect "value transparency" 
of the stock market. Complex and far from transparent disclosure rules for pensions may 
prevent investors from seeing through the accounting veil. Relevant papers here are 
Coronado and Sharpe (2003), which found that stock prices failed to properly 
incorporate the fair market value of sponsoring firms' net pension assets, and Picconi 
(2004), which argued that the market seems to improperly weight the off-balance sheet 
liability disclosed in the footnotes. If the market pays more attention to accounting than 
economic reality, this could also explain why papers such as Bodie et al. (1986) and 
Thies and Sturrock (1988) showed that companies try to actively manage pension 
assumptions such as the discount rate in order to improve their accounting numbers. 
Another argument is that the market does not pay enough attention to the implications 
of underfunding for future earnings and cash-flows. Franzoni and Marin (2006) found 
that the stock market tends to systematically overvalue firms with severely underfunded 
pension plans and is then caught by systematic negative surprises. 
Fewer studies looked at whether the bond market efficiently processes 
pension-related information. Among those, Martin and Henderson (1983), Maher (1987) 
and Carroll and Niehaus (1998) showed that unfunded pension liabilities affect 
corporate debt ratings. In particular, Carroll and Niehaus fmd support for the argument 
of Bulow and Scholes (1983) because excess pension assets and pension deficits were 
found to be asymmetrically associated with debt ratings with unfunded liabilities 
decreasing ratings more than an equal amount of assets would increase ratings. 
To our knowledge, no previous study has looked at actual bond prices or 
spreads instead of credit ratings. The latter is a significant limitation when it comes to 
drawing more general conclusions on bond market recognition of pension liabilities, 
because rating agencies' opinions do not necessarily correspond to market judgement 
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and also because ratings are categorical variables grouped into buckets, which make it 
impossible to differentiate between firms within a given bucket. 
3.4 Data 
This section reviews the data sources for credit spreads, accounting and market 
data used in the analysis. 
The source for credit spreads is the Merrill Lynch Global Broad Market Index 
(for investment grade bonds) and the Merrill Lynch Global High Yield Index (for below 
investment grades). Index constituents, yields and spreads of US-based issuers were 
downloaded through Bloomberg as of 31/12 of 2001, 2002 and 2003. According to 
Merrill Lynch (2000) methodological note, yields are measured as effective yields by 
stripping out embedded optionality features such as call, put or sinking funds and 
spreads are also option-adjusted to ensure consistency. For securities with no optionality 
features the spread is defined as the basis point shift in the par coupon Government 
curve that produces a discount function that will make the combined present values of 
the bond's individual cash flows equal to the actual price of the bond. Index rules 
include public debt issued in the domestic and Eurobond market and exclude bonds with 
remaining term to maturity lower than or equal to one year and, for dollar-denominated 
securities, bonds with amount outstanding lower than US$150 million. 
Alongside spreads and yields, the Merrill Lynch index constituents' databases 
record the following additional information: bond ticker, coupon rate, maturity date, 
composite ratingl°, currency, four-tier sector classification, type (e.g. whether the bond 
is senior, junior-subordinated etc.), face value, weight as a percentage of the index, 
price, accrued interest, effective duration", total return month-to-date in local currency 
and excess return month-to-date in local currency over comparable government 
securities. 
Historical fmancial data, including equity ticker, market capitalisation at the 
reporting date and items referred to companies' pension plans, are provided by the 
Watson Wyatt Pension Accounting Database and based upon published accounts and 
10K reports. Among pension plan items, the database records projected benefit 
1° This is calculated using an averaging algorithm biased to the lower of S&P and Moody's rating 
11 Effective duration is defined as percentage change in the price of a bond (or the theoretical price in the 
presence of optionalities) given a parallel shift in the par coupon Government curve 
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obligation (PBO), market value of plan assets, balance sheet liability, a detailed 
breakdown of pension cost and actuarial assumptions. The same items are also recorded 
separately for non-pension defmed benefit obligations (e.g. healthcare). For wave 2002 
and 2003 a detailed asset allocation split into five macro categories (equities, fixed 
income, real estate, cash and other) and the percentage of plan assets invested in the 
sponsoring stock are also available12. The accumulated benefit obligation (ABO), which 
calculates the liability on a "quit" basis13, is also available for wave 2002 and 2003, 
albeit not for all companies in the sample. 
There are also two additional sources for fmancials and market data: 
Bloomberg, which provided gross and net corporate debt from published fmancials, as 
well as CUSIP numbers and bond tickers; and Thomson Financial, which supplied data 
on annualised volatility at the reporting date computed over a three-year period. 
The Pension Accounting sample includes companies in the corresponding 
year's Fortune 1000 ranking that operate a defmed benefit pension scheme or healthcare 
benefits programme. Companies featuring in the ranking once are then tracked in the 
subsequent years even if the plan is terminated. For the purpose of this exercise a 3-year 
panel is constructed and companies are assigned to three waves of reporting dates: July 
2001 to June 2002 (wave 2001), July 2002 to June 2003 (wave 2002) and July 2003 to 
June 2004 (wave 2003). In the resulting panel there are 660 companies in wave 2001, 
664 in wave 2002 and 640 in wave 2003. The great majority of companies (between 
75% and 80% of the total) report every year between 27/12 and 03/01. 
The Pension Accounting sample is first matched with corporate debt, CUSIP 
numbers and bond tickers from Bloomberg using equity tickers, then matched with 
volatility data from Thomson Financials using CUSIP numbers. The resulting sample 
will be referred to as the Firm-Level (FL) sample. Meanwhile two bonds samples are 
constructed from Merrill Lynch constituents' databases by filtering out non-US issuers: 
the US Investment Grades Bond (UIGB) sample and US High Yields Bond (UHYB) 
sample. 
12 Disclosure of these items was only required since the publication of the Exposure Draft 1025-200 in 
September 2003, but wave 2002 data could be retrieved because corresponding numbers for the previous 
year are also disclosed 
13 The PBO is calculated using the Projected Unit Credit Method and, unlike the ABO, allows for future 
salary increases 
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Finally, the FL sample is matched with the UIGB and the UHYB samples 
using bond tickers14 to obtain the two data sets used for most of the analysis: an 
investment grade sample and an aggregate sample, which includes both investment 
grades and high yields. In the resulting panel each company is matched with Merrill 
Lynch Index constituents' for the year corresponding to its wave (e.g. wave 2002 is 
matched with 31/12/2002 index constituents). 
Table 3.1 presents an overview of the two samples. Both panels are not fully 
balanced due to changes in either companies included in the Pension Accounting 
database or Merrill Lynch constituents. The investment grade panel is made up of 
between 2,799 and 2,902 bonds (depending on wave of data) of around 350 different 
issuers, while the inclusion of high yields brings the sample to between 3,168 and 3,572 
bonds from between 454 and 500 issuers. The aggregate sample is more unbalanced 
because several companies were included in the high yield index for the first time in 
2002 or 2003. As one would expect, the inclusion of high yields has a sizable impact on 
average spreads, especially in 2002 when high yields lifted up the overall mean from 
1.72% (investment grades only) to 3.28% (aggregate sample). On average spreads 
increased between 2001 and 2002 and then tightened to below 2001 levels between 
2002 and 2003. 
3.5 The Empirical Analysis 
3.5.1 Methodology 
The key objective of the analysis is to test whether pension liabilities are 
priced into spreads on traded corporate bonds included in the Merrill Lynch index. To 
carry out the test an empirical model of credit spreads is constructed using a set of 
predictors consistent with the literature on structural models. Each of our two data sets 
(investment grades and aggregate) are large cross-sections of spreads measured at three 
points in time (year end 2001, 2002 and 2003), which enable us to isolate firm-level 
determinants of spreads without the need to control for macroeconomic and other 
aggregate factors found to be important predictors of the behaviour of spreads over time 
(Dufresne et al., 2001). 
14 Because bond tickers from Bloomberg did not always match up with tickers recorded in the Merrill 
Lynch database a manual checking of unmerged companies was also performed 
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The intuition behind the baseline empirical specification is that credit spreads 
are explained by leverage and firm value volatility consistently with a structural model 
specification. We also include dummy variables for bond duration buckets to account 
for possible credit spread term structure effects and wave dummies to control for 
aggregate factors. Leverage is defined as the ratio of total firmwide obligations to the 
value of the firm or enterprise value, which is proxied by the sum of market 
capitalisation, book value of corporate borrowings and pension liabilities (measured by 
the projected benefit obligation, or PBO). For the purpose of this exercise, which 
attempts to separate pension from other liabilities, firmwide obligations are then split 
into four components: long-term borrowings, short-term borrowings (both from 
Bloomberg) 's , unfunded pension liabilities and funded pension liabilities (both from the 
Watson Wyatt database). Table 3.2 presents our version of the extended balance sheet 
used in the analysis. 
Basic econometric theory suggests that, because the data set is in the form of a 
panel, a standard OLS estimator using three-year averages would not be the most 
efficient solution as it would fail to capture the within dimension of the data (difference 
within individual bonds and firms across time as opposed to difference between 
different bonds and firms). Most common solutions to this problem are either a fixed 
effects or a random effects estimator16; in this context the latter was chosen on the 
grounds that the sample is not exhaustive but rather drawn from the larger population of 
bonds issued by US companies which operate defined pension plans and whose 
corporate debt is (at least partially) traded in the capital markets. However, an 
alternative fixed effects specification is later considered as a robustness test. 
The following random effects panel regression model is fitted to both the 
investment grades and aggregate 3-year panels: 
SPir = p + flipdefu + 132 passet,f + fl 3 levltu + 13 41evsti1 
+ fi,vol„ + I36 dur 2 i, + fl7 dur31, + 138 dur4 ;1 + 139 year2„ (4) 
+ fi lo year3ii + ai + 
15 It was preferred to keep the two separate because empirical work on credit ratings, which are clearly 
linked to spreads, (e.g. Blume, Lim and McKinlay, 1998) found long-term but not short-term debt to be a 
significant predictor 
16 See for instance Wooldridge (2002) for a description of fixed and random effects models 
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where ai is the time-invariant bond-specific residual17, 6,, is the residual component 
uncorrelated with time, sp f, is the option-adjusted spread from the Merrill Lynch 
index of the i-th bond at year t and all explanatory variables are defined in Table 3.3, 
which also reports their predicted signs. 
Bearing in mind the discussion on labour contracts and Carroll and Niehaus 
(1998) results, we could suspect that the market may price asymmetrically excess 
pension assets and pension deficits. Moreover, one might also think that the market 
attach more importance to large deficits because of the potentially high fixed cost of 
extrapolating economic reality out of accounting numbers. We therefore report results 
after separating out companies with overfunded plans in a given year and further 
breaking down underfunded companies using quartiles of the unfunded pension 
liabilities to enterprise value ratio. The downside with this approach is that companies 
may be in different quartiles in different years thus making the partitioned samples more 
unbalanced than the original one. 
We therefore perform an alternative test of asymmetric impact of pension 
deficits by estimating the model using a set of interaction terms between overfunding or 
quartiles dummies and the pension liabilities to enterprise ratio. The new model is 
defmed as follows: 
sP„. p + fl,passet„ + 1321ev1t„ + f331evst„ + Mvol„ + 135 dur2„ 
+fl6 dur3it + f37 dur4 ;,+ fi s year2 1,+ fl 9 year3 ;,+ /310 int 10 	 ( 5 ) 
+flu int 2„ + $12 int 3„ + /313 int 4,, + $14 int 5„ + a, + e„ 
where hitt, —int5„ are interaction terms between pdef and five dummy 
def <0,),  variables defmed as follows: 1) Overfunded plan (p 	2) Underfunded plan, I 
quartile of Pdef ,  distribution (when Pdef,>0), 3) Underfunded plan, II quartile of pdef„ 
distribution (when pdef ,, >0), 4) Underfunded plan, III quartile of pdef a, distribution 
(when pdef ) 5) Underfunded plan, IV quartile of pdef,  distribution (when 
Pdef „>0), 
17 By definition in the random effects model this unobserved component is independent of all the 
observed explanatory variables 
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3.5.2 Results 
Table 3.5 and 3.6 display the results from running GLS random effects models 
(4) and (5) in the two samples and in the sub-samples defined by partitioning the 
pension deficit to enterprise value ratio as described in the previous section. In general, 
the relative size of unfunded pension liabilities turns out to be a significant predictor of 
credit spreads, even controlling for other variables suggested by the theory such as 
corporate leverage and volatility. Apart from a few exceptions in some of the partitioned 
samples, signs also agree with theoretical predictions. The main fmdings can be 
summarised as follows: 
1. From Table 3.5 results in Panel A and Panel B for the two overall samples it 
appears that the relative size of pension deficits is priced by corporate spreads, 
supporting the extended balance sheet hypothesis and consistently with the 
results of credit ratings models such as Carroll and Niehaus (1998). Moreover, in 
both samples estimated coefficients for relative pension deficit exposure are 
more than twice as large in magnitude as coefficients for ordinary leverage, 
which could be a reflection of market perception of additional risk in unfunded 
pension promises compared to more traditional forms of debt. 
2. The unfunded pension leverage effect on credit spreads appears to be 
economically significant. Using sample mean values in Table 3.4 we derive the 
average investment grade and aggregate spread predicted by the model for each 
year, as reported in Table 3.7. For instance in 2002, when the relative size of 
pension deficits was highest (2.48%), the average predicted spread was 1.77% in 
the investment grades sample and 2.78% in the aggregate sample. Keeping 
everything else constant but setting the pension deficit to zero, the model in 
2002 predicts spreads which are respectively 15 and 39 basis points lower, 
implying a 8% decrease in the investment grades sample and a 14% shift in the 
aggregate onels. Conversely in 2003, when the average ratio of pension deficit to 
enterprise value was 1.80%, the model predicts spreads 19 basis points higher in 
the investment grades sample and 33 basis points higher in the aggregate one 
(this is respectively a 20% and a 31% shift) if the relative size of pension deficit 
is set to 5% while everything else stays constant. These numbers suggest that 
18 Discrepancies with values reported in the table are due to rounding 
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cross-sectional variation in spreads driven by pension deficits could potentially 
become very large in the presence of substantial unfunded liabilities. 
3. By partitioning the sample into sub-groups according to relative pension deficit 
exposure it appears that the relationship between spreads and deficits may not be 
a perfectly linear one. In the fourth deficit to enterprise value quartile (deficits 
worth more than 3% of firm value) results are broadly consistent with the 
aggregate picture but with a higher estimated coefficient, whereas in the first 
quartile (very small deficits relative to firm value) estimated coefficients have 
the wrong sign. In the second quartile estimated coefficients are in both samples 
much larger in magnitude and fmally in the third quartile the pattern is different 
in the two samples: the beta estimate is large and positive in the investment 
grades sample whilst it is large and negative in the aggregate sample. Finally, we 
fmd that estimated coefficients for overfunded plans still have the right signs but 
are lower in magnitude, which could be read as an indirect support for the 
Bulow and Scholes (1983) hypothesis given that the market seems to punish 
companies with underfunded plans more than it rewards companies with 
overfunded ones. 
4. Models in Table 3.6 provide a more comprehensive picture of the interaction 
between spread sensitivity and relative size of pension deficit as they are 
estimated on the whole sample by adding five interaction terms to the random 
effects regression model. The results suggest that, whilst overfunded liabilities 
do not improve spreads and very small deficits do not have a meaningful impact, 
larger deficits are priced by corporate spreads. However, there is no obvious 
explanation to why the coefficients associated with Quartile II deficits are in 
both samples larger in magnitude than Quartile III and IV ones19. 
5. There is some evidence that the market does not take only unfunded liabilities 
into account, which is consistent with both Sharpe (1976) and the literature on 
embedded optionalities. Although smaller in magnitude, the coefficient on the 
ratio of funded liabilities to enterprise value in Table 3.5 is positive and 
19 Nevertheless, robustness tests shed some doubts on whether this is a true feature of the data. The model 
was re-estimated using fixed effects (results not shown but available upon request) and the resulting 
coefficients for in 3a , int*, int 5i, were all not statistically different from each other 
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significant in both samples. Consistently with the argument of the previous 
point, the results seem to indicate that the market perceives residual risk even in 
overfunded plans. In the partitioned sub-samples the relative size of funded 
liabilities appears to be positive and significant for overfunded plans and, in the 
aggregate sample, the same is true even for plans with very small deficits 
(Quartile I). 
6. Overall R-square in the investment grade sample is over 45% and just below 
40% in the aggregate sample. In both cases the between R-square is much larger 
than the within R-square confirming that these models have greater predictive 
power of the cross-sectional variation in spreads as opposed to movements of 
spreads over time, for which Dufresne et al. (2001) found aggregate factors to be 
stronger predictors than changes in firm-level fundamentals. Control variables, 
with the exception of short-term debt leverage (consistently with empirical 
models of credit ratings such as Blume, Lim and McKinlay,1998) and duration 
dummies, are significant and signs agree with theoretical predictions. 
3.6 Robustness 
In this section a number of tests are carried out to assess the robustness of the 
findings discussed in the previous section. For convenience these are divided into four 
groups: model specification, measurement of variables, endogeneity and omitted 
variables. 
3.6.1 Model specification 
In the previous section the credit spread model was estimated using GLS 
random effects panel model. To test the robustness of the findings discussed in the 
previous section the model was also estimated with fixed effects and as a conventional 
OLS within each of the three cross-sections of spreads and financials. Results are 
presented in the first four columns of Table 3.8. 
Sign and significance of relative pension deficit exposure is unchanged using 
both fixed effects and OLS, although there is some variation in the magnitude of 
estimated coefficients. The pension asset ratio becomes insignificant with fixed effects 
but is significant in wave 2001 and 2003 with OLS. Overall, the model seems to be 
sufficiently robust to alternative econometric specifications. 
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3.6.2 Measurement of variables 
A further robustness test relates to how predictive variables are measured. One 
of the problems with leverage ratios is the treatment of offsetting assets such as cash on 
the balance sheet or pension assets. As explained in Section 3.5.1, the baseline model 
was estimated using a gross rather than net debt definition to measure corporate 
borrowings and enterprise value. At the same time, the overall pension benefit 
obligation and not just the unfunded component was included alongside debt in the 
enterprise value defmition. 
There are arguments in favour of either a gross or a net debt defmition, both 
for corporate borrowings and the pension fund. Most empirical studies of credit spreads 
and credit ratings (for instance: Dufresne et al., 2001 or, for credit ratings, Amato and 
Furfme, 2004) use a gross debt defmition (i.e. book value of debt over market value of 
assets) but there is no universal consensus, Lardic and Rouzeau (2002), for example, 
take a different view by reclassifying fmancial accounts to obtain a measure of net debt. 
A gross debt definition may overstate true leverage when debt is partially 
offset by cash or liquid assets held in the balance sheet. If a corporation is sold, the 
buyer could buy back debt in the market using cash in the balance sheet and reduce 
leverage accordingly. However, because market value of corporate debt is generally not 
available and is typically proxied with the book value of debt, a net debt defmition may 
not reflect true economic leverage when the market value of debt is either very different 
from the book value or highly uncertain, as in the case of non-traded debt. With pension 
liabilities a further problem with a net debt defmition (liabilities minus assets) is that the 
true buyout cost of liabilities can deviate substantially from the projected benefit 
obligation because liabilities are subject to a high margin of uncertainty and cannot be 
perfectly hedged with market instruments (Sutcliffe, 2005). 
Notwithstanding these caveats, the baseline model was re-estimated using a 
consistent net debt defmition for both corporate borrowings and pension liabilities. 
Going back to the model presented in Table 3.3, enterprise value has been re-defined as 
the sum of market capitalisation, the difference between gross debt2° and the sum of 
cash and marketable securities and filially the difference between pension liabilities and 
20 Including accounts payable and short-term liabilities other than borrowings which were not included in 
the previous definition but are required here because cash can be held against those as well 
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pension assets. Accordingly, short-term leverage ( .levst il ) has also been re-defined in 
net terms and only the ratio of unfunded liabilities to enterprise value is taken into 
account given that liabilities covered by pension assets do not appear in the 
denominator. 
The results are presented in the sixth column of Table 3.8 and, by comparing 
against baseline results in Table 3.5 for the overall samples, it appears that whether debt 
is measured on a gross or net basis does not materially change the results on the 
sensitivity of corporate spreads to the relative size of unfunded pension liabilities. 
3.6.3 Endogeneity: simultaneity between volatility and spreads 
In the original Merton model, credit spreads are a non-linear function of firm 
value volatility and leverage, but from equation (4) equity volatility can itself be written 
as a function of leverage and firm value volatility. One could therefore argue that the 
baseline model may suffer from an endogeneity bias because both spreads and volatility 
are simultaneously determined by the same underlying fundamentals. Nikolaev and van 
Lent (2005) provide an extensive review of all issues surrounding endogeneity and 
suggest possible remedies. 
To mitigate this problem we tried different solutions. As a first step an 
instrumental variables approach was used and volatility was instrumented using its own 
one-year lagged value, which is clearly highly correlated with current volatility and less 
with the one-year ahead spread. Results are presented in the fifth column of Table 3.8. 
Although some coefficients change in magnitude (i.e. the relative size of pension deficit 
goes up from 5.89 to 9.94), which is somewhat predictable given that the new model is 
estimated using only two waves, the core implications discussed in the previous section 
are still robust. 
One shortcoming of the instrumental variable approach is that by using lagged 
volatility, one loses one-third of the data. The model was also re-estimated using a 
three-stage least-square simultaneous equations approach to jointly estimate volatility 
and corporate spreads in function of underlying firm-level fundamentals. 
Table 3.9 sheds light on the interdependence between the stock and the bond 
market, by showing that the same underlying company and pension plan fundamentals 
appear to be significant predictors of both stock price volatility and corporate spreads, 
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as implied by the Merton model. Interestingly, firm level fundamentals seem to be 
better predictors of spreads in the investment grades sample (R- square of 40.02% 
against 24.50% for volatility), but not in the aggregate sample where fundamentals 
account for around 30% of both spreads and volatility sample variation. 
3.6.4 Omitted Variables 
Omitted variables are those variables linked to corporate spreads but not 
captured by the baseline model. If these are uncorrelated with model predictors their 
inclusion would boost the R-square but leave fmdings discussed in Section 3.5.2 
unaffected. Conversely, missing variables correlated with other predictors would cause 
a more serious endogeneity problem (Nikolaev and van Lent, 2005). 
A range of potential missing variables were added to the baseline model in 
Table 3.5 as a further check on the robustness of the fmdings presented in the previous 
section. Each potential missing variable is judged on its own and is separately added to 
the baseline model. Detailed results are not presented here but are available upon 
request. Below is a summary of the key fmdings. 
First of all, additional firm-level variables, in particular proxies for firm 
profitability or interest coverage, seem to have a separate predictive power for credit 
spreads. In Merton's framework the return on corporate assets does not affect credit 
spreads, but with more complex structural models this does not necessarily hold. For 
instance Anderson and Sundaresan (2000) construct a composite leverage measure 
which combines a stock-based (debt to asset ratio) with a flow-based interest burden 
component (interests over profits) and incorporate it within the non-linear functional 
form of the structural model. 
Unfortunately, a direct measure of interest burden was not available in the 
sample but a number of proxies turned out to be significant providing some support for 
more complex structural models. The ratio of earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) to 
market capitalisation (capped to zero) is negative and significant in both samples and a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if EBIT is below 0 is also significant. Other things being 
equal, negative EBIT leads to 0.175% higher spreads in the investment grades and 
1.18% in the aggregate sample.. Average maturity of all bonds outstanding2I turns out to 
21 This is worked out by computing the average maturity of all securities issued by the same company and 
included in the Merrill Lynch index 
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be negative and significant and this can also be interpreted as a proxy for other 
unobservable firm characteristics such as access to capital markets. However, although 
there is some support for the inclusion of additional predictors, sign and order of 
magnitude of corporate leverage, pension leverage and volatility do not change with the 
inclusion of these additional variables. 
Secondly, bond level variables were also introduced in the analysis. In both 
samples issue size (natural logarithm of dollar value of the issue) turned out to be 
negative and significant, while coupon rate was found to be positive and significant. In 
the investment grades sample even the weight in the Merrill Lynch bond index was 
negative and significant. Interpretation of these results is not straightforward. Issue size 
and index weight could be interpreted as proxies for liquidity, which has been found to 
be a predictor of spreads and their movements over time (Dufresne et al, 2001). A 
positive coefficient on coupon rate on the other hand might be interpreted by 
considering a flow-based measure of leverage: a higher coupon rate, other things being 
equal, might add to overall risk by raising the ongoing interest burden. The introduction 
of bond-specific variables does not meaningfully change the coefficients estimated in 
the baseline model. 
Finally, the KMV methodology emphasises (Crosbie and Bohn, 2003) the role 
of sector-specific patterns, which could influence borrowers' ability to repay. To proxy 
for these patterns the baseline model was re-run adding broad sectors dummies first 
(fmancials, industrials and utilities) and narrower industry dummies (12 sectors) later. 
Sectors classifications were taken from the Merrill Lynch Bond Index. Findings 
reported in the previous section are robust to the inclusion of industry dummies in both 
samples. A broad dummy for bonds issued by industrials is positive and significant only 
in the investment grades sample, while in both samples dummies for basic industry, 
energy and insurance were positive and significant and dummies for banking, other 
fmance and capital goods were negative and significant. Banking was also negative and 
significant in the investment grades sample. 
3.7 Extensions 
3.7.1 Do other pension plan fundamentals matter? 
In the baseline specification credit spreads are modelled in function of the size 
of funded and unfunded projected benefit obligations. In this section we test whether 
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other fundamentals of the pension plan have a separate predictive power for credit 
spreads. We focus here on three additional variables: 
1. Asset allocation of the plan. As highlighted in the discussion of Section 3.3, 
there are theoretical reasons to believe the asset mix should enter the predictive 
equation of credit spreads. Although controversial, on balance it appears that 
credit spreads should be positively correlated with the riskiness of the asset mix 
because of the impact on the volatility of the firm value. To proxy for the 
riskiness of the asset mix we used total allocation to equities and allocation to 
company stock as a percentage of total plan asset, both from the Pension 
Accounting database22. As discussed in Section 3.4, the proxy is not available in 
2001 because disclosure was not required. In both samples and waves of data 
average equity allocation was in the range of 60% and company stock exposure 
was on average around 3.5%. 
2. Maturity of pension liabilities. Arguably, keeping aggregate liabilities constant, 
a more mature plan has a more immediate drain on companies' cash flow and 
there is less margin for benefits renegotiation if a high proportion of members 
are pensioners. However, a plan whose liability duration is longer is more 
sensitive to changes in interest rates which, other things being equal, translates 
into a higher volatility of the firm value in an extended balance sheet approach. 
Although the sign of the relationship is ambiguous we test whether there is an 
association between magnitude of spreads and a proxy for liability duration. In 
the absence of a direct measure of duration, we consider two metrics suggested 
by Picconi (2004): the ratio of accumulated benefit obligation or ABO to 
projected benefit obligation or PBO and the ratio of interest cost of pension 
liabilities to the sum of interest and current service cost23. The regressions 
22 In principle one should use an aggregate measure of asset risk over a liability-matched benchmark As 
discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis a 100% bond allocation may not be the minimum risk position for 
active members' liabilities rising in line with wages. Moreover, there are other sources of risk besides 
equity allocation (e.g. currency exposure, concentration of equity portfolios, allocation to risky 
investments other than equities such as hedge funds, property or private equity). However, in the absence 
of a direct measure of asset risk versus liabilities, equity and company stock allocation were deemed to be 
the best available proxies. 
23 Interest cost relates to the fact liabilities are 1-year closer to be settled whilst current service costs 
represents benefits accrued in one additional year of service. Both are component of the net periodic 
pension cost charged to operating income and the breakdown is disclosed in the notes to the accounts 
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employ the first metric, which is a more direct proxy, although it restricts the 
sample to wave 2002 and 2003. 
3. Accounting bias. As explained in Section 3.3 previous studies such as Coronado 
and Sharpe (2003) and Picconi (2004) questioned the value transparency of the 
stock market, which sometimes does not see through the accounting veil of 
pension-related disclosures. We test here whether similar effects are present in 
the bond market. The ratio of pension deficit to enterprise value (as defined in 
Table 3.3) was broken down into two components: a balance sheet deficit and an 
off-balance sheet deficit. Under FAS 87, the US accounting standard for 
pensions, companies can smooth their deficits by recording a balance sheet 
liability driven by cumulative income statement charges net of payments made 
and which is subject to a minimum floor. In the great majority of cases the 
balance sheet liability is lower than the funded status of the plan (or plan deficit). 
Table 3.10 presents an extension of the baseline random effects model of 
credit spreads to allow for asset allocation, liability maturity and accounting bias effects, 
while Table 3.11 replicates the three-stage least-square model of credit spreads and 
volatility presented in Table 3.9 with the inclusion of pension plan asset-mix factors. 
Asset allocation does not seem to be a significant predictive factor for credit 
spreads. Equity allocation is insignificant in both samples using the random effects 
model, while the percentage allocation to company stock is significant at 90% 
confidence level, although, interestingly, the sign is negative. In the three-stage least-
square model of Table 3.11 equity allocation is negative and significant in some of the 
specifications, while company stock exposure is insignificant as a predictor of credit 
spreads but, at least in the investment grades sample, strongly associated with higher 
share price volatility. The latter seems to suggest some kind of market segmentation 
whereby some information filtered by the stock market has not yet been processed by 
the bond market. 
The results for maturity of pension liabilities in Table 3.10 appear to be mixed. 
In the investment grades sample the coefficient is positive, although significant only at 
90% level, while in the aggregate sample the coefficient is negative and strongly 
significant. It appears that a mature plan is negatively correlated with spreads at the 
lower end of the ratings spectrum, perhaps because the market penalises the resulting 
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increase in the volatility of the firm value. However, these results are not robust to the 
choice of the maturity proxy and the coefficient turn out to be insignificant in both 
samples if the pension cost proxy is employed. 
Finally, the results suggest that even the bond market may fail to properly see 
through the accounting veil. Although both balance sheet and off-balance sheet pension 
liabilities appear to be priced by corporate spreads, the coefficient associated with 
balance sheet liabilities is twice as large in both samples24. It appears that the market 
does incorporate all unfunded liabilities in bond spreads but gives a higher weighting to 
liabilities reported on the balance sheet. 
3.7.2 What about other countries? 
All the evidence presented so far refers to the US. We investigate here whether 
the bond market accounts for pension liabilities in the same way in other two major 
countries where defined benefit pension liabilities are significant: the UK and Japan. 
Disclosure of pension information, which used to be widely different across 
countries and thus hampering comparability, has become more homogenous thanks to 
the work of the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) and the 
publication of IAS 19, the accounting standards for employee benefits, which was first 
issued in 1999. 
Notwithstanding this, there are still some differences in pension disclosure 
between the US, UK and Japan. For instance, FRS 17 in the UK has removed the 
distinction between balance sheet and off-balance sheet pension deficits by requiring the 
full deficit to be accounted for, although companies have so far retained the option to 
delay full implementation. 
While the Watson Wyatt data in the US is based on disclosure required under 
the FAS 87 accounting standard, the source for the UK is the disclosures required under 
the FRS 1725 accounting standard and the source for Japan is a database maintained by 
Nikkei which includes disclosure of retirement benefits in line with requirements set out 
24 The difference between the two coefficients is significant at 99% confidence level in both samples 
using a standard Chi-square test of coefficient restrictions 
25 The accounting standard FRS 17, which was issued in November 2000 with the purpose of replacing 
the old SSAP 24, requires a far more extensive disclosure of pension items, including a broadly 
homogenous measure of liabilities, pension assets at straight market value and pension plan asset 
allocation. 
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by the ASBJ26 in April 2000. The UK database includes the constituents of the FTSE 
350 stock index while the Japanese data set includes constituents of the Nikkei 500. 
Consistent with the approach taken in the US, only companies with defined benefit 
pension liabilities were included in the analysis. 
The UK and Japanese data sets were then merged with the Merrill Lynch 
Global Broad Market Index and the Merrill Lynch Global High Yield Index using the 
same methodology of the US data set described in Section 3.3. The resulting UK sample 
included 375 bonds from 86 companies in 2001 rising to 490 bonds from 98 companies 
in 2003, while the Japanese sample is made from 747 bonds from 112 companies in 
2001 rising to 815 bonds from 114 companies in 2003. The UK panel include a handful 
of non-investment grades bonds (16 in 2003), while the Japanese sample has investment 
grades only because there are no bonds issued by Japanese companies in the Merrill 
Lynch Global High Yield Index. 
IAS 19 has insisted that companies should set discount rates with reference to 
market yields (high quality corporate bonds with similar duration)27, which ensure 
comparability of reported numbers and makes it harder for companies to actively 
manage pension assumptions in order to improve their accounting numbers28. In spite of 
the recent accounting standards convergence, the methodology employed to calculate 
pension liabilities is not yet perfectly homogeneous across countries. Less problematic 
is the treatment of pension assets, which is sufficiently close to market value in all of 
the three countries. 
Table 3.12 shows median discount rates and corporate yields in the three 
countries considered in this section. Given that FRS 17 is very prescriptive on the use of 
AA corporate yields, discount rates do not deviate substantially from market yields in 
the UK. US companies have retained more flexibility but, especially in the investment 
grades panel, discount rates have come closer to market yields in 2002 and 2003. On the 
other hand, there is still substantial variation in discount rates across Japanese 
companies: the maximum discount rate in 2003 was still over 300 basis points above 
long-term corporate rates. 
26 Accounting Standards Board of Japan 
27 See IASB (2004) p.982-986 
28 See Bodie et al. (1985) and Thies and Sturrock (1988) 
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With these caveats in mind, Table 3.13 replicates the baseline random effects 
model of credit spreads in the UK and Japanese panel as well as some of the models 
with additional predictors presented in Section 3.7.1. A model with the ratio of 
projected benefit obligation to enterprise value among the predictors, without splitting 
between funded and unfunded liabilities, was also fitted to the data for reasons which 
will become evident in the discussion of UK results. The results can be summarised as 
follows: 
I. Whilst credit spreads are only associated with the relative size of unfunded 
pension liabilities in Japan, the UK bond market seems to worry about the 
relative size of projected benefit obligations and not about scheme deficits. 
When controlling for the relative size of funded obligations, the Pension Deficit 
to Enterprise Value ratio even enters the equation with a negative sign. 
2. The relationship between spreads and pension liabilities seems to be 
economically significant in the UK. The estimated coefficient associated with 
the relative size of pension liabilities is slightly larger than the coefficients 
associated with leverage arising from long-term debt. 
3. The predictive power of the structural model specification used in this chapter is 
very different in the UK and Japan. R-square in the UK approaches 55% while it 
is below 5% in Japan. Further research might address this case of apparent 
market segmentation. One of the reasons for apparent lack of predictive power 
in Japan could be related to the impossibility to distinguish between different 
types of pension plans, each with a different risk profile. Yoshida and Horiba 
(2003) found Japanese stock prices to respond to some of the specific 
characteristics of adopted plans29. 
4. The interrelation between pension liabilities' maturity and credit spreads is 
confirmed as a complex one: in the UK sample the estimated coefficient is 
negative, similarly to the US aggregate sample, while in Japan is positive but not 
significant. It is worth noting that maturity in UK and Japan was proxied using 
the pension cost metric given that ABOs are not disclosed. 
29 For instance in Japan traditional lump-sum severance benefits plans (hikiate) co-exist with explicit 
pension plans (such as tekikaku or kasei) 
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5. In the UK sample, when controlling for the relative size of pension liabilities and 
deficits, the equity share of total assets (on average 63% in the 2003 sample of 
UK companies) has a negative effect, unlike in the US. It appears that, in spite of 
the debate sparked by the decision of the Boots pension scheme in July 2001 to 
switch entirely its pension assets into bonds30, the market does not seem to view 
a conservative asset allocation as a risk-reducing factor for the sponsoring 
company. Unfortunately this exercise could not be replicated in the Japanese 
panel because the asset mix of the pension fund is not disclosed in the accounts. 
6. Whilst the US market seemed to give a higher weighting to pension liabilities 
reported in the balance sheet, off-balance sheet liabilities are more important in 
Japan: the coefficient associated with off-balance sheet liabilities is positive and 
strongly significant, while the relative size of balance sheet liabilities is negative 
and significant at 90% confidence level. This rather puzzling result could 
probably by explained if the split between balance sheet and off-balance sheet 
liabilities is correlated with unobservable characteristics of the plan such as 
those described by Yoshida and Horiba (2003). 
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the link between credit risk and pension liabilities 
using an econometric specification which builds upon structural models of market 
spreads but modifies it to allow for the presence of a defined benefit pension fund. The 
empirical test is carried out using US data for the period 2001-2003 referred to around 
350 investment grade issuers and between 100 and 150 high yield issuers. A similar test 
using UK and Japanese companies is also performed for comparison. 
The chapter provides support for the "extended balance sheet" hypothesis. 
Consistent with previous studies on the stock market or credit ratings, we find that even 
the US corporate bond market takes into account unfunded pension liabilities and the 
sensitivity of spreads to pension liabilities in the baseline specification is twice as large 
as the sensitivity to ordinary long-term debt. This key fmding seems to be sufficiently 
robust to alternative econometric specifications of the baseline model. Moreover, 
estimated coefficients suggest that large unfunded retirement obligations may be 
penalised with significant increases in borrowing costs: for instance in 2002, when 
30 See Ralfe (2001), Alexander (2002) and Sutcliffe (2005) for a discussion 
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deficits were largest, the model estimated with the aggregate sample predicts a 14% 
(equivalent to 39 basis points) decrease in credit spreads if the relative size of pension 
deficit goes from sample mean to zero, while everything else remains at its sample 
mean. 
Secondly, the relationship between pension liabilities and funding does not 
appear to be a monotonic one and therefore a linear regression model can only provide a 
first-order approximation. When the sample is partitioned to separate out overfunded 
plans we fmd that, consistent with the results of Carroll and Niehaus (1998) on credit 
ratings, the market does not seem to reward excess assets as much as it punishes excess 
liabilities. In addition, when underfunded plans are partitioned into quartiles according 
to the magnitude of deficits relative to company size, we fmd some evidence of 
diverging patterns. This suggests that the market, whilst it does seem to take reported 
pension deficits into account, may consider additional factors when it comes to 
incorporating corporate pension funds in a credit risk framework. 
Third, and in connection with the previous point, the bond market seems to 
price pension fund-related factors other than the relative size of unfunded liabilities. 
This could be justified because of the uncertainty over the true economic liability of 
defined benefit plans. Funded liabilities are still priced by spreads as if there were some 
residual risk and liability duration also seems to be taken into account, although the sign 
of the relationship is ambiguous. However, pension plan asset allocation does not seem 
to matter for credit spreads, either because the bond market has not yet incorporated this 
element, which was not disclosed in the accounts before 2003, or perhaps because the 
market does not see much difference in risk exposure across companies. Finally, even 
the bond market does not seem to be immune to accounting bias and appears to give a 
higher weighting to liabilities recognised on the balance sheet as opposed to off-balance 
sheet ones reported in footnotes. 
Finally, some of these patterns seem to apply to other countries as well, 
although some differences emerged in bond market recognition of pension liabilities. 
For instance in the UK the market seems to be worried about gross pension liabilities 
and not deficits, while in Japan off balance sheet liabilities seem to be more important 
than those on the balance sheet. 
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In conclusion, the empirical results in the chapter shed light for the first time 
on the interrelation between corporate bond markets and pension liabilities. Future 
studies could extend this methodology by including companies without pension funds in 
the analysis or investigate the response to other forms of long-term employee benefits 
reserves such as health liabilities in the United States or severance liabilities in countries 
such as Italy or Austria. Future work could also improve the modelling framework by 
including non-linearities in the relationship between yields and leverage or by 
calibrating a theoretical model of credit spreads which includes pension liabilities. 
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3.10 Tables and Figures 
TABLE 3.1 








SAMPLE A: INVESTMENT GRADES PANEL 
2001 
Number of bonds 585 1,192 1,022 0 2,799 
Number of companies 28 154 171 0 353 
Average spread 0.77% 1.34% 2.20% n/a 1.53% 
2002 
Number of bonds 463 1,233 1,079 0 2,775 
Number of companies 24 146 180 0 350 
Average spread 0.85% 1.32% 2.54% n/a 1.72% 
2003 
Number of bonds 454 1,310 1,138 0 2,902 
Number of companies 30 148 172 0 350 
Average spread 0.51% 0.66% 1.26% n/a 0.87% 
SAMPLE B: AGGREGATE PANEL 
2001 
Number of bonds 585 1,192 1,022 369 3,168 
Number of companies 28 154 171 101 454 
Average spread 0.77% 1.34% 2.20% 8.04% 2.29% 
2002 
Number of bonds 463 1,233 1,079 667 3,442 
Number of companies 24 146 180 144 494 
Average spread 0.85% 1.32% 2.54% 9.77% 3.28% 
2003 
Number of bonds 454 1,310 1,138 670 3,572 
Number of companies 30 148 172 150 500 
Average spread 0.51% 0.66% 1.26% 4.49% 1.55% 
Notes: 
1. Spread is option-adjusted spread calculated by Merrill Lynch 
2. Some companies issued both investment grades and high yield bonds, for the 
breakdown by companies these are considered investment grades 
TABLE 3.2 
The Extended Balance Sheet 
ASSETS LIABILITIES & EQUITY 
CORPORATE ASSETS CORPORATE BORROWINGS 
Short-Term borrowings 
Long-Term Borrowings 
PENSION ASSETS PENSION LIABILITIES 
Funded Pension Liabilities 
Unfunded Pension Liabilities 
MARKET VALUE OF EQUITY 
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TABLE 3.3 





passet il  
levltit  
levstit  
V 0 / it 
durlit 
dur2 it  
dur3 it 















Stock Price Volatility (over 
3-years annualised) 
I duration dummy variable 
( up to 3 years) 
II duration dummy variable 
( 3 and up to 5 years) 
III duration dummy variable 
( 5 and up to 10 years) 
IV duration dummy variable 
( over 10 years) 
I wave dummy variable 
(2001) 
II wave dummy variable 
(2002) 















1. The baseline model is: 
SP„ = p + fi l pdef„+ 13 2 passet,+ 13 3 1evlt„ + 13 4 1evst„ 
+13 5 vol0 + 13 6 dur2 0 + 13 7 dur3„+ 13 8 dur4„+ I3 9 year2„ 
+13 10 year3„+ a i + c if  
2. 	SP;, is the option-adjusted spread (in %) from the Merrill Lynch index of the i-th 
bond at year t 
3. Pension Liabilities are measured by the Projected Benefit Obligation 
4. Enterprise Value is equal to: Market Capitalisation + Book Value of Corporate 
Borrowings + Projected Benefit Obligation 
5. d u r 1 i , and yearl, are omitted because of multicollinearity 
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TABLE 3.4 
Corporate Leverage, Pension Leverage and Volatility: summary statistics 
Variable Wave Obs. Mean 10th Percent Median 90th Percent 
SAMPLE A: INVESTMENT GRADES PANEL 
pdef,  „ 
2001 308 0.25% -2.57% 0.31% 2.84% 
2002 322 2.48% 0.04% 1.50% 6.40% 
2003 322 1.80% -0.11% 1.03% 5.02% 
passet „ 
2001 308 10.53% 1.22% 7.41% 23.90% 
2002 322 8.80% 1.15% 6.42% 19.53% 
2003 322 8.93% 1.10% 6.56% 20.73% 
levit„ 
2001 308 22.78% 6.80% 21.51% 40.57% 
2002 322 23.96% 7.09% 21.81% 43.91% 
2003 322 21.14% 5.99% 18.14% 40.24% 
levst „ 
2001 308 8.67% 0.19% 3.62% 24.26% 
2002 322 8.27% 0.14% 3.06% 25.01% 
2003 322 7.37% 0.09% 2.24% 22.04% 
vol „ 
2001 338 37.90% 26.20% 36.10% 53.50% 
2002 345 36.94% 25.50% 35.50% 50.50% 
2003 343 30.14% 19.80% 28.40% 	_ 41.70% 
SAMPLE B: AGGREGATE PANEL 
pdef, 
2001 382 0.58% -2.21% 0.43% 3.49% 
2002 436 3.08% 0.09% 1.96% 7.72% 
2003 451 2.39% -0.06% 1.38% 6.26% 
passetit  
2001 382 11.02% 1.20% 7.41% 26.89% 
2002 436 9.75% 1.01% 6.68% 22.81% 
2003 451 10.11% 1.01% 7.25% 23.54% 
levlt„ 
2001 382 26.26% 7.44% 24.00% 47.47% 
2002 436 29.06% 8.56% 26.71% 54.99% 
2003 451 25.27% 7.82% 22.10% 47.89% 
levst „ 
2001 382 8.03% 0.11% 3.15% 21.61% 
2002 436 7.45% 0.09% 2.94% 18.96% 
2003 451 6.07% 0.05% 1.99% 17.00% 
vote 
2001 419 41.32% 27.30% 37.90% 60.50% 
2002 471 43.20% 26.10% 37.90% 65.40% 
2003 478 36.47% 20.40% 31.35% 61.60% 
Notes: 
1. Statistics computed on the matched firm-level data sets which exclude multiple 
observations (i.e. when there are more than one bond per firm in a given wave) 




Baseline Model: Results 
The following random effects panel regression model was estimated with GLS using the 3-year (2001 to 
2003) investment grades panel and 3-year (2001 to 2003) aggregate panel: 
SP„ = p + Mpdef„+ f3 2 passet„ + fl 3 levIt„+ fl 4 levst„ 
+ fivo1„+ fi 6 dur2„ + fl 7 clur3„+ fl 8 dur4„+ flyear2„ 
+ fl io year 












PANEL A: INVESTMENT GRADES ONLY 
pdef ,, 5.886*** 3.480*** -90.572*** 45.088*** 21.160*** 9.886*** 
(15.566) (4.870) (-5.104) (5.716) (4.951) (7.551) 
passet,, 0.826*** 1.033*** -0.635 -0.553 0.142 0.174 
(5.747) (5.868) (-1.413) (-1.439) (0.323) (0.364) 
levlt,, 2.594*** 2.425*** 1.205*** 2.211*** 1.871*** 3.401*** 
(28.575) (21.685) (7.077) (11.687) (8.449) (9.928) 
levsti, -0.190** -0.323*** -0.743*** 0.600* 3.346*** 2.545*** 
(-2.706) (-3.895) (-9.832) (2.487) (8.699) (3.955) 
vol,t 2.519*** 2.449*** 2.049*** 3.738*** 2.254*** 2.672*** 
(22.429) (14.891) (11.245) (13.120) (7.796) (8.289) 
dur2i, -0.236 -0.308 -0.325 -0.538* 0.113 0.499 
(-1.489) (-1.641) (-1.323) (-2.231) (0.200) (0.889) 
dur31, -0.058 -0.060 -0.134 -0.256 0.286 0.523 
(-0.368) (-0.318) (-0.546) (-1.060) (0.509) (0.933) 
dur4, 0.058 0.111 -0.020 -0.184 0.473 0.482 
(0.366) (0.596) (-0.082) (-0.776) (0.845) (0.864) 
year2il  0.016 -0.130*** 0.126*** -0.363*** 0.109 0.225* 
(0.833) (-4.878) (3.909) (-7.346) (1.683) (2.352) 
year3it  -0.535*** -0.486*** -0.447*** -0.569*** -0.534*** -0.583*** 
(-26.562) (-21.189) (-12.071) (-11.227) (-8.565) (-5.642) 
Intercept -0.056 -0.015 0.751** -0.183 -0.689 -1.285* 
(-0.342) (-0.074) (2.826) (-0.680) (-1.190) (-2.203) 
Overall R- 
Square 
45.9% 49.4% 43.5% 44.7% 36.0% 46.6% 
N 7,639 2,499 1,282 1,296 1,275 1,287 
PANEL B: AGGREGATE 
pdef,  „ 12.518*** 4.163** -318.668*** 105.638*** -45.022** 21.228*** 
(11.782) (2.804) (-9.583) (6.655) (-2.661) (9.290) 
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passet t i 1.799*** 3.097*** 2.501** -1.599 -2.092 1.477 
(4.142) (5.947) (2.841) (-1.648) (-1.495) (1.436) 
levltil 5A53*** 2.106*** 4.642*** 5.686*** 2.601*** 7.090*** 
(19.898) (6.999) (14.104) (13.289) (3.365) (9.850) 
levst,, -0.023 0.344 -1.138*** -0.073 7.336*** 1.401 
(-0.098) (1.228) (-5.329) (-0.128) (4.345) (1.145) 
vol. 6.718*** 1.961*** 6.237*** 3.168*** 11.808*** 7.138*** 
(27.629) (7.712) (19.283) (8.868) (17.653) (12.903) 
dur211 0.577 0.015 0.355 -0.066 2.172 2.056 
(1.039) (0.053) (0.615) (-0.101) (0.957) (1.344) 
dur3,, 0.389 0.223 0.330 0.055 1.929 1.298 
(0.701) (0.818) (0.572) (0.084) (0.850) (0.849) 
dur41, -0.051 0.342 0.291 -0.095 1.077 0.357 
(-0.092) (1.273) (0.507) (-0.147) (0.475) (0.235) 
0.219 year 2u 0.245*** -0.010 0.213*** -0.236* 1.320*** 
(3.876) (-0.215) (3.717) (-2.049) (4.877) 
-0.089 
(0.877) 
-1.017*** year 3, -0.747*** -0.452*** -0.434*** -1.111*** 
(-11.994) (-10.790) (-6.564) (-10.435) (-0.328) (-3.922) 
Intercept -2.457*** -0.174 -1.543** -1.076 -4.340 -4.551** 
(-4.364) (-0.572) (-2.590) (-1.605) (-1.873) (-2.895) 
Overall R- 
Square 37.7% 14.1% 53.8% 40.3% 37.3% 46.9% 
N 9,014 2,620 1,599 1,605 1,660 1,528 
Notes: 
1. T-tests are reported in parenthesis 
2. Variables are defined in Table 3.3 
3. Quartiles of pdef ratio used to partition the sample are: 
I Quartile Median III Quartile 
Investment grades 0.27% 1.21% 3.12% 
Aggregate 0.31% 1.38% 3.36% 
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TABLE 3.6 
Model with breakdown of pension deficit/surplus ratio 
The following random effects panel regression model was estimated with GLS using the 3-year (2001 to 
2003) investment grades panel and 3-year (2001 to 2003) aggregate panel: 
SP„ = p + fl i passet„+ fl 2 levlt„+ 13 3 Ievst„+ 	I3 5 dur2„ 
+ 13,dur3„+ 137 dur4 „ + 13 8 year2„+ fl 9 year3„+ fl o int 1„ 
+fl11 int 2,, + fl i2 int 3 i, + )013 int 4 a , + /3, 4 int 5 + a ,+ g it 
where int 1„- int 5„ are interaction terms between pdef i, and five dummy variables defined as 
de ( pf <o),  follows: 1) Overfunded plan 	2) Underfunded plan, I quartile of pdef,  distribution (when 
pder3), 3) Underfunded plan, II quartile of pdef,  distribution (when pdef  ,, >0), 4) Underfunded 
plan, III quartile of pdef ie distribution (when pdef u>0), 5) Underfunded plan, IV quartile of pdef  
distribution (when pdef ll >0 ), 
PANEL A: INVESTMENT 
GRADES ONLY 
PANEL B: AGGREGATE 
passed, 0.283 0.433 
(1.785) (0.915) 
levlt, 2.628*** 5.455*** 
(28.961) (19.837) 
levst, -0.114 0.032 
(-1.557) (0.133) 
VOL, 2.475*** 6.733*** 
(22.109) (27.680) 
dur2,  -0.222 0.591 
(-1.409) (1.066) 
dur3,  -0.045 0.405 
(-0.283) (0.730) 
dur4,  0.063 -0.048 
(0.401) (-0.088) 
year 2,, 0.014 0.275*** 
(0.735) (4.338) 
year 3,, -0.525*** -0.693*** 
(-25.987) (-11.048) 
int 1,, -0.648 -5.760* 
(-0.756) (-2.040) 
int 2,, -13.346 2.496 
(-0.814) (0.054) 
int 3,, 17.314*** 17.903 
(4.684) (1.906) 
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int 411 7.901*** 16.123*** 
(6.177) (4.608) 
int 5i, 8.436*** 17.492*** 
(17.448) (13.425) 
Intercept -0.094 -2.531*** 
(-0.572) (-4.492) 
Overall R- 
Square 46.2% 38.10% 
N 7,639 9,012 
Notes: 
1. T-tests are reported in parenthesis 
2. Variables other than interaction terms are defined in Table 3.3 
3. Mean of pdef ratio for each interaction variable is : 
int L int 2, int 3„ int 4i, int 5i, 
Investment grades -1.31% 0.11% 0.68% 2.06% 6.04% 
Aggregate -1.32% 0.13% 0.82% 2.35% 7.30% 
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TABLE 3.7 
Baseline Model: Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity analysis is based on baseline model estimated on overall sample (first column of Table 3.5), 
and report predicted spreads given different levels of pension deficit 
2001 2002 2003 
PANEL A: INVESTMENT GRADES ONLY 
Predicted Spread 
Sample Mean 1.63 1.77 0.94 
Predicted Spread 
Pension Deficit 
equal to 0 
1.62 1.63 0.83 
Pension Deficit 
equal to 3.5% of 
Enterprise Value 
1.82 1.83 1.04 
Pension Deficit 
equal to 5% of 
Enterprise Value 
1.91 1.92 1.13 
PANEL B: AGGREGATE 
Predicted Spread 
Sample Mean 1.97 2.78 1.05 
Predicted Spread 
Pension Deficit 
equal to 0 
1.90 2.40 0.75 
Pension Deficit 
equal to 3.5% of 
Enterprise Value 
2.33 2.84 1.19 
Pension Deficit 
equal to 5% of 
Enterprise Value 
2.52 3.02 1.38 
Notes: 
1. Spreads are expressed in percentage (e.g. 1.61 stands for 161 basis points) 
2. All other predictors stay at their sample mean 
3. We assume the effective duration is over 10 years 
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TABLE 3.8 
Baseline Model: Robustness tests 
The baseline model presented in Table 3.5 was re-estimated using 1) Fixed Effects panel regression, 2) 
OLS within each of the three waves of data, 3) Random Effects with instrumental variables (1-year 
lagged volatility as instrument), 4) Random Effects with change in variable measurement (net debt 
instead of gross debt in numerator and denominator of leverage ratios and net pension liabilities in the 





















PANEL A: INVESTMENT GRADES ONLY 
pdef „ 7.008*** 3.039*** 7.565*** 3.624*** 9.944*** 5.119*** 
(10.042) (5.377) (9.795) (10.718) (17.826) (14.636) 
passet. 0.011 0.624*** 0.176 0.773*** 0.332 
(0.019) (3.839) (0.605) (6.870) (1.626) 
kViter 3.228*** 2.636*** 3.964*** 1.284*** 3.349*** 2.485*** 
(13.056) (22.984) (25.257) (18.410) (27.273) (26.232) 
levst„ 3.185*** -0.786*** -0.109 -0.152** 0.221* -0.427*** 
(10.262) (-8.740) (-0.911) (-3.182) (2.542) (-6.114) 
VO/it 0.960*** 3.577*** 4.358*** 1.566*** 0.598** 2.827*** 
(4.952) (20.671) (19.096) (17.919) (3.043) (25.251) 
dur2„ -0.077 -0.340 -0.276 -0.650*** -0.401* -0.223 
(-0.379) (-0.652) (-1.003) (-5.044) (-2.113) (-1.387) 










0.070 dur41r 0.195 
(0.989) (0.055) (-0.506) (-2.058) (-0.388) (0.440) 
year 2a 0.013 (dropped) 0.037 
(-0.684) (1.873) 
year 3„ -0.521*** -0.587*** -0.524*** 
(-19.053) (-27.236) (-25.601) 
Intercept -0.275 -0.265 -0.970*** 0.369** 0.508* -0.025 
(-1.208) (-0.505) (-3.427) (2.825) (2.545) (-0.150) 
Overall R- 
Square 
16.00% 42.78% 46.03% 45.13% 47.23% 44.64% 
N 7,639 2,421 2,501 2,717 4,048 7,558 
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PANEL B: AGGREGATE 
pdef it  20.416*** 8.319*** 11.022*** 16.538*** 20.016*** 10.520*** 
(9.776) (7.227) (5.205) (21.750) (15.515) (10.934) 
passet„ 5.298** 1.229*** 1.076 0.567 0.512 
(2.992) (3.602) (1.180) (1.950) (0.963) 
levlt1, 11.991*** 4.245*** 5.790*** 2.518*** 7.298*** 3.598*** 
(17.332) (17.374) (11.405) (13.536) (21.271) (12.296) 
levsti, 14.054*** -1.191*** -0.938* -0.415** 0.046 -0.940*** 
(14.962) (-5.786) (-2.231) (-3.010) (0.185) (-4.042) 
VOL 3.020*** 7.582*** 13.894*** 2.945*** 3.576*** 7.941*** 
(6.889) (23.139) (28.554) (19.244) (10.403) (33.762) 
dur2,, 1.445* -0.022 0.544 -0.401 -0.112 0.669 
(1.984) (-0.018) (0.533) (-1.013) (-0.178) (1.191) 
durl 1.017 0.015 -0.060 -0.264 -0.093 0.488 
(1.412) (0.012) (-0.059) (-0.666) (-0.149) (0.870) 
dur4i, 0.308 -0.089 -0.891 -0.441 -0.639 0.039 
(0.433) (-0.073) (-0.877) (-1.116) (-1.026) (0.070) 
year 2. -0.229** (dropped) 0.335*** 
(-2.738) (5.270) 
year 3 -0.991*** -0.973*** -0.688*** 
(-11.900) (-11.540) (-10.818) 
Intercept -5.596*** -2.023 -4.598*** -0.291 -0.987 -2.193*** 
(-7.278) (-1.645) (-4.490) (0.733) (-1.565) (-3.866) 
Overall R- 
Square 
13.28% 39.64% 44.91% 43.37% 37.87% 35.91% 
N 9,014 2,669 3,043 3,302 4,842 8,790 
Notes: 
1. T-tests are reported in parenthesis 
2. Variables are defined in Table 3.3 




Three-stage least-square regression of volatility and spread 
The baseline model presented in Table 3.5 was re-estimated as a system of two simultaneous equations 
estimated using three-stage least-squares, where the dependent variables are respectively corporate 
spreads and stock price volatility 
PANEL A: INVESTMENT GRADES ONLY 
Dependent 
Variable SP,, voli, 
pdef „ 8.228*** 1.050*** 
(24.744) (28.931) 
passet, 0.917*** 0.100*** 
(7.854) (7.840) 
levlt,, 3.207*** 0.185*** 
(43.972) (23.241) 
levst,, 0.019 0.110*** 
(0.340) (18.403) 
dur2,,  -0.437** -0.013 
(-2.716) (-0.730) 
dur3,,  -0.197 -0.006 
(-1.223) (-0.363) 
thir4ii -0.116 -0.009 
(-0.720) (-0.492) 
year 2„ -0.078** -0.023*** 
(-3.079) (-8.348) 
year 3„ -0.791*** -0.069*** 
(-32.713) (-26.143) 
Intercept 0.899*** 0.310*** 
(5.539) (17.481) 
R-Square 40.02% 24.51% 
N 7,639 7,639 
PANEL B: AGGREGATE 
Dependent 
Variable SP,, vol,: 
pdef „ 18.888*** 0.872*** 
(20.409) (19.740) 
passet„ 2.239*** 0.168*** 
(6.392) (10.032) 
levlt,, 8.638*** 0.517*** 
(43.455) (54.428) 
kVStit 0.107 0.101*** 
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(0.586) (11.502) 
durl 0.183 0.004 
(0.329) (0.165) 
dur3u 0.167 0.015 
(0.300) (0.559) 
dur4u -0.367 -0.001 
(-0.662) (-0.040) 
year 2u 0.301*** -0.005 
(3.706) (-1.261) 
year 3„ -1.011*** -0.040*** 
(-13.000) (-10.881) 
Intercept -0.477 0.217*** 
(-0.853) (8.134) 
Overall R- 
Square 28.60% 32.29% 
N 9,014 9,014 
Notes: 
1. T-tests are reported in parenthesis 
2. Variables are defined in Table 3.3 
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TABLE 3.10 
Impact of additional pension variables on spread model 
The baseline model presented in Table 3.5 was re-estimated by adding 1) Asset mix split, 2) Maturity of 
pension liability, 3) Split between recognised and off-balance sheet pension deficit 
With equity 
allocation 







PANEL A: INVESTMENT GRADES ONLY 
pdef „ 10.645*** 7.124*** 9.708*** 





passeta 0.519* 0.577** 0.504* 1.902*** 
(2.551) (3.373) (2.311) (10.186) 






levltft 2.722*** 2.330*** 2.776*** 2.592*** 
(23.231) (18.079) (22.281) (28.691) 
kVStit 0.250** 0.097 0.186* -0.159* 
(2.847) (1.102) (2.095) (-2.270) 
vol, 1.412*** 0.748*** 1.387*** 2.497*** 
(9.584) (3.653) (9.189) (22.337) 
dur21, -0.328 -0.781*** -0.257 -0.237 
(-1.713) (-5.378) (-1.315) (-1.507) 
dur311 -0.121 -0.526*** -0.053 -0.064 
(-0.634) (-3.613) (-0.274) (-0.409) 
dur4, -0.051 -0.400** 0.021 0.048 
(-0.270) (-2.767) (0.107) (0.310) 
year 2il 0.540*** 0.427*** 0.538*** 0.074*** 
(28.870) (17.081) (28.890) (3.608) 
year 31, -0.480*** 
(-22.887) 
Intercept -0.319 0.658*** -0.661** -0.088 
(-1.497) (3.567) (-2.625) (-0.542) 
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Overall R-Square 46.64% 49.95% 45.57% 46.57% 
N 4,873 1,962 4,648 7,633 
PANEL B: AGGREGATE 
pdef „ 18.937*** 10.000"* 17.525*** 
(12.147) (3.893) (10.848) 




passet. 0.342 -1.211 1.667* 3.477*** 
(0.518) (-1.304) (2.385) (6.361) 






levltu 5.647*** 4.056*** 6.239*** 5.465*** 
(14.936) (6.336) (15.744) (19.905) 
0.022 levstu 0.319 0.574 0.578 
(1.055) (1.135) (1.883) (0.093) 
VOLt 6.004*** 9.678*** 5.669*** 6.735*** 
(18.403) (17.258) (16.722) (27.658) 
dur2u 0.379 -0.077 0.317 0.572 
(0.514) (-0.090) (0.416) (1.029) 
dur3u 0.260 -0.249 0.157 0.379 
(0.353) (-0.293) (0.207) (0.682) 
dur4u -0.454 -0.611 -0.592 -0.065 
(-0.619) (-0.724) (-0.782) (-0.118) 
year 2u 0.931*** 0.494*** 0.913*** 0.353*** 
(14.086) (4.192) (13.668) (5.313) 
year 3, -0.646*** 
(-9.908) 
-2.536*** Intercept -2.991*** -3.059** 0.353 
(-3.797) (-3.005) (0.380) (-4.504) 
Overall R-Square 35.83% 34.74% 36.00% 38.01% 
N 5,831 2,240 5,611 8,992 
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Notes: 
1. T-tests are reported in parenthesis 
2. R-square is overall R-square for panel regressions 
3. eqtyshi, is defined as follows: Pension Plan Assets in Equities/Total Pension 
Plan Assets 
4. COMStShit  is defined as follows: Pension Plan Assets in Company Stocks/Total 
Pension Plan Assets 
5. pmati, is defined as follows: Accumulated Benefit Obligation (ABO) to Projected 
Benefit Obligation (PBO) 
6. prec is defined as follows: Pension Deficit in Balance Sheet/Enterprise Value 
7. punrec is defined as follows: Off-Balance Sheet Pension Deficit/Enterprise 
Value 
8. Other variables are defined in Table 3.3 
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TABLE 3.11 
Three-stage least-square regression of volatility and spread with asset mix 
The baseline model presented in Table 3.5 was re-estimated as a system of two simultaneous equations 
estimated using three-stage least-squares, where the dependent variables are respectively corporate 
spreads and stock price volatility 
PANEL A: INVESTMENT GRADES ONLY 
With equity allocation only With equity & company stock 
allocation 
Dependent 
Variable SR, VOL, SPit VOL, 
pdef „ 10.565*** 1.245*** 6.888*** 0.295*** 
(24.172) (25.685) (14.088) (5.158) 
passet„ 0.682*** 0.101*** 0.605*** 0.081*** 
(4.155) (5.518) (3.895) (4.466) 
0.004 eqtysh„ -0.187 -0.035*** -0.479*** 
(-1.713) (-2.883) (-3.572) (0.230) 
comstshil 0.145 0.305*** 
(0.375) (6.750) 
levltu 3.217*** 0.239*** 2.702*** 0.247*** 
(35.106) (23.557) (24.990) (19.505) 
levstu 0.304*** 0.139*** -0.024 -0.044*** 
(4.400) (18.161) (-0.299) (-4.646) 
dur2,, -0.559*** -0.027 -0.850*** -0.031 
(-3.155) (-1.376) (-6.289) 
-0.603*** 
(-1.949) 
-0.032* dur3u -0.339 -0.022 
(-1.910) (-1.105) (-4.451) (-2.048) 
dur4,, -0.274 -0.025 -0.477*** -0.035* 
(-1.552) (-1.266) (-3.546) (-2.204) 
year 2,, 0.659*** 0.039*** 0.463*** 0.051*** 
(26.683) (14.396) (18.486) (17.399) 
0.262*** Intercept 0.319 0.258*** 1.007*** 
(1.658) (12.095) (6.153) (13.700) 
R-Square 43.70% 30.99% 49.51% 33.35% 
N 4,873 4,873 1,962 1,962 
PANEL B: AGGREGATE 
With equity allocation only With equity & company stock 
allocation 
Dependent 
Variable SP,, volu SP„ volt, 
pdef „ 24.269*** 1.019*** 15.137*** 0.486*** 
(18.523) (17.007) (6.293) (5.005) 
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Notes: 
1. T-tests are reported in parenthesis 
2. eqtysh is defined as follows: Pension Plan Assets in Equities/Total Pension if 
Plan Assets 
passetit 0.667 0.138*** -1.863* -0.035 
(1.195) (5.398) (-2.173) (-1.020) 
eqtysh„ -0.631 -0.078*** -0.793 -0.101*** 
(-1.717) (-4.626) (-1.042) (-3.298) 
comstsh„ -2.819 0.213* 
(-1.310) (2.446) 
levlt, 9.215*** 0.630*** 10.104*** 0.650*** 
(33.284) (49.791) (20.201) (32.181) 
-0.128*** levst, 0.484 0.126*** -1.058* 
(1.914) (10.863) (-2.279) (-6.839) 
dur211 -0.126 -0.021 -0.594 -0.032 
(-0.185) (-0.668) (-0.728) (-0.965) 
dur31, -0.200 -0.012 -0.715 -0.029 
(-0.292) (-0.374) (-0.875) (-0.873) 
dur4, -0.838 -0.027 -0.962 -0.036 
(-1.230) (-0.852) (-1.185) (-1.101) 
year 2 1.129*** 0.023*** 0.855*** 0.035*** 
(12.978) (5.756) (6.054) (6.069) 
0.292*** Intercept -0.852 0.216*** 0.265 
(-1.173) (6.496) (0.275) (7.516) 
R-Square 28.58% 37.87% 22.38% 39.13% 
N 5,831 5,831 2,240 2,240 
3. COmstshi,  is defined as follows: Pension Plan Assets in Company Stocks/Total 
Pension Plan Assets 
4. Other variables are defined in Table 3.3 
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TABLE 3.12 











AA rate (3 
to 5 years) 
AA rateAA 




SAMPLE A: US INVESTMENT GRADES PANEL 
2001 7.25% 6.00% 8.25% 5.07% 6.31% 6.72% 
2002 6.75% 5.52% 7.50% 3.48% 5.31% 5.87% 
2003 6.23% 5.40% 6.78% 3.57% 5.16% 5.54% 
SAMPLE B: US AGGREGATE PANEL 
2001 7.25% 6.00% 8.00% 5.07% 6.31% 6.72% 
2002 6.75% 5.00% 7.50% 3.48% 5.31% 5.87% 
2003 6.25% 5.30% 7.80% 3.57% 5.16% 5.54% 
SAMPLE C: UK PANEL 
2001 6.00% 5.50% 6.50% 5.71% 5.85% 5.98% 
2002 5.60% 5.15% 6.00% 4.29% 5.17% 5.45% 
2003 5.50% 4.85% 6.00% 4.01% 5.33% 5.38% 
SAMPLE B: JAPANESE PANEL 
2001 2.50% 1.62% 5.25% 0.55% 1.42% 1.61% 
2002 2.50% 0.60% 6.50% 0.31% 0.89% 1.03% 
2003 2.00% 0.65% 4.65%  0.52% 1.35% 1.45% 
Notes: 
1. Median AA rates are calculated within the corresponding sample 
2. Discount rates are those used to calculate pension liabilities and reported in the 
notes to the accounts 
3. When discount rates are reported in ranges the mid point was taken 
257 
TABLE 3.13 
UK and Japan spread models 
The baseline model presented in Table 3.5 and a range of alternative models presented in Table 3.10 were 
re-estimated using data referred to UK and Japanese bonds and companies 
PANEL A: UK 
Baseline With Projected 
Benefit Obligation 
only 
With maturity of 
liabilities 
With asset mix 
pdef il -1.723 -5.497*** -1.621 
(-1.911) (-4.488) (-1.773) 
3.021*** passeta 3.092*** 4.994*** 







levltil 1.986*** 1.906*** 2.400*** 1.968*** 
(7.851) (7.356) (7.807) (7.764) 
levstu -0.226 -0.206 -0.024 -0.229 
(-1.920) (-1.688) (-0.162) (-1.937) 
volil 4.463*** 4.404*** 4.336*** 4A47*** 
(17.532) (16.947) (13.876) (17.294) 
dur211 -0.297 -0.318 -0.507 -0.287 
(-0.797) (-0.845) (-0.585) (-0.767) 
dur31, -0.120 -0.141 -0.317 -0.111 
(-0.322) (-0.376) (-0.615) (-0.298) 
dur411 0.030 -0.005 -0.242 0.038 
(0.081) (-0.013) (-0.472) (0.104) 
year 2u 0.042 -0.100* 0.152 0.028 
(0.779) (-2.291) (0.636) (0.493) 
year 3,, -0.254*** -0.361*** -0.200 -0.270*** 
(-4.885) (-7.639) (-0.843) (-4.816) 
Intercept -0.986* -0.843* -0.312 -0.859* 
(-2.562) (-2.176) (-0.519) (-2.046) 
Overall R-Square 53.90% 51.20% 58.80% 53.90% 
N 1,182 1,182 840 1,179 
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PANEL B: JAPAN 
Baseline With Projected 
Benefit Obligation 
only 




pdef„ 0.605* 0.525 
(2.171) (1.861) 










levltif -0.136 -0.100 -0.188 -0.066 
(-1.087) (-0.809) (-1.461) (-0.551) 
levstil 0.451*** 0.445*** 0.469*** 0.472*** 
(4.413) (4.630) (4.571) (5.036) 
VOL 0.367** 0.386** 0.306* 0.424*** 
(2.870) (3.034) (2.328) (3.322) 
dur2it 0.162 0.154 0.168 0.149 
(1.324) (1.267) (1.377) (1.214) 
dura, 0.273* 0.267* 0.276* 0.263* 
(2.274) (2.228) (2.302) (2.186) 
dur4i, 0.270* 0.263* 0.272* 0.268* 
(2.299) (2.244) (2.318) (2.274) 
year 2. -0.030 -0.020 -0.022 -0.030 
(-1.810) (-1.242) (-1.258) (-1.810) 
year 3„ 0.018 0.013 0.030 0.044* 
(0.958) (0.706) (1.486) (2.159) 
Intercept -0.160 -0.179 -0.267 -0.220 
(-1.074) (-1.205) (-1.669) (-1.505) 
Overall R-Square 4.00% 4.33% 3.48% 5.61% 
N 2,199 2,222 2,199 2,173 
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Notes: 
1. T-tests are reported in parenthesis 
2. R-square is overall R-square for panel regressions 
3. pbokvif  is defined as follows: Project Benefit Obligation (=Aggregate Pension 
Liabilities)/Enterprise Value 
4. eqtysh is defined as follows: Pension Plan Assets in Equities/Total Pension 
Plan Assets 
5. pmati, is defined as follows: Interest Cost/(Current Service Cost+Interest Cost) 
6. prec, is defined as follows: Pension Deficit in Balance Sheet/Enterprise Value 
7. punrec1  is defined as follows: Off-Balance Sheet Pension Deficit/Enterprise 
Value 
8. Other variables are defined in Table 3.3 
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Conclusion 
The thesis presents three new applications of empirical fmancial economics to 
pension issues. In particular, the thesis explores the interrelationships between fmancial 
markets, asset allocation choices and both corporate and individual pension policy. 
Although there is much economic literature on pensions, the empirical finance 
component of this literature is sparse, particularly in critical areas such as risk 
management for individual pension investors, long-run relationships between pension 
funds' assets and liabilities and the bond market's perception of corporate pension 
policy. The thesis makes new contributions in all of these three areas. 
The first essay presents a case study on Chile of long-run risk management for 
individual investors in the context of a privatised pension system and a mixed system 
where a "social security" asset can be combined with mainstream financial assets. The 
analysis highlighted the cost of international investment restrictions and the 
diversification benefits of including social security in the menu of assets. 
Whilst the debate on pension reform on Chile has often focused on the 
ideological divide between State provision and privatised systems, it has failed to look 
at the counterfactual case as to what would have happened if Chile had a well-managed 
unfunded system. In perfect markets, funded and unfunded pensions are equivalent but 
markets are often imperfect and there can be differential returns. In this essay we show 
for the first time that Chile could have been better off with an unfunded system or 
certainly with a partially funded system than it has been with the funded accounts 
introduced in 1981. Core implication of the analysis is that pension reforms should 
focus on extending the menu of assets available to investors to enable them to fully 
achieve financial efficiency. 
In the second essay, the thesis presents for the first time substantive UK evidence 
of a long-run cointegrating relationship between aggregate wages and the price of 
financial assets, including equities, but also showed that no fmancial asset is a perfect 
hedge for wages on a period-by-period basis. 
This has wide-ranging implications for pension funds whose liabilities are, at 
least in part, dependent upon the growth of active members' wages. If there are no 
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perfect hedging opportunities in the market, the optimal strategy from the point of view 
of pension funds' risk management appears to be investing assets held against salary-
linked liabilities in a diversified portfolio with a substantial equity component, whilst 
accepting that there will be some residual risk in the short-term. The implications of 
long-run correlation between aggregate wages and fmancial assets are by no means 
confined to corporate fmal salary plans and could also be applied to individual 
retirement planning and the asset management of reserve funds to partially fund State 
pension wage-linked liabilities. 
The third essay shows empirically that companies' cost of debt capital was 
influenced by the relative size of their defined benefit retirement obligations. Whilst 
bond market pricing is not always perfect, especially when rather complex assumptions 
are needed (e.g. pension asset mix) or when disclosure standards are not fully 
transparent (e.g. off-balance sheet liabilities), there is robust evidence that pension 
liabilities are not ignored by the market assessment of overall creditworthiness. 
The key implication is that companies should manage pension liabilities in the 
context of firm-wide fmancial strategy. While these implications have previously been 
drawn out using data from equity markets, this essay makes a substantive contribution 
to the literature by doing the same in the more natural context of bond markets. In this 
context, some companies may still be able to afford defmed benefit or other forms of 
guaranteed pensions if this gives them a competitive advantage in the labour market, but 
the affordability of such choices will depend on the leverage of their underlying 
operating business and on their capital structure. However, this also implies that, unless 
a multi-employer framework with cross-subsidies and government intervention is 
established, a second pillar hinging upon corporate defmed benefit schemes will not 
achieve universal coverage of labour force. 
To summarise, this thesis breaks important new ground in three areas: pension 
financing, investment restrictions and individual risk management; cointegration, asset 
allocation and pension liabilities; and the link between bond markets and corporate 
pension policy. More fundamentally, empirical research on pension finance issues has 
been sparse, in some cases because of lack of decent data. As shown in the thesis, this is 
now changing and the field of empirical pensions fmance has significant possibilities 
going forward. 
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